Centralization privileges could cause revenue loss or DDoS

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact DISCLAIMER: I understand that this was under known issues M-1, and I'm submitting this on another angle which is in case owner is compromised. Namespace and Tray contract allow the owner to execute some privilege actions which give flexibility but at the...

CAN-2023-1000000 CWE in iPhone version 1.0

In Apple iPhone version 1.0 a CWE exists in the Security Legacy enclave that can be attacked via Local access resulting in Transfer digital ownership legacy...

Unsafe Storage Layout

Lines of code Vulnerability details Potentially lead to storage collision and cause the account to be re-initialized or have ownership transferred. Use upgradeable DiamondStorage for all inherited contracts. --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Pending owner can front-run current owner when current owner wants to cancel the ownership transfer.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact OwnableUpgradable contract has been modified to transfer ownership in a two-step ownership transfer way. This introduces an issue of front-run when admin adds a pendingOwner but later on decides to cancel the ownership transfer. Pending owner can become...

Single-step process for critical ownership transfer/renounce is risky

Lines of code Vulnerability details Single-step process for critical ownership transfer/renounce is risky Impact The following contracts and functions, allow owners to interact with core functions such as: execute, rawExecute and setApproval in OwnableSmartWallet registerKnotsToSyndicate,...

No access control for function deployDeletateFor

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. There is no access control for the deployDelegateFor function, so anyone can call this function and initialize all the parameters for a project. Moreover, the caller can also transfer the owner to a...

The contract can transfer Ownership to the zero address.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When we use transferOwnership or safeTransferOwnership to transfer contract ownership, there is the possibility of transferring ownership to the zero address. This will cause the owner to lose its ownership permanently. Proof of Concept In Ownable.sol...

Inadequate transferOwnership function prevents new owner from accessing funds

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description There are two sources of truth for identifying the account that owns a given MIMOProxy: 1. MIMOProxy.owner 2. MIMOProxyRegistry.getCurrentProxyaddress The first source of truth is only used within the proxy contract itself, and the second source of...

Registry not updated when proxy ownership is transferred

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When the ownership of a MIMOProxy instance is transferred using the transferOwnership function, the MIMOProxyRegistry contract is not updated, although it is the main entry point of all the workflows, as described in the README.md file. Even after the...

Old owner can still set automation / management for vaults after ownership transfer

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When the ownership of a user proxy is transferred, proxyRegistry.getCurrentProxy does not reflect this and still returns the proxy for the previous owner. This can be exploited in the access check of setAutomation. Because setManagement has the same chec...

Ownership transfer not correctly handled for flash loans

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In response to a flashloan, proxyRegistry.getCurrentProxyowner is used to retrieve the correct user proxy and check that this proxy has initiated the flash loan. This can be problematic after ownership transfers of the proxy, where...

Multiple auction can run on same vault - Collateral loss

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Due to insufficient checks, it is possible to run 2 auctions at same time. This can lead to loss of collateral for this vault as collateral quantity placed for auction will double Proof of Concept 1. User starts auction on vault id 1 which transfer...

oldToken.transferOwnership() to contract may be irreversible

Lines of code Vulnerability details oldToken.transferOwnership to contract may be irreversible Proof of Concept JBTokenStore.sol 265-266: if newOwner != address0 && oldToken != IJBTokenaddress0 oldToken.transferOwnershipprojectId, newOwner; OpenZeppelin library Ownerable.sol: function...

Lack of Two-Step Process for Critical Operations

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact This function transfers/renounce the ownership of the contract in a single step. There is no way to reverse a one-step transfer of ownership to an address without an owner. This would not be the case if ownership were transferred through a two-step proce...

Threat Spotlight: "Haskers Gang" Introduces New ZingoStealer

Update 04/14/22: Following the initial publication of this blog, we observed a new post in the Haskers Gang Telegram channel announcing that ownership of the ZingoStealer project is being transferred to a new threat actor. We also observed the malware author offering to sell the source code for...

setMinter() in vcon.sol missing important checks can lead to loss of minting ability

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The setMinter function in Vcon.sol lacks both zero address checks and a proper ownership transfer pattern. I am submitting this as a medium-severity issue separate from similar low-severity instances due to this example's effect on the entire protocol. I...

Ownership of Swap.vy cannot be transferred

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Ownership transfer function of Swap.vy is commented out. Fund can be stuck if an AMM and governance change/upgrade is required. Proof of Concept --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Users could lose funds if owner took out reward which is not multiplier of allocatedTokensPerEpoch

Handle xYrYuYx Vulnerability details Impact User could lost funds if owner take reward which is not multiplier of allocatedTokensPerEpoch. Proof of Concept This is my test case to proof this issue. This issue occur because of Line 104 Ex. If allocatedTokensPerEpoch is 1 CQT. and now available epo...

Single-step process for critical admin transfer is risky

Handle 0xRajeev Vulnerability details Impact LongShort and Staker contracts have the notion of an “admin” address that is used within onlyAdmin or adminOnly modifiers for granting authorization to critical functions. Such contracts use a single-step ownership transfer of such admin addresses usin...

Single-step process for critical ownership transfer/renounce is risky

Handle 0xRajeev Vulnerability details Impact The SwappableYieldSource allows owners and asset managers to set/swap/transfer yield sources/funds. As such, the contract ownership plays a critical role in the protocol. Given that AssetManager is derived from Ownable, the ownership management of this...