PT-2026-38619

Zebra's block validator undercounts transparent signature operations against the 20000-sigop block limit MAX BLOCK SIGOPS, allowing it to accept blocks that zcashd rejects with bad-blk-sigops. A miner who produces such a block can split the network: Zebra nodes follow the offending chain while...

PT-2026-25113

Overview P2PKH has 20 bytes just like P2SH. We protect against revealing P2PKH deposits by manually assembling the expected P2SH script in the smart contract and comparing hashes. However, we missed the case when the attacker embeds a valid P2SH inside of P2PKH as an output script. bitcoin-spv...

Undefined Behavior in zencashjs

Versions of zencashjs prior to 1.2.0 may cause loss of funds when used with cryptocurrency wallets. The package relies on a string comparison of the first two characters of a Horizen address to determine the destination address type of a transaction P2PKH or P2SH. Due to the base58 address prefix...

PT-2020-21589

Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions zencashjs versions prior to 1.2.0 Description The issue affects the handling of cryptocurrency transactions, specifically with Horizen addresses. It relies on string comparison of the first two characters of an address to determine the...

Insecure String Comparison

zencashjs uses an insecure string comparison. This is due to a clash of address prefixes for testnet P2PKH and mainnet P2SH addresses. The package interprets transactions sent to a zt P2SH address on mainnet as P2PKH transactions erroneously. Any funds sent to a mainnet P2SH multisignature addres...