128 matches found
ConcoLLMic
ConcoLLMic: Agentic Concolic Execution Paper : IEEE S&P 2026 ConcoLLMic is the first language- and theory-agnostic concolic executor powered by LLM agents. Unlike traditional symbolic execution tools that require language-specific implementations and struggle with constraint solving, ConcoLLMic:...
agentic-dm-gateway
Agentic DM Gateway Security control plane for LLM agents over private chat typically Discord DMs. It sits in front of your agent. It decides who may talk, whether the session is unlocked, whether the process is paused, and whether this message is safe enough to forward. Your model and tools stay...
skyvern
π Automate Browser-based workflows using LLMs and Computer Vision π Skyvern automates browser-based workflows using LLMs and computer vision. It provides a Playwright-compatible SDK that adds AI functionality on top of playwright, as well as a no-code workflow builder to help both technical and...
anamnesis-release
Anamnesis: LLM Exploit Generation Evaluation This repository contains the evaluation framework for studying how LLM agents generate exploits from vulnerability reports in the presence of exploit mitigations. Given a bug report and proof-of-concept trigger, agents analyze vulnerable software and...
memform-code
MemForm evaluation release This repository accompanies the paper MemForm: Benchmarking Memory Formation Poisoning in LLM Agents. MemForm is a deterministic benchmark of persistent-memory poisoning in LLM agents. It asks a causal question that ordinary jailbreak or prompt-injection suites do not...
AgentWatcher
AgentWatcher AgentWatcher is a detection-based defense against indirect prompt injection in LLM agents. It first runs causal context attribution over untrusted context to find the most influential contexts, then applies a monitor LLM that classifies those contexts under explicit, customizable...
agenttriage-open-source
AgentTriage AgentTriage is a cross-agent tracing and security-diagnosis system for tool-using LLM agents. It observes source ingress, planning and tool lifecycles, normalizes them into one canonical event contract, reconstructs a Simplified Typed Provenance Graph STPG, extracts a source-to-sink...
llm-agent-testbed
π‘οΈ LLM Agent Security Testbed Empirical Vulnerability & Defense Harness for Tool-Calling LLM Agents A disciplined security testbed testing whether tool-equipped LLM agents can be manipulated into unauthorized data exfiltration via prompt injection, role-claim social engineering, and confused-deput...
ClawGuard
ClawGuard π‘οΈ δΈζη Our Project:https://github.com/SafeAgent-Beihang/clawguard ClawGuard is a security toolkit designed to mitigate risks associated with autonomous agents, such as OpenClaw and other LLM-driven entities. As agents gain more autonomy to execute code, access APIs, and manage files,...
AgentStalker
AgentStalker Agent St atic + A ttack-graph + L ive-replay K ernel for treating an LLM agent as a system to be audited β not a model to be aligned. δΈζη Β· v2 Roadmap Β· CodeWhale Audit Report Table of Contents Overview Validated in the Wild Features Current Capability Boundaries Architecture Quick...
ActGuard
ActGuard ActGuard is a pre-execution action-auditing defense against indirect prompt injection in tool-using LLM agents. This repository contains the final ActGuard implementation and the AgentDojo-based runtime needed to evaluate it. The release contains only the final, full ActGuard...
benign-instruction-bench
Passing the Test You Trained On Re-evaluating prompt-injection detectors where LLM agents actually use them: on the tool outputs an agent reads. Teams pick injection detectors by their benchmark scores. We check whether those scores predict behavior inside an agent, and find that they mostly...
ShadowMem
ShadowMem: Safeguarding LLM Agents against Long-Horizon Threats via Shadow Memory This repository contains the official code release for the paper Safeguarding LLM Agents against Long-Horizon Threats via Shadow Memory. ShadowMem is a defensive framework that maintains a dedicated, safety-focused...
agent-trace-detector-eval
What Standard Evaluations Hide About Detectors of Hijacked LLM Agents: Rare Attacks, Unseen Tools and Benchmark Transfer Code, derived data, result files and every monitor call for the paper by Mahmoud Abbasi University of Salamanca, Juan M. NΓΊΓ±ez V. AIR Institute, Salamanca and Amin Shahraki...
PIPETTE: Prompt Injection Purple-Teaming for Robust LLM Agents
Large language model LLM agents routinely interact with untrusted external data, exposing them to indirect prompt injection IPI attacks that hijack agents into executing attacker-chosen tasks. To uncover these vulnerabilities at scale, automated red-teaming methods often leverage reinforcement...
AutoPI: Taxonomy-Guided Adaptive Red Teaming for Prompt Injection in LLM Agents
Prompt injection is the dominant unsolved security risk for LLM agents, and the community now agrees that robustness must be measured against adaptive attackers rather than fixed benchmark injections. Many adaptive red teamers exist, and most are built to maximize attack success rate ASR. Yet ASR...
Defenses-for-Tool-Integrated-LLM
Universal Defences for Tool-Integrated LLM Agents Against Adversarial Attacks This repository contains the code and experiments for our project on defending tool-integrated large language model LLM agents against adversarial attacks. Overview We build upon Agent Security Bench ASB to evaluate how...
StealthyPoison: Manipulating LLM Agent Behavior through Procedural Poisoning of Third-Party Skills
LLM agents increasingly retrieve third-party skills from public registries and follow their procedures to complete user tasks. This reliance allows attackers to manipulate agent behavior by poisoning the skills. However, overtly malicious instructions can provide explicit signals for detection. W...
Detecting Shadow AI: Unsanctioned LLM Agents on Enterprise Endpoints: A Taxonomy, an Open Detector and a Controlled Evaluation
Shadow IT, the use of technology that the IT organisation has not approved, is a long-standing governance problem. We argue that autonomous AI agents can make it grow much faster: agents make building tools nearly free, act with their user's privileges, and leave behind scripts, automations and M...
Least-Privilege Auditing of Agent Tool Calls with Intent Graphs and Reasoning-Guided Escalation
LLM agents that call tools are exposed to indirect prompt injection: instructions hidden in tool outputs can steer an agent into calls the user never asked for. We present a runtime audit that derives an executable intent graph from the user's objective and the deployment's tool catalog with one...