11 matches found
Meta_SecAlign
Meta SecAlign: A Secure Foundation LLM Against Prompt Injection Attacks Sizhe Chen, Arman Zharmagambetov, David Wagner, Chuan Guo for equal technical contributions 🔥 Meta-SecAlign models are now licensed for commercial use under the Llama community licenses, despite this codebase being licensed f...
agentic-dm-gateway
Agentic DM Gateway Security control plane for LLM agents over private chat typically Discord DMs. It sits in front of your agent. It decides who may talk, whether the session is unlocked, whether the process is paused, and whether this message is safe enough to forward. Your model and tools stay...
PYSEC-2026-4248 PraisonAI: Prompt-injection defense blocks only when 3+ detector families fire simultaneously; realistic single-vector injections pass through unblocked
Summary PraisonAI's opt-in prompt-injection defense enableinjectiondefense only blocks at ThreatLevel.CRITICAL, which requires three or more distinct detector families to match simultaneously. A realistic single- or double-vector prompt injection e.g. "Ignore all previous instructions…" is...
PraisonAI: Prompt-injection defense blocks only when 3+ detector families fire simultaneously; realistic single-vector injections pass through unblocked
SummaryPraisonAI's opt-in prompt-injection defense enableinjectiondefense only blocks at ThreatLevel.CRITICAL, which requires three or more distinct detector families to match simultaneously. A realistic single- or double-vector prompt injection e.g. "Ignore all previous instructions…" is...
PraisonAI: Prompt Injection Defense Bypassed for HIGH-Level Threats
SummaryInjection Defense is a purpose-built prompt injection defense layer. It scans LLM inputs through six detection categories: instruction overrides, authority claims, boundary manipulation, obfuscation, financial manipulation, and self-harm instructions.The defense is misconfigured by default...
GHSA-4R3P-W3MC-5V34 PraisonAI: Prompt-injection defense blocks only when 3+ detector families fire simultaneously; realistic single-vector injections pass through unblocked
Summary PraisonAI's opt-in prompt-injection defense enableinjectiondefense only blocks at ThreatLevel.CRITICAL, which requires three or more distinct detector families to match simultaneously. A realistic single- or double-vector prompt injection e.g. "Ignore all previous instructions…" is...
agent-vault-proxy v0.9.0
keys-on-the-wire Just-in-time API keys for AI agents and any other process you route through it: the caller only ever sees a placeholder. Formerlyagent-vault-proxy. The CLI is now kow; the old avp command still works this release and is removed in the next major ADR-0045. Keys on the Wire protect...
Insecure Default Initialization of Resource
Overview PraisonAI is a PraisonAI is an AI Agents Framework with Self Reflection. PraisonAI application combines PraisonAI Agents, AutoGen, and CrewAI into a low-code solution for building and managing multi-agent LLM systems, focusing on simplicity, customisation, and efficient human-agent...
Automating Cloud Security and Forensics through a Secure-By-Design Generative AI Framework
As cloud environments become increasingly complex, cybersecurity and forensic investigations must evolve to meet emerging threats. Large Language Models LLMs have shown promise in automating log analysis and reasoning tasks, yet they remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks and lack forensic...
Agent Privilege Separation in OpenClaw: A Structural Defense against Prompt Injection
Prompt injection remains one of the most practical attack vectors against LLM-integrated applications. We replicate the Microsoft LLMail-Inject benchmark Greshake et al., 2024 against current generation models running inside OpenClaw, an open source multitool agent platform. Our proposed defense...
Optimizing Agent Planning for Security and Autonomy
Indirect prompt injection attacks threaten AI agents that execute consequential actions, motivating deterministic system-level defenses. Such defenses can provably block unsafe actions by enforcing confidentiality and integrity policies, but currently appear costly: they reduce task completion...