BIT-AIRFLOW-2026-58076 Apache Airflow: Unguarded import_string() of airflow_exc_ser / base_exc_ser exception nodes in BaseSerialization.deserialize enables DAG-author RCE on Scheduler / API Server

Apache Airflow's serialization layer reconstructed exception nodes by calling importstring on a class name taken from the serialized blob and instantiating it with arguments from the same blob, with no restriction on what could be imported. An operator's executorconfig reaches that branch, so a D...

CVE-2026-58076 Apache Airflow: Unguarded import_string() of airflow_exc_ser / base_exc_ser exception nodes in BaseSerialization.deserialize enables DAG-author RCE on Scheduler / API Server

Apache Airflow's serialization layer reconstructed exception nodes by calling importstring on a class name taken from the serialized blob and instantiating it with arguments from the same blob, with no restriction on what could be imported. An operator's executorconfig reaches that branch, so a D...

CVE-2026-33264

A bug in BaseSerialization.deserialize allowed unrestricted importstring of attacker-controlled class paths when the Scheduler / API Server loaded a serialized DAG: a DAG author could embed a malicious trigger into a DAG to gain remote code execution on the API Server / Scheduler process, crossin...