Wrong Implementation of EIP-712

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The EIP-712 uses several parameters. Those parameters are exactly: EIP712Domain string name; string version; uint256 chainId; address verifyingContract; As you can see on the following Domain, ZkSync, is missing one parameter: bytes32 constant...

deploying contracts with forceDeployOnAddress will break contracts when callConstructor is false

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact when function forceDeployOnAddress used for deploying contract and callConstructor is false, then contract's bytecodehash would stay in constructing state and calling the contract won't be possible. it can cause protocol and other contracts that are usin...

ProfilePictureData is not stored, which will cause serious logic errors

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact All data minted by the contract will not be stored, paralyzing the entire contract Proof of Concept code snippet： function mintaddress nftContract, uint256 nftID external uint256 tokenId = ++numMinted; if ERC721nftContract.ownerOfnftID != msg.sender reve...

function _nonSystemDeployOnAddress() should try another nonces when getNewAddressCreate() result is in kernel space otherwise some logics would be broken

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Function createAccount Deploys a contract account with similar address derivation rules to the EVM's CREATE opcode. the deployed contract address is calculated based on sender deployed nonce. code uses nonSystemDeployOnAddress to deploy the contract to n...

The call to MsgValueSimulator with non zero msg.value will call to sender itself which will bypass the onlySelf check

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact First, I need to clarify, there may be more serious ways to exploit this issue. Due to the lack of time and documents, I cannot complete further exploit. The current exploit has only achieved the impact in the title. I will expand the possibility of...

Missing check for NFT contract, a bad actor can mint a PFP NFT without having a CID NFT

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Missing check for NFT contract, a bad actor can mint a PFP NFT without having a CID NFT. Proof of Concept The ProfilePicture.mint is used to mint a new PFP NFT. function mintaddress nftContract, uint256 nftID external uint256 tokenId = ++numMinted; if...

Attacker could potentially burn the token balance of totalSupply and L2EthContract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Attacker potentially can burn all L2EthContract and totalSupply tokens Proof of Concept function withdrawaddress l1Receiver external payable override uint256 amount = msg.value; // Silent burning of the ether unchecked balanceaddressthis -= amount;...

Bytecode Compressor Contract Replay Attack.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Injection of duplicate code. Proof of Concept In the markBytecodeAsPublished function, the contract does not check whether a particular hash has already been added to the storage. The contract only checks the current marker value of the hash, which is se...

User can cause the points of their LP stake position to underflow

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact This vulnerability allows a user to cause their LP position points to underflow which will then allow a user to receive a massively disproportionate amount of the emission rewards relative to their stake because they now practically have an infinite amou...

Use the _assetTransferFrom function instead of _assetTransfer. This is because the tokens are held in the escrow contract, rather than being in the destination BYTES address, and thus require a transfer from the escrow contract to the recipient's address

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The msg.sender lose his stakedBytes From BYTES address not possible to send stakedBytes to msg.sender. The stakedBytes only help in escrow contract not in BYTES address. Proof of Concept function assetTransfer address asset, address to, uint256 amount...

Misconfiguration of LP token contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If the LP token contract is set to a non-contract address or a no-revert-on-transfer token, users will be able to: 1. Mint huge amounts of BYTES 2.0 tokens. 2. Drain the contract of all its LP tokens. Vulnerability Details Throughout the contract, it is...

Audit Findings for BYTES Token Contract - Burn Function Vulnerabilities

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact BYTES2.burn: The function burn allows authorized callers to burn BYTES tokens from a specific address and mint DAO taxes. However, the function does not check if the from address actually has enough BYTES tokens to burn. This means that an attacker could...

Infinite mint via points underflow (in scope)

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Due to unchecked math in the withdrawLP function, a user can trigger an underflow in their points and infinitely increase their rewards. The problem exists in several places. Problem 1. The configureTimelockOptions function allows setting...

BYTES2.getReward: no check for input

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact the function getReward should validate that to is not an empty address 0x0 to prevent accidental loss of BYTES. Impact: mint reward BYTES to address0 will be lost Proof of Concept function getReward address to external uint256 reward, uint256 daoCommisio...

const-cstr is Unmaintained

Last release was about five years ago. The maintainers have been unreachable to respond to any issues that may or may not include security issues. The repository is now archived and there is no security policy in place to contact the maintainers otherwise. No direct fork exist. const-cstr is...

No data validation, will result in all funds from the DAO contract stolen

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The vulnerability relies on the proposal creation function which forwards the proposal once accepted for the DAO contract to execute. Each proposal has a set of actions attached. struct Action address to; uint256 value; bytes data; function createProposa...

Locked Ether

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Contract with a payable function, but without a withdrawal capacity. Proof of Concept File: packages/contracts/src/core/dao/DAO.sol 233: external payable override 284: receive external payable Every Ether sent to DAO.sol will be lost. Tools Used VS Code...

INITIALIZE FUNCTION IN COUNTERV2.SOL CAN BE INVOKED MULTIPLE TIMES FROM THE IMPLEMENTATION CONTRACT

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Initialize function in CounterV2.sol can be invoked multiple times from the implementation contract. This means a compromised implementation can reinitialize the contract above. Usually in Upgradeable contract, an initialize function is protected by the...

there is no way withdraw eth

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact eth will be stuck inside the contract Proof of Concept Provide direct links to all referenced code in GitHub. Add screenshots, logs, or any other relevant proof that illustrates the concept. Tools Used Recommended Mitigation Steps --- The text was update...

Make proposals fail, no-revert on error, loss of funds

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The issue exists because anyone can call executein the multisig contract with will execute the proposal in the DAO contract. The problem here is that certain proposal will not revert when they fail because they have the uint256 allowFailureMap param set ...