CVE-2024-37880

The Kyber reference implementation before 9b8d306, when compiled by LLVM Clang through 18.x with some common optimization options, has a timing side channel that allows attackers to recover an ML-KEM 512 secret key in minutes. This occurs because polyfrommsg in poly.c does not prevent Clang from...

Post-quantum Cryptography for the Go Ecosystem

filippo.io/mlkem768 is a pure-Go implementation of ML-KEM-768 optimized for correctness and readability. ML-KEM formerly known as Kyber, renamed because we can't have nice things is a post-quantum key exchange mechanism in the process of being standardized by NIST and adopted by most of the...

RUSTSEC-2023-0079 KyberSlash: division timings depending on secrets

Various Kyber software libraries in various environments leak secret information into timing, specifically because these libraries include a line of code that divides a secret numerator by a public denominator, the number of CPU cycles for division in various environments varies depending on the...

KyberSlash: division timings depending on secrets

Various Kyber software libraries in various environments leak secret information into timing, specifically because these libraries include a line of code that divides a secret numerator by a public denominator, the number of CPU cycles for division in various environments varies depending on the...

Enough Polynomials and Linear Algebra to Implement Kyber

I was once talking with a mathematician and trying to explain elliptic curve cryptography. Eventually, something clicked and they went "oh, that! I think there was a chapter about it in the book. You made a whole field out of it?" Yes, in cryptography we end up focusing on a very narrow slice of...

KEMs and Post-Quantum age

Theyre here! NIST selected a first batch of post-quantum cryptographic key exchange and signature algorithms. The report is a nice read that explains a lot of the goals, candidates, selections, and rationales. I recommend Sections 2, 3.3, and 4.1. For key exchange, NIST selected only...