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    NotCVE Advisory — NotCVE-2026-0012
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    [-] Summary:
    kamalpanse18 EmpManageX, a Flask-based employee management application,
    ships hard-coded administrative credentials in its authentication logic.
    The username admin and the plaintext password admin123 are module-level
    constants in app.py, compared directly against the values submitted to the
    /api/login handler. An attacker who can reach the listener authenticates as
    the sole administrator and obtains full read and write control of every
    employee record. The credentials are not a guessable secret: the project's
    own README.md and QUICK_START.md state them openly. As shipped the server
    binds to 127.0.0.1 only, so the default exposure is local; a deployer who
    binds an external interface makes the same defect remotely reachable.
    CVSS:3.1 7.7 (AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N).
    
    [-] Affected:
    kamalpanse18 EmpManageX, all versions (app.py).
    The repository has a single commit, f4de83b, dated 2025-12-31, and no
    tagged releases. No fixed version is currently verified.
    
    [-] Technical Description:
    ADMIN_USERNAME and ADMIN_PASSWORD are assigned at lines 17-18 of app.py and
    compared directly against the submitted values in the /api/login handler.
    The credential pair is a source-level constant with no configuration
    mechanism behind it: app.py contains no use of os.environ or os.getenv, no
    configuration file, no first-run setup step and no password-change
    endpoint. The only supported way to alter the administrator password is to
    edit the source and restart the process, and that change is lost whenever
    the deployment is refreshed from the upstream repository. The same value is
    therefore present in every unmodified deployment, and because README.md and
    QUICK_START.md state it openly it is a published constant rather than a
    guessable secret.
    
    A successful call to /api/login sets session['logged_in'], which is the
    only condition tested by the login_required decorator. No further
    authorisation check is performed, so the caller obtains the entire
    protected surface: POST /api/employee (create), GET /api/employees and
    GET /api/employee/<int:emp_id> (read all stored employee data),
    PUT /api/employee/<int:emp_id> (modify) and
    DELETE /api/employee/<int:emp_id> (delete). On a match the handler sets
    session['user_id'], session['username'] and session['logged_in'] and
    returns a signed session cookie marked permanent with a 24-hour lifetime,
    which the caller can replay against the protected endpoints.
    
    The entry point is app.run(debug=True, port=5000), which passes no host
    argument and therefore binds the Werkzeug development server to 127.0.0.1
    only; README.md, SETUP_GUIDE.md and QUICK_START.md all direct the user to
    http://127.0.0.1:5000. In the configuration as shipped the endpoint is
    reachable only from the local host, which is what the CVSS vector above
    reflects. A deployer who binds 0.0.0.0 or places the application behind a
    reverse proxy makes the same defect remotely reachable.
    
    SETUP_GUIDE.md carries a "Security Recommendations for Production" section
    suggesting that the credentials be read from environment variables, but
    that guidance is not implemented in the shipped app.py, and the example it
    gives retains admin/admin123 as the fallback default.
    
    The step-by-step attack path and the full write-up are published at the
    advisory URL below.
    
    Weaknesses:
    CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials
    CWE-1392: Use of Default Credentials
    CWE-256: Plaintext Storage of a Password
    CAPEC-70: Try Common or Default Usernames and Passwords
    
    [-] Timeline:
    [29/07/2026] - Report received and NotCVE ID reserved.
    [20/08/2026] - Published as NotCVE-2026-0012.
    
    [-] Credit:
    Discovered by netspacer1124.
    
    [-] Full Details and Updates:
    https://notcve.org/notcve/NotCVE-2026-0012
    
    [-] References:
    https://github.com/kamalpanse18/EmpManageX
    https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kamalpanse18/EmpManageX/main/app.py
    https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kamalpanse18/EmpManageX/main/README.md
    https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kamalpanse18/EmpManageX/main/QUICK_START.md
    https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kamalpanse18/EmpManageX/main/SETUP_GUIDE.md
    https://github.com/kamalpanse18/EmpManageX/commits/main/app.py
    
    [-] About NotCVE:
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    --- packet storm attached poc ---
    
    Steps
    
        The attacker identifies a running EmpManageX instance and takes the administrator credentials from the project's public repository, where README.md and QUICK_START.md state them directly. Reading the source on the deployed host is not required.
    
        The attacker probes GET /api/check-auth to confirm the API surface is present and to see whether a session is currently authenticated.
    
        The attacker sends a POST request to /api/login with a JSON body carrying the published username and password values.
    
        The handler compares the submitted values against ADMIN_USERNAME and ADMIN_PASSWORD; on a match it sets session['user_id'], session['username'] and session['logged_in'], and returns a signed session cookie marked permanent with a 24-hour lifetime.
    
        The attacker replays that cookie against the endpoints wrapped by login_required, which tests only for the presence of session['logged_in'] and performs no further authorisation check.
    
        The attacker reads the full employee dataset via GET /api/employees, and modifies or removes individual records via PUT and DELETE /api/employee/<int:emp_id>. Because the credential cannot be changed without a source edit, the same access remains available across restarts and redeployments.