Atlassian Confluence AppFusions Doxygen 1.3.x Cross Site Scripting

2016-11-21T00:00:00
ID PACKETSTORM:139840
Type packetstorm
Reporter Julien Ahrens
Modified 2016-11-21T00:00:00

Description

                                        
                                            `RCE Security Advisory  
https://www.rcesecurity.com  
  
  
1. ADVISORY INFORMATION  
=======================  
Product: AppFusions Doxygen for Atlassian Confluence  
Vendor URL: www.appfusions.com  
Type: Cross-site Scripting [CWE-79]  
Date found: 2016-06-29  
Date published: -  
CVSSv3 Score: 6.4 (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N)  
CVE: -  
  
  
2. CREDITS  
==========  
This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Julien Ahrens from  
RCE Security.  
  
  
3. VERSIONS AFFECTED  
====================  
AppFusions Doxygen for Atlassian Confluence v1.3.3  
AppFusions Doxygen for Atlassian Confluence v1.3.2  
AppFusions Doxygen for Atlassian Confluence v1.3.1  
AppFusions Doxygen for Atlassian Confluence v1.3.0  
older versions may be affected too.  
  
  
4. INTRODUCTION  
===============  
With Doxygen in Confluence, you can embed full-structure code documentation:  
-Doxygen blueprint in Confluence to allow Doxygen archive imports  
-Display documentation from annotated sources such as Java (i.e., JavaDoc),  
C++, Objective-C, C#, C, PHP, Python, IDL (Corba, Microsoft, and  
UNO/OpenOffice  
flavors), Fortran, VHDL, Tcl, D in Confluence.  
-Navigation supports code structure (classes, hierarchies, files), element  
dependencies, inheritance and collaboration diagrams.  
-Search documentation from within Confluence  
-Restrict access to who can see/add what  
-Doxygen in JIRA also available  
  
(from the vendor's homepage)  
  
  
5. VULNERABILITY DETAILS  
========================  
The application offers the functionality to import zipped Doxygen  
documentations via a file upload to make them available in a Confluence  
page, but does not properly validate the file format/the contents of the  
uploaded Doxygen file. Since the uploaded file is basically a zipped  
archive, it is possible to store any type of file in it like an HTML  
file containing arbitrary script.  
  
In DoxygenFileServlet.java (lines 82-105) the "file" GET parameter is read  
and used as part of a File object:  
  
private void renderContent(HttpServletRequest request,  
HttpServletResponse response) throws IOException {  
String pathInfo = request.getPathInfo();  
String[] pathInfoParts = pathInfo.split("file/");  
String requestedFile = pathInfoParts[1];  
File homeDirectory = this.applicationProperties.getHomeDirectory();  
String doxygenDir = homeDirectory.getAbsolutePath() + File.separator  
+ "doxygen";  
File file = new File(doxygenDir, requestedFile);  
String contentType =  
this.getServletContext().getMimeType(file.getName());  
if (contentType == null) {  
contentType = "application/octet-stream";  
}  
response.setContentType(contentType);  
FileInputStream inputStream = null;  
ServletOutputStream outputStream = null;  
try {  
inputStream = new FileInputStream(file);  
outputStream = response.getOutputStream();  
IOUtils.copy((InputStream)inputStream, (OutputStream)outputStream);  
}  
finally {  
IOUtils.closeQuietly((InputStream)inputStream);  
IOUtils.closeQuietly((OutputStream)outputStream);  
}  
}  
  
  
6. RISK  
=======  
To successfully exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must be  
authenticated and must have the rights within Atlassian Confluence to  
upload Doxygen files (default).  
  
The vulnerability allows remote attackers to permanently embed arbitrary  
script code into the context of an Atlassian Confluence page, which  
offers a wide range of possible attacks such as redirecting users to  
arbitrary pages, present phishing content or attacking the browser and  
its components of a user visiting the page.  
  
  
7. SOLUTION  
===========  
Update to AppFusions Doxygen for Atlassian Confluence v1.3.4  
  
  
8. REPORT TIMELINE (DD/MM/YYYY)  
===============================  
23/08/2016: Discovery of the vulnerability  
23/08/2016: Sent preliminary advisory incl. PoC to known mail address  
30/08/2016: No response, sent out another notification  
30/08/2016: Vendor response, team is working on it  
20/10/2016: Vendor releases v1.3.4 which fixes this vulnerability  
20/11/2016: Advisory released  
  
  
9. REFERENCES  
=============  
-  
  
  
`