254521 matches found
ECHO-6E54-DE1B-08C9
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ECHO-26F2-ACDE-46CC
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ECHO-12DE-2DCA-D7DC
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ECHO-3050-E6F8-F8C9
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ECHO-1EC0-58D1-CB3D Keycloak's GHSA advisory (GHSA-gv3v-2cpp-3pmq) lists the affected package/range as org.keycloak:keycloak-quarkus-server < 26.5.6 with no lower bound, so by version string alone 25.0.6 is nominally in range. The actual vulnerable mechanism is the HTTP access log feature (config.HttpAccessLogOptions, HttpAccessLogPropertyMappers) added by the fix commit's PR to mask Authorization/Cookie headers in a verbose access-log pattern. That feature does not exist in 25.0.6 at all — confirmed via a full source search (no HttpAccessLogOptions.java, HttpAccessLogPropertyMappers.java, or any http-access-log config option anywhere in quarkus/config-api or quarkus/runtime). There is no access-log-pattern mechanism in this version capable of the described header disclosure.
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ECHO-3D2B-DE07-3BBE
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ECHO-A405-9171-9BA2
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ECHO-5DD9-EB24-E2ED
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ECHO-E419-5755-0224
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ECHO-73AB-600D-62BE Caught by Cursor Bugbot review on PR #19827: the real vulnerability (GHSA-7xf9-4jfc-wgm4) is specific to Fine-Grained Admin Permissions V2's RealmPermissionsV2 treating manage-clients as equivalent to managing the special "admin-permissions" client, which then grants realm-wide admin power. RealmPermissionsV2 and the admin-permissions client concept do not exist in 25.0.6 — its older RealmPermissions.canManageAuthorizationDefault() has no per-ResourceServer parameter at all (it's a single, undifferentiated realm-wide check), so there is no "is this the special admin-permissions client" distinction for a narrow, upstream-faithful fix to attach to. An earlier patch here unconditionally removed MANAGE_CLIENTS from that check to close the described escalation, but that changes intended authorization behavior for every regular client's authorization management, not just a vulnerable path (upstream's real fix leaves the MANAGE_CLIENTS grant intact for non-admin-permissions clients) — reverted.
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ECHO-FEA2-5EA1-2849
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ECHO-2EC4-6424-5DC8
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ECHO-8D9E-3A10-78A7
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ECHO-A65A-C6E8-0F1D
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ECHO-CC7D-8394-7880
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ECHO-7E4D-4229-7370
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ECHO-1969-C688-A45C Keycloak's GHSA advisory (GHSA-rr5q-3xwr-f323) lists the affected range as < 26.6.3 with no lower bound, so by version string alone 25.0.6 is nominally in range. The actual vulnerability requires a generic parameter-length-limiting mechanism (OIDCProviderConfig's max-length-per-parameter config, TokenEndpoint's checkParameters() gate) that silently drops any oversized request parameter, including subject_token — the fix exempts token-shaped parameters from that drop via a new getTokenParameterNames() method. That length-limiting framework does not exist anywhere in 25.0.6 (same finding as CVE-2026-4634, investigated separately) — confirmed via source search, no getMaxLengthForTheParameter/checkParameters/length-cap mechanism exists on any OIDC grant-type endpoint. With no mechanism to silently drop an oversized subject_token, the described fallback to client-credentials cannot occur.
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ECHO-7EDB-23C5-02EC
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