CVE-2026-46654

Plonky3 is a toolkit for polynomial IOPs PIOPs. Prior to versions 0.4.3 and 0.5.3, an attacker controlling prover-side observations can craft distinct transcripts that produce identical challenges, breaking the binding property of Fiat-Shamir. This issue has been patched in versions 0.4.3 and 0.5...

CVE-2026-46654

The CVE-2026-46654 issue affects Plonky3’s MultiField32Challenger in the prover transcript handling, where transcript malleability allows an attacker controlling prover-side observations to craft transcripts that yield identical challenges, breaking Fiat-Shamir binding. Root cause: a mismatch bet...

CVE-2026-46654 Plonky3 MultiField32Challenger: transcript malleability and challenge entropy loss

Plonky3 is a toolkit for polynomial IOPs PIOPs. Prior to versions 0.4.3 and 0.5.3, an attacker controlling prover-side observations can craft distinct transcripts that produce identical challenges, breaking the binding property of Fiat-Shamir. This issue has been patched in versions 0.4.3 and 0.5...

Plonky3 data falsification vulnerability

Plonky3 is an open-source implementation of the Polynomial IOP cryptographic primitive toolkit by Plonky3 developers. Versions of Plonky3 prior to 0.4.3 and 0.5.3 contained a data forgery vulnerability. This vulnerability allowed attackers to control the observations made by the prover, resulting...

CVE-2026-46654: Use of a Cryptographic Primitive with a Risky Implementation

Plonky3 is a toolkit for polynomial IOPs PIOPs. Prior to versions 0.4.3 and 0.5.3, an attacker controlling prover-side observations can craft distinct transcripts that produce identical challenges, breaking the binding property of Fiat-Shamir. This issue has been patched in versions 0.4.3 and 0.5...

GHSA-VJ64-RJF3-W3V7 Plonky3 MultiField32Challenger: transcript malleability and challenge entropy loss

Impact - Key: challenger/src/multifieldchallenger.rs | MultiField32Challenger::duplexing | transcriptmalleability - Affected files: challenger/src/multifieldchallenger.rs, field/src/helpers.rs - Violated invariant: The Fiat-Shamir sponge must bind challenges to the exact sequence of observed fiel...

Plonky3: The sponge construction used to get a hash function from a cryptographic permutation is not collision resistant for inputs of different lengths

Vulnerability Currently, when hashing, if the number of elements to hash is not a multiple of the rate, hashiter pads by elements of the current state. This means that it is possible to create iterators of different lengths which lead to an identical hashed state. Given a simple example using a...