SumatraPDF DLL Hijack

`Hi @ll,  
  
the executable installers [°] of all versions of SumatraPDF (see  
<http://www.sumatrapdfreader.org/free-pdf-reader-de.html>) are  
vulnerable:  
  
1. On Windows Embedded POSReady 2009 (alias Windows XP SP3) the  
installer of the current version 3.1.1 loads and executes a  
rogue/bogus/malicious DCIMan32.dll ['] eventually found in the  
directory it is started from (the "application directory").  
  
2. The installers of older versions of SumatraPDF load and execute  
a rogue/bogus/malicious UXTheme.dll ['] (and depending on the  
Windows version others like DCIMan32.dll too) eventually found in  
the directory they are started from (the "application directory").  
  
For software downloaded with a web browser this is typically the  
"Downloads" directory: see  
<https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2008/09/carpet-bombing-and-directory-poisoning.html>,  
<http://blog.acrossecurity.com/2012/02/downloads-folder-binary-planting.html>  
and <http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2012/Aug/134>  
  
If DCIMan32.dll, UXTheme.dll etc. get(s) planted in the users  
"Downloads" directory per "drive-by download" this vulnerability  
becomes a remote code execution.  
  
Due to an application manifest embedded in the executable which  
specifies "requireAdministrator" or the "installer detection" (see  
<https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd835540.aspx#BKMK_InstDet>)  
of Windows' "user account control" executable installers are  
typically started with administrative privileges ("protected"  
administrators are prompted for consent, unprivileged standard  
users are prompted for an administrator password); execution of  
DCIMan32.dll then results in an escalation of privilege!  
  
  
Proof of concept/demonstration:  
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  
  
1. visit <http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/sentinel.html>, download  
<http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/download/SENTINEL.DLL> and save  
it as DCIMan32.dll in your "Downloads" directory;  
  
2. download  
<https://kjkpub.s3.amazonaws.com/sumatrapdf/rel/SumatraPDF-3.1.1-install.exe>  
(via <http://www.sumatrapdfreader.org/free-pdf-reader-de.html>)  
or <http://software.zeniko.ch/sumatrapdf/SumatraPDF-install.exe>  
and save it in your "Downloads" directory;  
  
3. execute SumatraPDF-3.1.1-install.exe from your "Downloads"  
directory;  
  
4. notice the message box displayed from DCIMan32.dll placed in  
step 1;  
  
5. in your "Downloads" directory copy DCIMan32.dll as UXTheme.dll;  
  
6. download  
<http://kjkpub.s3.amazonaws.com/sumatrapdf/rel/SumatraPDF-3.0-install.exe>  
(via <http://www.sumatrapdfreader.org/download-prev-de.html>)  
and save it in your "Downloads" directory;  
  
7. execute SumatraPDF-3.0-install.exe from your "Downloads" directory;  
  
8. notice the message box displayed from DCIMan32.dll and UXTheme.dll  
placed in steps 1 and 5.  
  
  
Mitigation(s):  
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  
  
0. DON'T USE EXECUTABLE INSTALLERS [°]!  
  
If your favourite applications are not distributed in the native  
installer package format of the resp. target platform: ask^WURGE  
their vendors/developers to provide native installation packages.  
If they don't: dump these applications, stay away from such cruft!  
  
1. Turn off UAC's privilege elevation for standard users and installer  
detection for all users:  
  
[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System]  
"ConsentPromptBehaviorUser"=dword:00000000 ; Automatically deny elevation requests  
"EnableInstallerDetection"=dword:00000000  
  
See <https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd835564.aspx#BKMK_RegistryKeys>  
  
2. NEVER execute files in UNSAFE directories (like "Downloads" and  
and "%TEMP%")!  
  
3. Deny execution (at least) in the "Downloads" directories and all  
"%TEMP%" directories and their subdirectories:  
  
* Add the NTFS ACE "(D;OIIO;WP;;;WD)" meaning "deny execution of  
files in this directory for everyone, inheritable to all files  
in all subdirectories" (use CACLS.EXE /S:<SDDL> for example);  
  
* Use "software restriction policies" resp. AppLocker.  
  
Consider to apply either/both to every "%USERPROFILE%" as well as  
"%ALLUSERSPROFILE%" alias %ProgramData%" and "%PUBLIC%": Windows  
doesn't place executables in these directories and beyond.  
  
See <http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/safer.html> as well as  
<http://mechbgon.com/srp/> plus  
<http://csrc.nist.gov/itsec/SP800-68r1.pdf>,  
<https://www.nsa.gov/ia/_files/os/win2k/application_whitelisting_using_srp.pdf>  
or <https://books.google.de/books?isbn=1437914926> and finally  
<http://www.asd.gov.au/infosec/top35mitigationstrategies.htm>!  
  
  
stay tuned  
Stefan Kanthak  
  
  
PS: see <http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Nov/101> (resp. the  
not yet finished <http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/!execute.html>)  
for more details!  
  
PPS: the case numbers are not in chronological order.  
  
  
[°] Self-extracting archives and executable installers are flawed^W  
b(rainde)ad in concept and dangerous in practice.  
  
DON'T USE SUCH CRUFT!  
ALWAYS use the resp. target platforms native package and archive  
format.  
  
For Windows these are .INF (plus .CAB) and .MSI (plus .CAB),  
introduced 20 years ago (with Windows 95 and Windows NT4) resp.  
16 years ago (with Office 2000).  
  
Both .INF and .MSI are "opened" by programs residing in  
%SystemRoot%\System32\ which are therefore immune to this kind  
of "DLL and EXE Search Order Hijacking" attack.  
Since both .INF and .MSI access the contents of .CAB directly  
they eliminate the attack vector "unsafe temporary directory"  
too.  
  
['] A well-known (trivial, easy to exploit and easy to avoid) and  
well-documented vulnerability: see  
<https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html>,  
<https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/2269637.aspx>,  
<https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff919712.aspx> and  
<https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682586.aspx>  
  
  
Timeline:  
~~~~~~~~~  
  
2015-11-18 vulnerability report sent to authors  
  
NO ANSWER, not even an acknowledgement of receipt  
  
2015-11-29 vulnerability report resent to authors  
  
2015-11-29 response from author:  
"we don't load dciman32.dll in our code.  
[...]  
Either way, there's no bug in Sumatra"  
  
2015-11-29 on Windows XP DCIMan32.dll is loaded due to the use  
of GDI32.dll. This is unique behaviour, not seen in  
any other executable installer I know.  
  
NO ANSWER, not even an acknowledgement of receipt  
  
2015-12-07 report published  
`