...[ More ]

Android's CALL_PHONE permission, shown to users as "make and manage phone
calls", also authorises execution of carrier MMI/USSD codes against the SIM.
The permission text does not mention this, no confirmation is shown before
execution -- a transient "USSD code running" dialog appears only afterwards
--
and MMI execution writes no call log entry. Where a CALL_PHONE-holding app
also
exposes a browser-reachable deeplink into an auto-dial path, the capability
becomes remotely triggerable with a single tap.

Demonstrated against ACR Phone / Cube ACR (com.nll.cb, 5M+ installs), which
declares an intent filter carrying action CALL_BUTTON, category BROWSABLE
and a
tel: scheme, resolving to an activity that dials rather than pre-fills.
Chrome's
intent: URI syntax lets a page nominate an arbitrary action, and Chrome's
only
check is that the resolved filter declares BROWSABLE, so the string executes
under ACR's own CALL_PHONE grant rather than any grant held by the browser.
No
chooser appears (ACR is the sole handler) and no confirmation is requested.
The
terminating hash must be percent-encoded as %23 -- a literal # parses, but
is
lost further down the dial path, and the remainder is placed as an ordinary
call.


intent:*21*5550000000%23#Intent;scheme=tel;action=android.intent.action.CALL_BUTTON;end

One tap registers unconditional call forwarding to the attacker's number.
Incoming calls -- including voice-delivered OTPs and bank verification
callbacks
-- are then delivered to the attacker. Registration is held in the carrier
network rather than on the handset, so it survives reboot, uninstalling the
app
and a factory reset, and persists until cancelled. Clear with ##21#,
interrogate
with *#21#. Both *21*<n>%23 and **21*<n>%23 register.

Preconditions for the demonstration: ACR must hold CALL_PHONE and the DIALER
role. Both are the ordinary state for a dialer replacement, but neither is
automatic. The role matters twice over -- ACR's own DialerActivity.a0()
redirects to setup without it, and Android 14 added a platform check that
refuses dangerous MMI codes from a non-default dialer, which ACR being the
default dialer satisfies. Of 88 call, dialer and VoIP apps scanned at the
manifest level, 66 declared CALL_PHONE and 54 exposed some browser-reachable
dial surface; most pre-fill rather than dial, so whether any given one is
exploitable turns on its own deeplink handling, while the platform grants
the
underlying capability to all of them uniformly.

A related Android 17 change removes the need for a vulnerable third-party
app
altogether. Telecom moved into the com.android.telephonycore mainline
module and
its UI into a separate privileged application; com.android.server.telecom
is now
a shim whose UserCallActivity re-starts the intent against
com.google.android.telecomui, which calls TelecomManager.placeCall() as
itself.
The launching package is not carried across. placeCall() binds the caller
to the
binder UID, and telecomui holds CALL_PRIVILEGED, so the dangerous-MMI check
--
which still runs on every call -- is evaluated against telecomui and
passes. A
plain **21*<number># sent via ACTION_CALL by an app holding only CALL_PHONE,
with no dialer role, is therefore dispatched as an MMI code. Reported
separately; confirmed on an emulator only.

Tested on: Samsung Galaxy M16 5G, Android 16 (One UI 8.5), build
BP4A.251205.006.M166PXXS7DZG1, security patch level 5 July 2026, against a
live
Airtel India network (single-asterisk form). Reproduced on Android 14 (API
34)
and Android 17 (API 37, patch 2026-07-05) emulators, double-asterisk form
against the simulated network.

Vendor status: Google closed the platform report as Won't Fix (Infeasible),
assessing it as insecure deeplink handling in third-party dialers rather
than an
Android vulnerability. The Android 17 trampoline report was closed as a
duplicate of an earlier internal report. The ACR Phone developer responded
within 48 minutes and committed a fix to the next release; the Play release
is
pending Google's review.

Timeline:
12 Sep 2026 - Reported to the Android & Google Devices VRP
14 Sep 2026 - Android 17 retest added; TelecomUi trampoline reported
separately
17 Sep 2026 - Platform report closed Won't Fix (Infeasible)
24 Sep 2026 - Trampoline report closed as duplicate of an internal Google
report
25 Sep 2026 - Request to be added to that report declined
09 Oct 2026 - Reported to the ACR Phone developer; acknowledged, fix
committed
09 Oct 2026 - Public disclosure

Full write-up:
https://karansaini.com/mmi-android/

Sincerely,
Karan Saini