Avaya one-X 9.x / 10.0.x / 10.1.x Arbitrary File Disclosure / Deletion

2018-09-10T00:00:00
ID PACKETSTORM:149284
Type packetstorm
Reporter Pedro Andujar
Modified 2018-09-10T00:00:00

Description

                                        
                                            ` ===============================  
- Advisory -  
===============================  
  
Tittle: one-X portal arbitrary OS file access  
Risk: High  
Date: 07.Ago.2018  
Author: Pedro Andujar  
Twitter: @pandujar  
  
  
  
.: [ INTRO ] :  
  
one-X Portal for IP Office is an application that runs on a web server connected to the IP Office telephone system. Using a web browser, one can access   
the one-X Portal for IP Office and use it to perform actions such as:  
  
* Control your telephone calls.  
* View details of calls and directories of contacts.  
* Configure settings that affect how your calls are treated by the telephone system.  
* Conference calls.  
* Manage your voicemail messages.  
  
  
  
.: [ TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION ] :.  
  
Avaya one-x for ip office contains a default low privileged account, which has limited access to the application, where it's intended to perform backup duties.  
  
An arbitrary file download issue was found in the backup portal, affecting to either Linux and Windows versions of the 9.x, 10.0.x and 10.1.x series. An   
authenticated remote attacker could send specially crafted request leading into potential information disclosure and DoS.   
  
  
  
.: [ ISSUE #1 ]:.  
  
Name: Arbitrary OS file download/deletion  
Severity: High  
CVE: CVE-2018-15610  
  
DownloadToLocalDriveServlet allows to download any operating system file.  
  
<<<REQUEST>>>  
GET /path/to/DownloadToLocalDriveServlet**REDACTED** HTTP/1.1  
Host: 192.168.1.38  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:58.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/58.0  
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8  
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
Referer: https://192.168.1.38/onexportal-afa.html  
Cookie: JSESSIONID=740B74DC4B77E0B8EB8F4FED6BA5EAE8;  
Connection: close  
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1  
  
<<<RESPONSE>>>  
HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1  
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=passwd;  
Content-Type: application/zip  
Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2018 20:38:39 GMT  
Connection: close  
Content-Length: 1910  
  
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash  
bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin  
daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin  
adm:x:3:4:adm:/var/adm:/sbin/nologin  
lp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/sbin/nologin  
sync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync  
....  
  
This request also deletes de file after being downloaded (depending on the OS file and process permissions). Be carefull on Windows version as process runs with   
system privileges.  
  
Vulnerable piece of code:  
  
if (sessionManager.isSessionAlive(session)) {  
String folder = req.getParameter("folder");  
String filename = req.getParameter("filename");  
if (logger.isDebugEnabled()) logger.debug(new Object[] { "doGet(), folder:", Helper.reformatFolderPath(folder), ", filename: ", filename });  
BufferedOutputStream bos = null;  
FileInputStream in = null;  
try {  
resp.setContentType("application/zip");  
resp.setHeader("Content-Disposition", "attachment; filename=" + filename + ";");  
bos = new BufferedOutputStream(resp.getOutputStream());  
in = new FileInputStream(Helper.reformatFolderPath(folder) + filename)  
  
  
  
.: [ CHANGELOG ] :.  
  
* 18/Mar/2018: - Vuln discovered during pentest engagement.  
* 19/Mar/2018: - Avaya product security contacted.   
* 19/Mar/2018: - Avaya product security replied.   
* 23/Mar/2018: - Avaya product security confirmed and planned fix.   
* 23/Jul/2018: - Fix available to customers.  
* 31/Ago/2018: - Public disclosure.  
  
(Kudos to the ProducSec Team, for the excelent communication and incident handling)  
  
  
  
.: [ SOLUTIONS ] :.  
  
- DownloadToLocalDriveServlet it is only intended to download backup zip files from server to the desktop. Backup file default folder it's predefined setting that   
appears as serverFolderForBackup directive on $TOMCAT\bin\inyama-user.xml file, and therefore do not need to be passed through GET parameter.   
  
String serverFolder = loggedInUser.getServerFolder() + File.separator;  
File downloadedFile = new File(Helper.reformatFolderPath(serverFolder), fileName);  
  
- Implement file type checks and enforce/append .zip extension (this is also recomended for UploadFromLocalServlet.class which allows arbitrary file upload,   
but at least enforces destination folder).  
  
- Avoid sending filename as GET or ensure path traversal protection is in place.  
  
  
https://downloads.avaya.com/css/P8/documents/101051984  
  
For 10.0.x, upgrade to IP Office one-X portal 10.0.702.16.  
For 10.1.x, upgrade to IP Office one-X portal 10.1.300.12.  
Fix is also provided in 11.0 or later.  
  
Avaya strongly recommends following networking and security best practices by implementing firewalls, ACLs, physical security or other appropriate access   
restrictions. Though Avaya believes such restrictions should always be in place, risk to Avaya products and the surrounding network from this potential   
vulnerability may be mitigated by ensuring these practices are implemented until such time as an Avaya provided product update or the recommended Avaya   
action is applied. Further restrictions as deemed necessary based on the customer's security policies may be required during this interim period, but the   
System Product operating system or application should not be modified unless the change is approved by Avaya. Making changes that are not approved may void   
the Avaya product service contract.  
  
  
  
.: [ REFERENCES ] :.  
  
[+] Installing Avaya one-XA(r) Portal for IP OfficeaC/ Platform  
https://downloads.avaya.com/css/P8/documents/101028405  
  
[+] Avaya Product Security  
https://support.avaya.com/security  
  
[+] Cobalt.io  
https://app.cobalt.io/researchers  
  
  
  
  
  
  
-=EOF=-  
  
  
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