CISA, NSA, and NIST Publish Factsheet on Quantum Readiness

Today, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency CISA, National Security Agency NSA and National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST released a joint factsheet, Quantum-Readiness: Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography PQC, to inform organizations—especially those that support...

You Can’t Rush Post-Quantum-Computing Cryptography Standards

I just read an article complaining that NIST is taking too long in finalizing its post-quantum-computing cryptography standards. This process has been going on since 2016, and since that time there has been a huge increase in quantum technology and an equally large increase in quantum understandi...

NIST Draft Document on Post-Quantum Cryptography Guidance

NIST has released a draft of Special Publication1800-38A: "Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography: Preparation for Considering the Implementation and Adoption of Quantum Safe Cryptography." Its only four pages long, and it doesnt have a lot of detail--more "volumes" are coming, with more...

Akamai and the Adoption of Post-Quantum Cryptography

...

Improve Post-Quantum Cryptography Security with CSPM

Gain valuable insight into the emerging world of post-quantum computing and how a security posture management CSPM can bolster your post quantum cryptography defenses...

Experts Discover Flaw in U.S. Govt's Chosen Quantum-Resistant Encryption Algorithm

A group of researchers has revealed what it says is a vulnerability in a specific implementation of CRYSTALS-Kyber, one of the encryption algorithms chosen by the U.S. government as quantum-resistant last year. The exploit relates to "side-channel attacks on up to the fifth-order masked...

Side-Channel Attack against CRYSTALS-Kyber

CRYSTALS-Kyber is one of the public-key algorithms currently recommended by NIST as part of its post-quantum cryptography standardization process. Researchers have just published a side-channel attack--using power consumption--against an implementation of the algorithm that was supposed to be...

CVE-2023-24025

CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM in Post-Quantum Cryptography Selected Algorithms 2022 in PQClean d03da30 may allow universal forgeries of digital signatures via a template side-channel attack because of intermediate data leakage of one vector...

Design/Logic Flaw

CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM in Post-Quantum Cryptography Selected Algorithms 2022 in PQClean d03da30 may allow universal forgeries of digital signatures via a template side-channel attack because of intermediate data leakage of one vector...

CVE-2023-24025

CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM in Post-Quantum Cryptography Selected Algorithms 2022 in PQClean d03da30 may allow universal forgeries of digital signatures via a template side-channel attack because of intermediate data leakage of one vector...

Improve Post-Quantum Cryptography Security with CSPM

Gain valuable insight into the emerging world of post-quantum computing. Understand the threats attackers with access to quantum computers pose. Learn how harnessing the power of cloud security posture management CSPM can mitigate these looming dangers...

Preparing Critical Infrastructure for Post-Quantum Cryptography

CISA has released CISA Insights: Preparing Critical Infrastructure for Post-Quantum Cryptography, which outlines the actions that critical infrastructure stakeholders should take now to prepare for their future migration to the post-quantum cryptographic standard that the National Institute of...

oqs's Post-Quantum Signature scheme Rainbow level I parametersets broken

Ward Beullens found a practical key-recovery attack against Rainbow. The level I parametersets are removed from liboqs starting from version 0.7.2. Find the scientific details in Breaking Rainbow Takes a Weekend on a Laptop. This means all the oqs::sig::Algorithm::RainbowI variants are insecure...

oqs's Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanism SIKE broken

Wouter Castryck and Thomas Decru presented an efficient key recovery attack on the SIDH protocol. As a result, the secret key of SIKEp751 can be recovered in a matter of hours. The SIKE and SIDH schemes will be removed from oqs 0.7.2. An efficient key recovery attack on SIDH preliminary version...

GHSA-HRJV-PF36-JPMR oqs's Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanism SIKE broken

Wouter Castryck and Thomas Decru presented an efficient key recovery attack on the SIDH protocol. As a result, the secret key of SIKEp751 can be recovered in a matter of hours. The SIKE and SIDH schemes will be removed from oqs 0.7.2. An efficient key recovery attack on SIDH preliminary version...

Single-Core CPU Cracked Post-Quantum Encryption Candidate Algorithm in Just an Hour

A late-stage candidate encryption algorithm that was meant to withstand decryption by powerful quantum computers in the future has been trivially cracked by using a computer running Intel Xeon CPU in an hour's time. The algorithm in question is SIKE — short for Supersingular Isogeny Key...

A New Attack Easily Knocked Out a Potential Encryption Algorithm

SIKE was a contender for post-quantum-computing encryption. It took researchers an hour and a single PC to break it...

RUSTSEC-2022-0045 Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanism SIKE broken

Wouter Castryck and Thomas Decru presented an efficient key recovery attack on the SIDH protocol. As a result, the secret key of SIKEp751 can be recovered in a matter of hours. The SIKE and SIDH schemes will be removed from oqs 0.7.2. The affected schemes are the oqs::kem::Algorithm::Sike and...

Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanism SIKE broken

Wouter Castryck and Thomas Decru presented an efficient key recovery attack on the SIDH protocol. As a result, the secret key of SIKEp751 can be recovered in a matter of hours. The SIKE and SIDH schemes will be removed from oqs 0.7.2. The affected schemes are the oqs::kem::Algorithm::Sike and...

KEMs and Post-Quantum age

Theyre here! NIST selected a first batch of post-quantum cryptographic key exchange and signature algorithms. The report is a nice read that explains a lot of the goals, candidates, selections, and rationales. I recommend Sections 2, 3.3, and 4.1. For key exchange, NIST selected only...