9073 matches found
PT-2026-26397
Summary On macOS node-host, optional exec-approval allowlist mode previously treated basename-only entries for example echo as trusted command matches. This could allow a same-name local binary for example ./echo to run without approval under security=allowlist + ask=on-miss. Scope / Precondition...
PT-2026-26405
Summary OpenClaw avatar handling allowed a symlink traversal path that could expose local files outside an agent workspace through gateway avatar surfaces. Affected Packages / Versions - Package: openclaw npm - Affected versions: = 2026.2.22 so after npm release, the remaining action is to publis...
PT-2026-26228
Summary In [email protected], node system.run approval-path hardening rewrote wrapper command argv in a way that changed execution semantics. A command shown/approved as a shell payload for example echo SAFE could execute a different local script when wrapper argv were rewritten. Affected Package...
PT-2026-26414
A workspace-only file-system guard mismatch allowed @-prefixed absolute paths to bypass boundary validation in some tool path checks. Impact When tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, certain @-prefixed absolute paths for example @/etc/passwd could be validated before canonicalization while runtime path...
PT-2026-26416
Summary In [email protected], the Discord voice transcript path called agentCommand... without senderIsOwner, and agentCommand defaults missing senderIsOwner to true. This could allow a non-owner voice participant in the same channel to reach owner-only tool surfaces gateway, cron during voice...
PT-2026-26235
Summary On Windows, the Lobster extension previously retried certain spawn failures ENOENT/EINVAL with shell: true for wrapper compatibility. In that fallback path, tool-provided arguments could be interpreted by cmd.exe if fallback was triggered. Affected Packages / Versions - Package: openclaw...
PT-2026-26011
Summary A path-confinement bypass in browser output handling allowed writes outside intended roots in openclaw versions up to and including 2026.3.1. The fix unifies root-bound, file-descriptor-verified write semantics and canonical path-boundary validation across browser output and related...
PT-2026-24673
Summary A command injection vulnerability exists in OpenClaw’s Linux systemd unit generation path. When rendering Environment= entries, attacker-controlled values are not rejected for CR/LF, and systemdEscapeArg uses an incorrect whitespace-matching regex. This allows newline injection to break o...
PT-2026-26017
Summary In openclaw up to and including 2026.2.23 latest npm release as of February 24, 2026, sandbox bind-source validation could be bypassed when a bind source used a symlinked parent plus a non-existent leaf path. Affected Packages / Versions - Package: openclaw npm - Affected: = 2026.2.24...
PT-2026-26407
Summary Sandbox media local-path validation accepted absolute paths under host tmp, even when those paths were outside the active sandbox root. Affected Packages / Versions - Package: openclaw npm - Latest published version verified during triage: 2026.2.23 - Affected versions: = 2026.2.24 Detail...
PT-2026-26417
Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.26 Description The OpenClaw gateway plugin contains a path traversal issue that allows remote attackers to bypass route authentication checks. This is achieved by manipulating the /api/channels paths with...
PT-2026-26404
Summary A wrapper-depth parsing mismatch in system.run allowed nested transparent dispatch wrappers for example repeated /usr/bin/env to suppress shell-wrapper detection while still matching allowlist resolution. In security=allowlist + ask=on-miss, this could bypass the expected approval prompt...
PT-2026-26008
Summary OpenClaw allowed dangerous process-control environment variables from env.vars for example NODE OPTIONS, LD , DYLD to flow into gateway service runtime environments, enabling startup-time code execution in the OpenClaw process context. Details collectConfigEnvVars accepted unfiltered keys...
PT-2026-26225
Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.22 Description The software contains an allowlist bypass issue in the system.run function. This allows attackers to execute commands not included in the allowlist by utilizing shell line-continuation character...
PT-2026-26406
This issue is a browser-origin WebSocket auth chain on local loopback deployments using password auth. It is serious, but conditional: an attacker must get the user to open a malicious page and then successfully guess the gateway password. Context and Preconditions OpenClaw’s web/gateway surface ...
PT-2026-26013
Summary shell-env fallback trusted prefix-based executable paths for $SHELL, allowing execution of attacker-controlled binaries in local/runtime-env influence scenarios. Details In affected versions, shell selection accepted either: 1. a shell listed in /etc/shells, or 2. any executable under...
PT-2026-26411
Summary When iMessage remote attachment fetching is enabled channels.imessage.remoteHost, stageSandboxMedia accepted arbitrary absolute paths and used SCP to copy them into local staging. If a non-attachment path reaches this flow, files outside expected iMessage attachment directories on the...
PT-2026-26240
Summary The Lobster extension tool execution path used a Windows shell fallback shell: true after spawn failures EINVAL/ENOENT. In that fallback path, shell metacharacters in command arguments can be interpreted by the shell, enabling command injection. Affected Packages / Versions - Package:...
PT-2026-26234
Summary OpenClaw Windows Scheduled Task script generation allowed unsafe argument handling in generated gateway.cmd files. In vulnerable versions, cmd metacharacter-only values could be emitted without safe quoting/escaping, which could lead to unintended command execution when the scheduled task...
PT-2026-26222
Summary system.run exec allowlist analysis treated wrapper binaries as the effective executable and did not fully unwrap env/shell-dispatch wrappers. This allowed wrapper-smuggled payloads for example env bash -lc ... to satisfy an allowlist entry for the wrapper while executing non-allowlisted...