Type packetstorm
Reporter Oliver Karow
Modified 2008-08-16T00:00:00


                                            `MicroWorld MailScan - Multiple Vulnerabilities within Admin-Webinterface  
>> Affected Products <<  
- MailScan for Mail Servers   
* Version: 5.6.a with espatch1  
* Win32 Platform  
Other Mailscan Products, Versions, also, if available   
for other platforms, were not tested.  
>> Product/Company Information <<  
From MicroWorld's website: "MailScan 5.6 is the world's most   
advanced Real-Time AntiVirus and AntiSpam solution for Mail Servers.   
The software safeguards organizations against Virus, Worm, Trojan and   
many other malware breeds with futuristic and proactive technologies.   
Employing an array of intelligent filters, MailScan offers powerful   
protection against Spam and Phishing mails along with comprehensive   
Content Security."  
>> Vulnerabilities <<  
MailScan offers "Web Based Administration". The administration console   
(Server.exe) is running as an http service on tcp port 10443 with   
LocalSystem privileges. The communication is plain http without SSL/TLS.  
The interface is vulnerable to the attacks described below. All attacks   
do *not* require authentication.  
-- >> Directory Traversal <<  
It is possible to access files on the system outside of the webroot   
directory with privileges of the LocalSystem account:  
echo -e "GET /../../../../boot.ini HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n" | nc <server> <port>  
-- >> Authentication bypass <<  
After a login attempt with an invalid username and password, the application  
is setting a cookie at the webclient with the following content:  
Set-Cookie: User=admin; path=/  
Set-Cookie: login=true; path=/  
Set-Cookie: IsAdmin=false; path=/  
Set-Cookie: IP=; path=/  
Providing valid username and password will give a cookie with the   
following content:  
Set-Cookie: User=admin; path=/  
Set-Cookie: login=true; path=/  
Set-Cookie: IsAdmin=true; path=/  
Set-Cookie: IP=; path=/  
It is sufficient to set the cookie as shown above to get authenticated on the  
admin interface. The user "admin" is a default account, with a password set during  
*BUT* requesting a resource on the webserver *without* supplying a cookie will   
also grant access to the requested resource. The attacker just needs to know   
the path to the resource.   
-- >> Cross-Site-Scripting (XSS) <<  
-- >> Access to Logfile <<  
It is possible to access the logfiles of the application because the folder   
"/LOG" inside the webroot ("C:\Program Files\Common Files\MicroWorld\WebServer")   
is not protected.... note that this does not require the directory traversal,   
mentioned before and thus is imho a separate vuln.  
The logfiles contain different information, like installation path, ip adresses,  
and error messages.  
http://ip:10443/LOG/W072808.LOG (Format seems to be W:Month:Date:year)  
>> History <<  
28. July 2008 - Touching base with MicroWorld's Support via Messenger  
28. July 2008 - Sending High-Level description of vulns and RFP-Policy to agree  
30. July 2008 - MicroWorld agreed to the policy  
30. July 2008 - Detailed description and PoC-Script creating an admin user without  
authenticatin send to Microworld  
01. Aug. 2008 - Asking Microworld if they were able to reproduce  
02. Aug. 2008 - MicroWorld answered: "Not Yet"  
05. Aug. 2008 - Asking Microworld if they were able to reproduce, and if yes, when  
a patch will be available  
13. Aug. 2008 - No response from Microworld; I informed them that i will publish  
an advisory within the next days  
15. Aug. 2008 - Advisory release  
>> Credits <<  
mail: Oliver-dot-karow-at-gmx-dot-de