Aerohive Networks HiveManager Remote Shell Upload

`I. BACKGROUND  
  
Aerohive Networks HiveManager Classic Online NMS is a cloud-enabled  
enterprise-class management system for Aerohive networking products.  
HiveManager Classic Online offers simple policy creation, firmware  
upgrades, and centralized monitoring of thousands of Aerohive access  
points, switches, and branch routers.  
  
Responsible disclosure with Aerohive: Aerohive has a very reactive  
security staff.  
  
Their response to our communication was pretty fast, we received the  
first ack within 24hrs and an official statement in 4days.  
  
The latest version of the software at the time of writing can be  
obtained from support portal at https://support.aerohive.com/login  
  
II. DESCRIPTION  
  
The vulnerability allows a local user, even restricted as a Tenant, to  
upload a backup archive that contain jsp webshell, therefore to execute  
code on underlying system.  
  
The affected component is Backup Archive Handler.  
  
III. ANALYSIS  
  
The HiveManager Classic backup is a plain .tar.gz file with a very  
simple structure.  
  
Once the archive is extracted, you will see two folders:  
  
- HiveManager  
- dbxmlfile  
  
"dbxmlfile/" contains the HM/VHM configuration, an interesting file to  
work on. Anyway our interest moved to "HiveManager/" as it contains a  
directory named "tomcat/webapps" which is the default Tomcat web app.  
  
The full tree is something like:  
  
aa tomcat  
aaa webapps  
aaa hm  
aaa domains  
aaa MyTenant  
aaa maps  
aaa ca.png  
aaa campus.png  
aaa map_floorplan.png  
aaa us.png  
aaa world.png  
  
If such directory is tampered, tar gzipped and then restored using the  
backup/restore functionality, an attacker can gain code execution on the  
system.  
  
As Proof of Concept a "webshell.jsp" file has been added at maps/ level,  
then we created a new .tar.gz archive and tried to restore it.  
  
No error has been thrown and jsp file was available under the docroot at  
URI /hm/domains/MyTenant/maps/  
  
Further analysis pointed out that full path was writable so it's  
possible to upload a jsp shell even outside the Tenant scope.  
  
Code will be executed as tomcat (uid/gid 501) allowing a full compromise  
of the web UI and access to other Tenant files and configurations as  
well.  
  
IV. WORKAROUND  
  
We are not aware of any workaround.  
  
VI. VENDOR RESPONSE  
  
Vendor is moving to a completely new release of the product called  
HiveManager-NG, which has a different architecture and is not affected  
by this vulnerability. We did not perform any audit on such version of  
the product.  
  
VII. CVE INFORMATION  
  
Mitre assigned the CVE-2017-14105 for this vulnerability.  
  
VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE  
  
20170828 Bug discovered  
20170829 Vulnerability disclosed to Aerohive  
20170829 First reply from Aerohive  
20170901 The vendor reply with a wontfix  
20170901 Request for CVE to Mitre  
20170901 Got CVE-2017-14105 from cve-assign  
20170902 Full disclosure  
  
IX. REFERENCES  
  
https://github.com/theguly/CVE-2017-14105  
  
  
  
taste your favourite IT consultant  
  
  
`