Open-Xchange OX Guard Cross Site Scripting / Signature Validation

`Dear subscribers,  
  
we're sharing our latest advisory with you and like to thank everyone who contributed in finding and solving those vulnerabilities. Feel free to join our bug bounty programs (appsuite, dovecot, powerdns) at HackerOne.  
  
Yours sincerely,  
Martin Heiland, Open-Xchange GmbH  
  
  
  
Product: OX Guard  
Vendor: OX Software GmbH  
  
Internal reference: 65132 (Bug ID)  
Vulnerability type: Cross-Site Scripting (CWE-80)  
Vulnerable version: 7.10.2 and earlier  
Vulnerable component: backend  
Report confidence: Confirmed  
Solution status: Fixed by Vendor  
Fixed version: 7.6.3-rev48, 7.8.4-rev59, 7.10.0-rev32, 7.10.1-rev14, 7.10.2-rev5  
Vendor notification: 2019-05-09  
Solution date: 2019-06-13  
Public disclosure: 2019-08-15  
CVE reference: CVE-2018-9997  
CVSS: 5.4 (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N)  
  
Vulnerability Details:  
Curly brackets can be used to bypass XSS sanitization in HTML mail and other HTML attachments. A variation of the original issue has been found thats based on incorrect global eventhandler blacklist entries.  
  
Risk:  
Malicious script code can be executed within a users context. This can lead to session hijacking or triggering unwanted actions via the web interface (sending mail, deleting data etc.).  
  
Steps to reproduce:  
1. Create a HTML mail with curly brackets that disguise event handlers in CSS  
2. Make a App Suite user open the malicious mail  
  
Proof of concept:  
<div style=width:100%;height:10px;font:\"'/{/onMouseLeave=alert(1)//></div>  
  
Solution:  
We updated the list of blacklisted event handlers to close this bypass, operators may add a workaround by updating "globaleventhandlers.list" and change the incorrect handler "onmounseleave" to "onmouseleave".  
  
  
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Internal reference: 64992 (Bug ID)  
Vulnerability type: Data validation fault (CWE-34)  
Vulnerable version: 7.10.1 and earlier, 2.10.2 and earlier  
Vulnerable component: guard, backend  
Report confidence: Confirmed  
Solution status: Fixed by Vendor  
Fixed version (guard): 2.8.0-rev22, 2.10.1-rev7  
Fixed version (backend): 7.8.4-rev59, 7.10.1-rev14  
Vendor notification: 2019-05-03  
Solution date: 2019-06-13  
Public disclosure: 2019-08-15  
Researcher Credits: Jens Müller, Marcus Brinkmann, Damian Poddebniak, Hanno Böck, Sebastian Schinzel, Juraj Somorovsky, and Jörg Schwenk  
CVE reference: CVE-2019-11521  
CVSS: 5.3 (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N)  
  
Vulnerability Details:  
Internal evaluation revealed that OX Guard is vulnerable to a subset of techniques used to display a valid signature from the identity of a trusted communication partner located in the mail header, although the crafted email is actually signed by an attacker. Our discoveries are based on work of a team of researchers, publishing these spoofing techniques under the "Johnny You Are Fired" project name.  
  
Risk:  
Recipients of signed PGP mail could be fooled to assume the mail originates from a trusted source rather than an attacker. This would elevate the mails trust level and potentially ease social-engineering attacks.  
  
Steps to reproduce:  
1. Create mails that contain valid signatures but originate from a different source  
  
Proof of concept:  
https://github.com/RUB-NDS/Johnny-You-Are-Fired/tree/master/04-id  
  
Solution:  
We improved validation and make sure mail with valid signatures is only evaluated to be "trusted" if the sender matches the signature issuer. We also extended our API to provide more information about a specific signature to let clients add checks and handle invalid signature information.  
  
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